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2Dear readers!
The next, 24th issue of the analytical bulletin "IISEPS News" offers to your attention materials reflecting the
most interesting results of the institute’s work in the second quarter of 2002.
Within the framework of IISEPS’s new project "Strengthening Role of Independent Social Research and Ex-
pert' Networks in Belarus" launched earlier this year, a national public opinion poll was conducted, which
brought about sensational results: for the first time during A. Lukashenko’s rule his rating (which leveled at
45% just six months ago) dropped to 30%. The "collapse" (using one of the president’s favorite words) is ex-
plained first of all by social-economic reasons: non-fulfillment of election promises, backpay of wages and pen-
sions, narrowing of life prospects for millions of Belarusians. At the same time, as the survey showed, a whole
stratum of rather well-off ("rich" according to Belarusian standards) people appeared, who got used to the ex-
isting conditions and support the present course.
Many significant events took place on the foreign policy front. The opposition of Belarus and the West be-
came even more strained (after the forced departure of its leading members, OSCE AMG’s activity is in fact
frozen). The "sluggish integration" with Russia after V. Putin’s sensational statement, which he made soon af-
ter his meeting with the Belarusian head of state (caused, as many analysts say, by A. Lukashenko’s falling
rating and the scandal around the OSCE) faced the most serious challenge in its history. The above events are
reflected in public opinion as well, which record new fundamental shifts.
As always, we offer our readers interesting information without comment in the light of major social-
demographic groups and trends of the most important indicators of public opinion.
Aside form the survey results, the bulletin contains materials of the scientific-practical seminar "Social Re-
search and Social Development in Belarus", which took place in the framework of the above mentioned project
of IISEPS in Gomel in early June. Although the seminar was of a strictly scientific character (mostly researches
and analysts from Minsk, Warsaw and the Gomel region participated in it), local authorities were very fright-
ened and even forced its participants out from a rented conference-hall. As a result, scientific debates contin-
ued in … a private bar. Probably, while reading the seminar’s materials, you would feel an unusual "atmos-
phere" of Gomel’s hospitality. However, we cannot complain of the absence of attention from Belarus’
authorities: there are reasons to assume that A. Lukashenko’s stormy reaction at the April 29 session of the
Cabinet of Ministers, as well as an unusual reaction by V. Putin at the "integration processes", relates to the
results of activities of independent Belarusian analysts. The apotheosis of such attention from the Belarusian
authorities to think tanks was the Resolution of the Cabinet #707 dated May 31, 2002, taking a total control of
public opinion study, and finally of public opinion itself (See Appendixes).
This time our traditional rubric "Open Forum" is given to a non-traditional author – a representative of the
unrecognized abroad Belarusian parliament. General Valery Frolov, who headed this spring a new group of
deputies "Republic", revealed outstanding abilities to oppose authorities within the authorities and offers an
alternative of his own. How and why "he is living such life", how he sees development of the public-political
process in Belarus – see an interview with V. Dorokhov, a leading researcher of IISEPS.
We hope that the current issue of our bulletin would be interesting and helpful to you and your colleagues.
We are awaiting your comments and requests!
IISEPS Board
3S T R E N G T H E N I N G  R O L E  O F  I N D E P E N D E N T  S O C I A L
R E S E A R C H  A N D  E X P E R T S '  N E T W O R K S  I N  B E L A R U S
In April 2002 in the framework of the project "Strengthening Role of Independent Social Research and Expert' Net-
works in Belarus" IISEPS conducted a nation public opinion poll (those interviewed – 1464 persons aged 18 and over,
margin of error does not exceed 0.03). The questionnaire, as usual, covered a wide range of problems related to the most
pressing and most topical aspects of life in Belarus.
Below you will find commentaries on the most important findings of the poll made by IISEPS experts. "No answer"
and "Find it difficult to answer" alternatives are not available in most points of the questionnaire. In several tables the
total amount may be different for 100% as the interviewees could choose more than one alternative. Certain findings of
the poll were traditionally represented with regard to the basic social-demographic groups and without commentaries. As
before, we traditionally present the major trends of the public opinion’s basic social parameters.
Collapse: for the first time during A. Lukashenko’s ruling his rating has gone down to 30%
There was no avoiding of the anticipated. Just six months after the presidential election there happened a "collapse", as
A. Lukashenko would say. However, it was not the Belarusian ruble or the international isolation of Belarus that fell down
like a collapse, but the president’s political rating. With reference to the IISEPS findings, in April this year only 30.9% of
respondents said they backed A. Lukashenko, although on the very eve of the election around 45% of those interviewed
would vote A. Lukashenko and around 57% actually gave their votes to him on the election day.
Table 1
Dynamics of electorate’s attitude towards A. Lukashenko, %***
Indexes of attitude
towards A. Lukashenko
Mentioned A. Lukashenko
(option À)
Did not mention A. Lukashenko
(option Â)
11‘97 09‘98 06‘99 04‘00 08'01 04‘02 11‘97 09‘98 06 ‘99 04‘00 08'01 04‘02
Would have voted for
A. Lukashenko at a new
election ** 44.3 52.2 46.0 38.4 44.4 30.9 55.7 47.8 54.0 61.6 55.6 69.1
Would have voted for
A.  Lukashenko at an
B.  election of Russia-
Belarus president 35.2 44.7 32.8 22.3 27.8 14.0 64.8 55.3 67.2 77.7 72.2 86.0
Trust the President 45.0 48.0 41.0 39.2 43.8 32.4 22.5* 22.1* 28.8* 32.9* 37.1* 50.1*
Consider A. Lukashenko an
ideal politician 50.4 51.5 45.7 37.0 39.4 26.0 49.6 48.5 54.3 63.0 60.6 74.0
* Do not trust the president.
** Answer to an open question (i.e. the respondents wrote down politician’s name)).
*** All table to be read vertically. Data of IISEPS’s reports is given (in all cases 1.500 respondents aged 18 and up were questioned, margin of error
did not exceed 0.03).
As one can see from Table 1, it was a total collapse, all parameters down. Over the past five years the number of those
who would vote A. Lukashenko at the Belarus-Russia Union presidential election has gone down by 20%, almost a two-
fold reduction of those who considers him an ideal politician, while the number of those who do not trust him outnum-
bered those who still have confidence in him, passing the 50% mark. Today A. Lukashenko’s convinced opponents out-
number his adherents 4.5fold, although five years ago the number of his convinced supporters (i.e. those who chose him
with regard to all the four parameters) was way above the number of his convinced opponents.
It is none the less important to note that since then the "floating number" (i.e. those who would prefer A. Lukashenko
in one group of cases and wouldn’t in the other) has in fact shrunk by more than 10%, in effect ceasing to be the majority.
It is the first time that the convinced opponents of the president are in the majority (See Table 2).
Why was there no avoiding such a collapse? First, because the "grip" (of the deceitful and aggressive propaganda,
tough pressure of the authorities on all non-state forms of life – political opposition, independent media, private business,
non-government organisations) tightened on the society during the election campaign, has loosened slightly over the past
six months. Second, new factors came into play.
The main cause of such a break-neck fall of the president’s political rating is the economic situation and the people’s
well-being going worse: such was the reply of 71% of A. Lukashenko’s opponents; over 60% repeatedly faced the problem
of arrears in salaries and pensions, while 35.5% said there was not way one could bear it any more. Generously thrown
4around on the election’s eve, the promises of "economic liberalisation" and a host of others remained unfulfilled. It would
be quite demonstrative to see the rows of A. Lukashenko’s convinced opponents being replenished by individuals, who
lent him their support just six months ago: today the number of these "fooled investors" has passed the 500.000 mark! For
the time being, the share of the over-50s among A. Lukashenko’s opponents is equal 21.8%, although 5 years ago it was
13.5%, three years ago – 18.4%. The trend is observed among residents of small towns and villages, too – 47.9%, 45.3%,
and 34.2% respectively. The tendency is obvious: the president’s most reliable electoral resource is running out steadily.
Table 2
Dynamics of electoral types regarding A. Lukashenko, %
Electoral types 11‘97 09‘98 06‘99 04‘00 08'01 04’02
Convinced supporters of A. Lukashenko
(chose option A while answering all four
questions) 26.0 29.3 21.8 15.5 21.8 10.4
Vacillatory majority 53.2 53.3 52.1 54.2 46.1 42.7
Convinced opponents of A. Lukashenko
(chose option B while answering all four
questions) 20.8 17.4 26.1 30.3 32.1 46.9
Another reason behind this is the loss of future prospects. Around 60% of the president’s opponents believe it takes
moving to a foreign country for young people to make a successful career. Just as many would wish to leave for a foreign
country themselves and settle down. You just think of that: at the beginning of the 21st century over three million Belaru-
sians are so dissatisfied with life in their home country that that would eagerly swap it for a foreign one! An overwhelm-
ing majority of the president’s opponents believe that "life standards in Belarus are worse that in the western countries"
and put the blame for that on "the poor state management". Such platitudinarian explanations as "we are constantly being
interfered with by the domestic and foreign enemies" or "we do not have raw material resources" are not longer popular
even with the convinced supporters of the president.
What is the forecast then? Relying on the findings of our recent public opinion poll, one may suppose that the presi-
dent is in for serious trouble unless he changes something about his political guidelines. The traditional mechanisms to
influence the authorities by means of elections are now frequently put to reasonable doubt by a great deal of
A. Lukashenko’s opponents. The government’s tough grip on the electoral process not only invites negative comments
from the world community (the condemnation which one could ignore but up to a point), but also causes people to lose
faith in the freedom of will by means of elections. A third of A. Lukashenko’s convinced opponents either did not take
part in the latest presidential election at all, or voted against all candidates. More than one third are determined to not go
to the polls at the local elections next year, "for no matter whom you back, it is candidates supported by the authorities
who will become deputies" (basic motive). If the absolute majority of pro-presidential adherents are determined to vote for
candidates supporting A. Lukashenko in the belied that most voters will do the same, however, the convinced opponents
would vote for candidates opposed to A. Lukashenko, although the number of those who believes that the majority of vot-
ers will do the same – is twice as little. The "spiral of silence", of which we have said more than once, keeps strangling
those who feel dissatisfied with the present policies of the government and the situation in the country in general: being in
the apparent majority, they keep thinking they are in the minority.
The president’s public relations policy makers probably consider this as their victory. However, it may turn out to be a
Pyrrhic victory against the background of the collapse fall of the presidential rating: deprived of the legal mechanisms to
influence the government by means of elections, millions of disillusioned Belarusians may finally take to the streets. To-
day only 21.1% of those polled would agree that "things are getting right" in Belarus, while 55.5% reckon "things go
wrong". Six months ago, a fortnight after the presidential election, the replies were different: 36.7% and 38.1% respec-
tively. Let’s take a risk to suppose that the pending social explosion will look much different from peaceful street marches
staged by the opposition. Chances are that the opposition will have nothing to do with that. Then the president would
have a fairly limited choice: either to switch off from the political process not only "the displeased ones", but practically
the whole society (by means of total control over any sort of elections and referendums, banning the freedom of speech
and gatherings); or to change one’s policies and hold real reforms. All our neighbours have chosen the second alternative
(take a note that Putin’s Russia tends to appeal to Belarusians more and more: it comes third on the list of countries after
Germany and the United States where our compatriots would wish to go and settle down. Asked about their ideal politi-
cian, 68.1% point to Putin, while A. Lukashenko gained only 26%), which is why the first alternative is fraught with
complete isolation for Belarus even in this particular region. So far the president still has time to make his choice, how-
ever, judging by how fast his rating is falling, it is running out.
5Local elections – disillusioned interest
As you know, elections to the local councils will be held in Belarus in spring next year. So far not much is being said
about these elections in order to attract social attention to them. Moreover, only half a year has passed since the presiden-
tial election, the significance and influence of which on the life on an average citizen is immeasurably higher. Neverthe-
less, as early as now almost 70% of those polled say they are ready to go the polls (See Table 3). Bearing in mind the fact
that the electorate’s intentions may change any minute, it would be unfair to say that no one has interest in the elections.
Table 3
Distribution of answers to the question: "It is known that the election to local Council is to take place in spring of
2003. Are you going to take part in voting?", %
Variants of answer All
respondents
Supporters of
À. Lukashenko
Opponents of
À. Lukashenko
Vacillatory
Would definitely vote 32.6 52.0 25.2 36.0
Most likely would vote 35.7 33.6 33.3 38.7
Most likely would not vote 15.1 5.9 21.1 10.7
Definitely would not vote 10.9 3.3 15.4 7.7
Let us remind us that one of the eve of the latest local elections in the spring of 1999, Belarusians appeared to more
reluctant – 45% of respondents said at that time that they would go to the polls.
Matching these reports with the election turnout (60.2% came to the ballot boxes) and extrapolating them onto the
forthcoming elections, we may suppose that next year will see a fairly high election turnout.
It is worth mentioning that A. Lukashenko’s electorate again demonstrates a much higher political readiness in com-
parison with the democracy-oriented voters – twice as more A. Lukashenko’s supporters said they would go to the polls.
What is the reason why some part of the electorate would not wish to take part in local elections? First comes the dis-
belief in the chance that the vote will bring victory to the really strongest candidate – around 15% of those polled (24.1%
of A. Lukashenko’s opponents) believe that the authorities’ proteges will become deputies all the same. By adding to them
the ones who do not believe in the free and fair character of the elections, we will see that almost half of those polled and
more than one third of A. Lukashenko’s opponents are ready to ignore the elections today, because they doubt whether it
is going to be real elections, when the outcome actually depend on the will of the electorate alone.
Without speculating about how grounded such fears and doubts are, and what Belarusian democrats and the world
community should do to dispel those fears, it is worth mentioning that an a-priori-sceptical attitude to the elections as a
universal power replacement mechanism is a serious warning for all who wants changes in Belarus.
Without analyzing into who is to blame for the fact that the institution of election – this icon of democracy – is much
discredited in Belarus, it is necessary to accentuate the point that this state of matter is not normal and needs changing.
This applies to those local elections in the first place. If people do not bother to elect their nearest representatives, whose
activities indeed influence their everyday life, it is hard to expect the same lot of people to be more responsible about elec-
tions of a higher level, when the link between your decision and its consequences is much less evident. We must admit
that the situation here is far from being excellent – more than three thirds of interviewees find it hard to tell the name of
the local council deputy, who presents their constituency. Of course, one may object saying that local councils have little
power, so not much depends of the deputies. However, one will have to make a beginning all the same and it would be
logical to start from the local level, where the link between the choice of each particular citizen and its immediate result
in much more evident and clear.
Now a few ideas on the choice to be made by those as early as now decided to go to the polls, and what they think
about the choice of the majority.
Here we again observe Noel-Noiman’s spiral of silence phenomenon – just as many people are expected to vote both
for pro-A. Lukashenko candidates and candidates opposed to the president. However, 3 times as many interviewees said
the majority would vote for the first group of candidates in comparison with the second group (See Tables 4–5). Without
taking into account the "floating voters" and adherents of the president, even one third of his opponents thinks the same.
Table 4
Distribution of answers to the question: "Which candidate would you prefer to vote for?", %
Variants of answer All
respondents
Supporters of
A. Lukashenko
Opponents of
À. Lukashenko
Vacillatory
For a candidate – supporter of À. Lukashenko 29.2 92.1 2.3 43.4
For a candidate – opponent of À. Lukashenko 28.3 - 49.6 11.8
For another candidate 15.2 0.7 19.7 13.9
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Distribution of answers to the question: "For whom, do you think, the majority of Belarusian voters would
vote?", %
Variants of answer All
respondents
Supporters of
À. Lukashenko
Opponents of
À. Lukashenko
Vacillatory
For a candidate – supporter À. Lukashenko 49.5 86.8 32.8 58.7
For a candidate – opponent À. Lukashenko 16.5 0.7 27.7 8.0
For another candidate 6.6 0.7 8.7 5.8
It has been repeatedly observed that a considerable part of the electorate, which took part in the election, does not have
sufficient information about the candidates or their election manifestos, so what they actually do is "a blind vote". On the
one hand – it is a peculiar way to manifest one’s indifference to the election process. But on the other, while making their
choice, those voters have to rely on some other criteria than the personal qualities of the candidates and their manifestos.
It is at this point that the attitude of this or that candidate to A. Lukashenko becomes perhaps the most important indica-
tor, some sort of an identifying feature for the voters to classify candidates into "friends" and "enemies".
For the time being, the electorate’s preferences as regards this criterion have slit even. Around 30% of respondents
said they would vote for a pro-A. Lukashenko candidate and just as many were ready to support an anti-presidential can-
didate (See Table 4). Besides, another 15% of those polled are in the mood to lend support to a different candidate, i.e.
those opposed to the president have a certain advantage. Now one can observe the good old "here we go again" picture –
A. Lukashenko’s supporters still stand solid around their idol, while the opponents are not so homogenous about the posi-
tive choice, although they are unanimous in their aversion to those who is linked with the present-day leader of the coun-
try.
One should also pay attention to the fact that each 30% of both the "floating electorate" and those opposed to the
president are uncertain about their choice they will make, which goes to prove that there is potential for democratic sup-
port to increase.
The idea is that it is not in the interests of democratic candidates to build their campaign on sweeping criticism of the
state system (for this would affect the candidates’ image) and its major ideologist. One should try, as a manner of saying,
to displace the accents in the pre-election situation, which many would wish to reduce to arguments around the personal-
ity and policies of A. Lukashenko. The black-and-white perception of life in the country will play into the hands of the
authorities. The arguments about democracy and dictatorship, liberalism and nationalism are absolutely inefficient here. It
is in the interests of democratic forces, in particular in the local elections, to campaign by means of ideology-free specific
programs aimed at improving people’s life standards, whose efficiency or inefficiency would be intelligible to any voter.
Speculations about a comparatively higher value of this or that ideology will hardly be a productive tool in winning the
liking of the electorate. A candidate’s membership with a political party will also be of no particular help (See Table 6).
Table 6
Distribution of answers to the question: "If you are going to vote for a candidate of a certain party, which party
in particular?"
Variants of answer %
Liberal Democratic Party (S. Gaidukevich) 5.5
Women’s Party "Nadzeya" (V. Polevikova) 4.3
Belarusian Social Democratic Gramada (S. Shushkevich) 3.8
United Civic Party (À. Lebedko) 3.8
Belarusian Party of Communists (S. Kalyakin) 2.7
Belarusian Social-Democratic Party Narodnaya Gramada
(N. Statkevich) 2.6
Belarusian Popular Front Adradzhennye (V. Vecherko) 2.0
Conservative-Christian Party of BPF (Z. Poznyak) 1.9
Communist Party of Belarus (V. Zakharchenko) 1.7
Labor Party (À. Bukhvostov) 1.4
Other 6.2
The above holds true not only for some particular opposition political party, but for a bloc of parties, too. Yes, it is true
that a greater number of those polled (36.5%) support the idea of establishing a bloc of democratic parties rather than any
single party. However, even without mentioning that the bloc has just as many adherents as opponents, we will make an
observation that it is far from being a panacea or a magic wand but an organised unity of democratic forces – a most im-
portant pre-requirement for success at any elections, especially in contemporary Belarus. However, this bloc should by no
means carry ideological principles on its colours instead of being closely ties to regional programme. It takes different
7moves to achieve success on the local level – do something to touch people’s hearts, arrange for running water supply or a
new trolley-bus route or pave the sidewalks.
When it comes to evaluate the job done by electoral commissions, respondents are being fairly critical – around half of
them believe the commissions are subjected to the authorities, a third believes that the commissions are guided by the law
alone (See Table 7). Just like in all matters of this kind reactions of the adherents and opponents of the president are mir-
ror-like. By way of comparison – evaluating voter turnout reports by the Central Electoral Commission at the previous lo-
cal elections, just a quarter of respondents had faith in those data, while the majority of those interviewed (60%) had
nothing to say on this matter, i.e. the level of confidence was fairly low.
Table 7
Distribution of answers to the question: "Which of the below listed statements do you agree with?", %
Variants of answer All
respondents
Supporters of
À. Lukashenko
Opponents of
À. Lukashenko
Vacillatory
Election commissions are bodies guided first of
all by instructions of authorities 47.3 15.8 69.0 31.0
Election commissions – are unbiased bodies
guided only by law 33.3 63.8 18.2 42.4
Table 8
Distribution of answers to the question: "Do you think all candidates for deputies of local
Councils would enjoy equal conditions during the future election?", %
Variants of answer All
respondents
Supporters of
À. Lukashenko
Opponents of
À. Lukashenko
Vacillatory
No 57.4 15.1 80.2 42.6
Yes 24.4 64.5 7.4 33.3
DA/NA 18.2 20.4 12.1 24.1
Apparently, remembering the two recent election campaigns (presidential and parliamentary), the electorate does not
have illusions about the terms of the next local elections. Just a quarter of those polled said all runners for local councils
will have equal opportunities, while 57.4% were of the opposite opinion (See Table 8). And, as a matter of fact, the oppo-
nents and adherents of A. Lukashenko again demonstrated diametrically opposite views.
Who appeals more to the needy and who is the favourite to the rich?
It has become an established public opinion that the convinced supporters of A. Lukashenko are, as a rule, representatives
of the poor social strata. It goes without saying that among his followers there are indeed a lot of people, who make use of
the opportunities provided by the authorities in exchange for being loyal to them (corruption, monopoly, business backing
and so on) and have no material problems. However, empirical observations prove that the core of A. Lukashenko’s elec-
torate are fairly poor.
As one can see from the poll findings, this point of view is grounded enough. In particular, A. Lukashenko’s con-
vinced supporters1 earned on average $44.7 per capita in March this year, which is slightly above the official poverty line
(March’s minimum living wage totaled $43.7 at the market exchange rate).
In Table 9 one can see respondents with different per capita incomes answer questions, which characterize their atti-
tude to A. Lukashenko. As one can see, 50.3% of the poor voted A. Lukashenko at the previous presidential elections,
while just 26.2% of the rich (per capita monthly income exceeds $100) made the same choice. It was V. Goncharik who
enjoyed the most popular support among the rich (34.4%). Confidence in the president, too, depends much of the level of
incomes of the electorate. And, although A. Lukashenko does not enjoy large-scale support even among the poor, every
sixth one of the rich (16.4%) said he had faith in him, while three quarters of the well-to-do respondents (73.8%) demon-
strated distrust.
Today slightly more that one third of the needy (36.3%) are ready to vote A. Lukashenko at the next presidential elec-
tions, while only every seventh "rich man" (14.8%) said he would do the same.
It is quite interesting to observe that the overwhelming majority of the poor (69.2%) choose Putin as their ideal politi-
cian, while A. Lukashenko lags far behind with 30.6%. Therefore, it would not come as a surprise that if they now held
union presidential elections, Putin could beat his Belarusian counterpart even among the poor. As far as the rich are con-
                                               
1
 Convinced supporters of A. Lukashenko are those are ready simultaneously to vote for him at the Belarusian presidential election and the
«union» presidential election, who trust him and see in him an ideal politician. Convinced opponents are those who think in the contrary on all the
given issues.
8cerned, their preferences are basically the same, however their attitude to both of them is more cool and reserved.
Table 9
Attitude towards À. Lukashenko depending on the level of incomes per capita, %
Variant of answer Incomes per capita All population
Above $100 Below the living wage
budget
1. For whom did you vote at the 2001 presidential election?
For À. Lukashenko 26.2 50.3 43.8
For V. Goncharik 34.4 15.6 19.4
For S. Gaidukevich 9.8 4.0 5.9
2. Do you trust the president?
Trust 16.4 36.2 32.4
Do no trust 73.8 45.8 50.1
3. If tomorrow there were a new presidential election, for whom would you vote? (open question)
For À. Lukashenko 14.8 36.2 30.9
For Â. Goncharik 16.4 7.5 8.3
4. Who of the modern politicians of the highest rank you like most of all, consider an ideal politician?
À. Lukashenko 14.8 30.6 26.0
V. Putin 52.5 69.2 68.1
5. If the post of Russia-Belarus President is introduced, for whom would you vote?
For À. Lukashenko 9.8 15.9 14.0
For V. Putin 49.2 47.9 50.5
On the whole, the conclusion is that the overall majority of the poor support A. Lukashenko and vote for him. One of
the underlying reasons for their attitude is that many of them failed to adapt themselves to new economic conditions and
continue to hope for the help of the state. We must admit that A. Lukashenko understands the circumstances and tries to
exploit them in full. He shamelessly equates himself with the state, demonstrates "paternalistic" attitude towards the poor
and identifies all welfare policy of the state with his name. However, this can deprive him of the aura of the defender if he
makes a mistake or gives promises that are impossible to fulfil, the way it happened last spring.
And what about the "rich"? Table 9 shows that their overall attitude towards A. Lukashenko is more negative than that
of the poor. However, the attitude can change. Table 10 demonstrates that as times goes, part of the rich provide more
support to A. Lukashenko.
Table 10
Dynamics of attitude of the "rich" towards À. Lukashenko, %
Index of attitude 04'01 04'02
Closed rating 15.6 26.2*
Open rating 12.4 14.8
Consider an ideal politician 12.4 14.8
Would elect the present of the Russia-Belarus Union State 0 9.8
* The answer to the question about the factual voting at the 2001 election.
As it has been said above, some people became "rich" by adjusting to the realities of the regime. They do not want to
change the circumstances they are used to, study the qualities and wishes of new authorities and search for the ways to
"please" them. There are not many of them, less than 1%, but they exist and their number is slowly growing, in spite of
severe public repression of some former associates and supporters. It seems they hope that the president’s anger will pass
them by. The fate of most of the people who assisted him on the way to power demonstrates the opposite.
Lack of objective information undermines trust in mass media
Foreseeable enough, the easily accessible television remains the main source of public, political, social and economic in-
formation to most of Belarusians (81.3%). Printed mass media ranks second (62.5%) and is 1.5 times more popular than
radio (42.7%). However, person-to-person contacts are not among important sources of information in the era of contem-
porary mass communications (4.5%) and the Internet has not become easy-to-access so far (2.0%). Belarusians trust the
television (28.6%), the press (13.8%) and the radio (8.1%) most.
As far as TV channels are concerned, except for the noticeable slide in the popularity of the Belarusian BT channel
(by 10%), the tendencies are steady, i.e. the rating of the ORT is on the rise, that of the NTV is declining (it has been ever
9since the old NTV team left), and that of the RTR remains practically unchanged (See Table 11). Apart from the political
calm noted above, changes in the face, although not in the top leadership of the BT channel, that official agitation and
propaganda department, might also be a reason why fewer people have been watching it recently in the capital and the
major cities of Belarus. Some of the programs broadcast on the eve of the presidential election were odious but attracted
much attention; after the election, they were replaced with gray and dull programs that do not cause even a slightest curi-
osity.
Table 11
Distribution of answers to the question: "Which TV channels do you watch?", %
(more than one answer is possible)
Variants of answer 06'97* 08'00 08'01 04'02
ORT 90.7 89.8 93.1 95.1
RTR 58.1 77.1 80.7 77.0
Belarusian Television 66.4 71.9 77.1 67.7
NTV 27.7 56.1 54.9 50.5
Local television (regional, city) -** 37.2 39.0 32.4
TV-6 4.8 - - 12.3
Cable television - - - 9.3
Satellite television 1.3 10.0 9.7 5.3
Other - 7.6 7.4 4.9
*In the given opinion poll this question was put like follows - "Programs of which TV channels do you regularly watch?"
**No data
Table 12
Distribution of answers to the question: "Which radio stations do you listen to?", %
(more than one answer is possible)
Variants of answer 06'97* 07'00 08'01 04'02
Belarusian radio 55.0 53.8 49.0 43.3
Local radio -** 34.2 37.9 32.4
FM-stations - 33.1 35.6 42.3
Russian radio stations - 30.2 31.0 22.5
Belarusian service of Radio Liberty 2.4 7.1 11.3 8.9
Other western radio stations - 4.6 3.6 1.4
Russian service of Radio Liberty - 4.2 6.9 4.4
Other radio stations - 3.3 4.2 2.7
* In the given opinion poll this question was put like follows – "Which radio stations do you regularly listen to?"
**No data
Unlike the BT’s one, the popularity of the Belarusian radio has long been declining and, judging by appearances, will
continue to (See Table 12). FM radio stations are winning the audience over from both the Belarusian and the Russian ra-
dio stations, for they are becoming more and more numerous and are creating better and better programs yearly. Mini-
mum of politics and maximum of useful information, entertainment and music, as well as modern approaches are the keys
to the success of FM radio stations.
In the Belarusian printed mass media market, non-state editions have long competed with the state ones successfully.
Yet, as compared to the previous survey held straight after the presidential election, the public has lost its interest towards
independent mass media, the Komsomolskaya Pravda in Belarus being the only exception to the rule (See Table 13 dis-
playing an enviably steady growth in its rating). That is quite normal; people usually read more during mass political
campaigns and so they did last autumn, the circulation of practically all non-state newspapers surging in October as a re-
sult; however, as soon as the presidential election campaign was over, the political Olympus stopped causing that much
interest and the demand for information went down.
Bearing in mind the difference between state and non-state mass media as far as the financial support, the contents
and the working conditions are concerned, one is welcome to see the dynamics of trust towards both on the part of Belaru-
sian nationals (See Table 14). The "credibility gap" (let us call it so) is evident. Twice as many people have come to dis-
trust state mass media and almost twice as many people have lost their confidence in independent mass media over the
past five years. At that, the level of confidence in state editions has remained almost unchanged all through the period,
which means that the official press has gained no new supporters.
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Table 13
Distribution of answers to the question: "Which newspapers do you read?", %
(more than one answer is possible)
Variants of answer 06'97* 07'00 10'01 04'02
Local newspaper (Vecherny Minsk, Brest Courier, etc.) 43.1 42.3 -** 48.8
Komsomolskaya Pravda in Belarus 4.1 21.0 35.6 39.4
Sovetskaya Belorussia 23.2 29.4 37.7 34.8
Argumenty i Facty in Belarus 22.0 25.6 40.5 31.5
Belorusskaya Delovaya Gazeta 2.5 7.4 12.1 11.7
Narodnaya Volya 5.5 9.8 12.8 10.5
Svobodnye Novosti 4.9 6.1 10.4 7.1
Izvetia in Belarus -** 6.4 10.7 6.2
Belorusskaya Gazeta 2.5 4.4 8.4 5.3
Belorussky Rynok" 2.2 4.7 6.6 4.4
Nasha Svoboda - 2.6 5.5 3.3
Belarusky Chas - - 5.2 2.6
Den - - 3.0 1.8
Rabochy 2.0 2.4 2.4 1.6
Belaruskaya Molodezhnaya - - - 0.9
Belarus Today - - - 0.5
Other 21.9 16.6 21.9 17.8
* In the given opinion poll this question was put like follows – "Which newspapers do you regularly read?"
**The given newspapers were not mentioned in these polls
As far as independent mass media are concerned, their readers and viewers are beginning to get more numerous after
their confidence towards them was on the decline. On the whole, one can assert at a stretch that attitudes of Belarusians to
the two different segments of the Belarusian press are practically the same.
Table 14
Dynamics of trust towards mass media, %
Variant of answer 11'97 09'98 06'99 04'00 10'01 04'02
State-run mass media
– trust
– do not trust
43.7
21.0
41.8
26.0
39.8
31.0
38.5
31.6
40.4
42.4
38.7
43.1
Non-state mass media
– trust
– do not trust
25.4
24.1
19.6
32.6
19.5
34.9
25.7
31.9
31.7
42.1
32.2
43.9
Why has this happened? Why, so to speak, such a disappointment in the press? As far as state mass media are con-
cerned, the situation is more or less clear. Being part of the agitation and propaganda machine, they keep telling the news
about the country as the authorities demand and not as the things are. No more than 11.5% of respondents believe the of-
ficial information completely in line with the real state of affaires; 66.7% of those questioned say, the official information
is only partially true and 16.1% say, it is totally untrue.
The economy is decaying, President’s rating is falling, the number of his convinced opponents is growing, yet no in-
crease in the trust towards independent mass media is visible. Why? Has it not been the Prometheus of an alternative
viewpoint recently? It is a well-known fact that the positions of convinced opponents and supporters of A. Lukashenko are
diametrically opposite with regard to crucial issues. So are their attitudes towards the press but for a small and extremely
important exception.
As many as 82.2% of A. Lukashenko’s supporters trust state mass media and as many as 11.2% trust non-state mass
media (6.6% and 70.4% respectively do not). As many as 11.3% of A. Lukashenko’s opponents trust state mass media
and as many as 42.9% trust non-state mass media, while 72.8% and 40% (!) respectively do not. The latter indicator not
only destroys the "mirror-like" picture of supporters and opponents’ positions, but also points at the fact that, strangely
enough, the democratic-minded voters distrust the democratic-minded press.
It will not be out of place to remark here that among independent newspapers, it is those that deliberately cover no or
little politics (like The Argumenty i Facty in Belarus, The Komsomolskaya Pravda in Belarus) that are popular. This does
not mean that the opposition newspapers should avoid covering politics – in that case they will lose their traditional read-
ers – yet, in selecting political information for the issue, they should remember the well-known but never outdated criteria
such as objectiveness, timeliness and comprehensiveness. Namely, the viewpoints of all the parties involved ought to be
covered, which unfortunately the Belarusian independent press may seldom be proud of. That is exactly what today’s
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readers want: not just political or economic information, which is not insufficient at present, but objective and truthful
information. One fourth of those questioned said so. He who is fastest to meet that demand shall reap laurels.
Searching for the lost alternative
It is hardly a secret that the situation in Belarus is tottering, President’s rating falling down to as low as 30%, the social-
economic crisis deepening, the resentment against the present policies surging. Who can be a source of changes, who can
Belarusians lay hopes on? That question is asked in the East and in the West and in Belarus itself more and more often.
Theoretically, A. Lukashenko himself might trigger changes. In that case, he would have to stop blaming the "remiss offi-
cials", the opposition or the "outer enemies" and change his own outlook radically instead. However, there is little hope of
such possibility; A. Lukashenko himself is stating regularly that he does not intend to change the present course.
The majority of those alarmed at the "Belarusian issue" are looking for an alternative leader but the area of search is
very narrow restricted to the opposition leaders and the surroundings of A. Lukashenko. We think this useless and fruit-
less. It is clear that an alternative political leader cannot possibly spring up from nowhere. It is only on some social or
professional background that a real alternative leader with a real alternative team and program has to stand. In 1994,
during Belarus’ first presidential election, each of the contenders (V. Kebich, S. Shushkevich, Z. Pozniak,
A. Lukashenko, V. Novikov and N. Dubko) was a truly alternative runner for presidency exactly because each of them had
particular structures and the interests of a particular social layer behind their backs. However, those alternatives are no
longer available. Are there any others or any chances of finding others? In the social survey the question sounds as fol-
lows: which social groups enjoy the most authority today? Let us see Table 15 for the results of IISEPS’s latest national
survey.
Table 15
Attitude of the population towards leading social-professional groups of Belarusian society, %
Social-
professional
groups
Presidential
vertical
Deputies of the
National
Assembly
Law
enforcers
Chiefs
of state-run
enterprises,
collective
farms
Busi-
nessmen
Opposition
politicians
Journa-
lists
Military
How do you assess material status of the following population groups of Belarus?
Bad 1.1 0.8 2.3 8.4 4.5 11.1 13.6 26.6
Average 10.8 17.8 33.9 31.6 39.1 35.2 58.1 49.7
Good 87.0 80.0 62.9 59.2 55.5 51.9 27.3 22.7
Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Does life of the following groups correspond to their merits before the society?
Live worse,
than deserve 2.1 2.1 6.8 12.0 12.2 10.5 22.5 45.8
Live the life
that they de-
serve
25.3 31.1 44.0 40.0 58.4 45.4 63.3 43.0
Live better,
than deserve 71.0 65.5 48.6 47.3 28.9 42.5 13.3 10.0
Rank 1 2 3 4 6 5 7 8
Do the following groups enjoy respect in society?
They are not re-
spects 15.7 35.9 42.9 20.4 20.2 44.7 17.6 15.7
Enjoy some
respect 62.2 53.6 45.8 64.7 70.0 48.4 67.3 62.2
They are highly
respected 21.1 9.3 10.3 14.2 9.2 5.6 14.1 21.1
Rank 5 6 7 4 3 8 2 1
How do the following groups influence Belarusians’ life?
No influence 19.5 30.3 18.5 22.0 26.9 43.9 19.2 37.2
Average
influence 30.7 43.2 45.6 46.8 50.2 41.5 54.8 44.1
Considerable
influence 48.5 25.3 35.0 30.3 22.2 12.6 24.9 17.7
Rank 1 6 2 3 5 8 4 7
*Read vertically
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The position of the leading social and professional layers of Belarusian society was analyzed in accordance with four
basic criteria, such as: financial well-being, the correspondence of well-being to the social merits, to the moral authority
and to the real power. The results are completely amazing.
The groups that represent the three branches of power – the executive power in the face of the presidential vertical, the
legislative power in the persons of MPs and the juridical power, i.e. lawyers and law enforcers – are believed to be pros-
pering but for no merit and having much real power (except for MPs) but little moral authority.
The groups that do not represent the power – journalists, entrepreneurs and the opposition politicians – are considered
to be low-income groups, which corresponds to or is worse than their merits, and are attached much moral (except for the
opposition) but little real authority. The majority of respondents place military men lowest among social layers and be-
lieve directors the neutral layer in between the top and the bottom. Comparing those results to the 1996 survey, one can
see that the power groups have got better off over the six years (the presidential vertical by 9% and law enforcers by 10%),
yet respondents see even less merit behind that prosperity (by 5% with the presidential vertical and by 8% with the law
enforcers). The moral authority has slid (5% more people say, law enforcers enjoy no respect), budget the real power in
their hands has grown (by 10% with the presidential vertical and by 13% with law enforcers).
Meanwhile the positions of non-power groups (journalists, businessmen) have got worse; businessmen’s affluence is
believed to have decreased by 29% and their real power by 6% (that of journalists by 5%).
No doubt, there are many well-educated, hard-working and upright officials among hundreds of them working for the
Belarusian state machinery. However unfair the above-stated evaluations might seem to them, that is the logic of the poli-
tics which would not have been possible without their active involvement. We refer you to the article Executive Vertical:
President’s Support or Hostage? published in 1996 to the following fragment: "The executive vertical proves to be a hos-
tage rather than the support of president’s policies. Now that the crisis is deepening, president is likely to start acting as
an aeronaut whose balloon is dipping – he will be getting rid of the heaviest ballast, which the executive branch or at
least part of it will most probably turn out to be. Really, isn’t it an effective move: president admits "certain mistakes and
serious lapses" and "gives in" his vertical as the most irritating and the "least trustworthy" structure of the state machin-
ery. Thus he satisfies the expectations of the people and demonstrates to the whole world that he is not only irreconcil-
able with the enemies, but is hard on the "next of kin", too. Nevertheless, that move is only seemingly effective; in reality,
it is of little help as far as the perfection of the state governance and the satisfaction of people’s true interests and ex-
pectations is concerned. Those sacrificed will be replaced with new leaders just as dependent on the one who appointed
them and not on the ones who elect them as their predecessors were". Time has proved that prophecy right; let us remind
you of the recent "purge" done by president at the April 29 sitting of the Cabinet of Ministers. State officials will continue
becoming even more estranged from society and even more dependent on president is the continue pursuing the present
policies. Therefore those who hope that representatives of the authorities ("Their Majesty Nomenclature" as an opposition
politician said once) will whip up changes hope in vain, to our mind. Changes are hardly possible without an alliance
with nomenclature, yet nomenclature may back up the initiatives of other social and professional groups in case if those
initiatives are backed up by society first.
Table 16
Distribution of answers to the question: "If you are going to vote for candidate of a certain party, which party in
particular?", %
Political party 11'97 10'98 11'99 10'00** 04 ‘01*** 04 '02
Belarusian Social-Democratic Gramada
(S. Shushkevich) -* - 6.1 - 2.6 3.8
Belarusian Social-Democratic Party Narodnaya Gramada
(N. Statkevich) 0.6 0.1 1.6 4.2 2.1 2.6
Belarusian Popular Front Adradzhennye
(V. Vecherko) 5.0 3.0 4.4 - 3.8 2.0
Conservative-Christian Party of the BPF
(Z. Poznyak) - - 1.9
Women’s Party Nadzeya (V. Polevikova) - - 8.4 - 5.5 4.3
Liberal Democratic Party
(S. Gaidukevich) - 0.7 1.5 4.0 1.8 5.5
United Civic Party (À. Lebedko) 1.8 1.4 3.0 - 2.3 3.8
Belarusian Party of Communists (S. Kalyakin) 1.2 0.6 2.4 2.6 1.2 2.7
Labor Party (À. Bukhvostov) - - 1.4 3.3 2.5 1.4
*No data
**Answers to the question: "For candidate of which party did you vote at the recent parliamentary election?"
*** Answers to the question: "Which political party do you support?"
Who then? If Belarus were a Latin-American country, military men might be thought of as a source of changes, for
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military men enjoy high and stable respect in Latin-American societies. But Belarus is a Slavic country, its traditions are
totally different and the social position of military men is different. A "Belarusian military junta" is even more improbable
than a "rebellion of the nomenclature": the army will not initiate political changes independently. However, bearing in
mind their low social position, one may count on their latent support, such as non-participation in repression.
The opposition naturally seems to be the one to prompt changes. Unfortunately, today’s opposition enjoys no authority
or influence in Belarusian society. The ratings of the opposition political parties are extremely low (in April, four parties
exceeded the error margin only), and that has been so for the past six years since the opposition was ousted from the state
machinery (See Table 16).
Relentless pressure upon the opposition on the part of the authorities and aggressive propaganda in state mass media
aimed at discrediting the opposition parties and blocking up their contacts with society are definitely one of the crucial
reasons for that. There are also other reasons, on the other hand: the tactics and the strategies of the opposition itself have
not always been correct; until recently, it has been trying to have society conform to its programs rather than bring its
programs in conformity with the needs of society. For instance, having boycotted the 1999–2000 local and parliamentary
elections, the opposition harmed its image a lot, in our opinion. Be that as it may, today’s image of the opposition in pub-
lic opinion leaves no room for society to regard it as a real source of changes.
Public opinion polls show, journalists and businessmen are the most promising groups; they might form an alliance
and directors might support it (see data above). Journalists, however much we respect them, will hardly head the move-
ment for changes, for their job and their functions are different. But they certainly might play an important role in the
formation of the public opinion and drumming up support for such an alliance.
We believe, it is a many-component alternative that might gain the support of society and cause changes. A coalition
of regional civil structures that are of real influence, such as Businessmen’s Union, the Belarusian Helsinki Committee,
the Belarusian Association of Journalists, the Chernobyl Children Foundation, the Belarusian Language Society, part of
the Writers’ Union and of the Belarusian Labor Union Federation (the latter one is likely to split in a democratic and a
pro-governmental organisations soon) should be a most important component. The political opposition represented by the
Coordination Council of Democratic Forces and the Consultative Council of the Opposition Parties should be another im-
portant component. Also, the part of the political establishment that may enlist the support of the unhappy nomenclature
(such as the Republic MP group formed at the Lower Chamber not long ago, for example) should join and be a crucial
component, too. Members of that group have repeatedly displayed their willingness to restore the parliamentary mode of
power and quite specific social and professional groups stand behind each member. Directors might support that alliance,
too, as was noted above. An efficient interaction between each components of the alliance is the key to the success of the
alternative.
Apart from the downslide of president’s rating, there is another factor that creates favourable conditions for the for-
mation of the political alternative. The matter concerns the changes in Russia’s policies, such as deeper reforms, rap-
prochement with the West, which has fundamentally told on the Belarusian public opinion: many opponents of Belarusian
president look at Russia with hope and sympathy. The conditions are such that their Russian party cooperation partners
will evidently be with them (B. Nemtsov’s recent visit to Minsk upon the invitation of the United Civic Party is a good
example), and there are also chances that they will have the support of V. Putin’s administration. In order not to lose
those chances, one should elaborate a strategy that would consider the interests of Russia, which A. Lukashenko has guar-
anteed all the way. The Foundation For A New Belarus set up in Moscow some time ago might become the necessary link
between the new Belarusian alternative and Russia.
"What are the guarantees that the above-mentioned groups will manage to find consensus and cooperate efficiently?",
a skeptic might ask. Frankly speaking, they are none. But the formation of the civil coalition on the eve of the recent
presidential election campaign is a good experience to use in preparing for the local election and a possible referendum. It
is clear that no alternative will appear without persistent and purposeful searches and efforts. The results of the surveys
are a good base for the new alternative not to get lost for another eight years.
Voters and economy
As was expected, the economic situation in the country after the presidential elections again took a visible turn for the
worse. This can be persuasively confirmed by the figures in Table 17. A certain improvement that had been mentioned by
our respondents throughout 2001 was displaced again with more pessimistic views. This shows again that we were right
assuming that the economic improvement was associated with the realization of A. Lukashenko’s electoral strategy, the
core idea of which was forcing enterprises to push up their social expenses by the voting day and to build a mirage of eco-
nomic progress for the electorate. And naturally, the economy turned to its habitual state after the elections, which was
reflected in the results of the opinion poll.
The same can be seen in Table 18 – as one may see, six months after the elections people grew much less optimistic.
As Table 19 shows, today a huge part of Belarusians are worried about wage and pension delays. Earlier, the authori-
ties regarded payments in due time as their merit and scared the population with the pitiful situation in Russia, and now,
83.7% of Belarusians have already faced this problem during the last 12 months, and 55.2% of them repeatedly.
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Table 17
Change of economic situation in Belarus over the last year, %*
Variant of answer 06'96 11'99 04'00 10'00 08'01 10'01 04'02
– has improved 8.3 8.5 7.0 7.5 16.9 17.8 7.7
– has not changed 28.8 23.9 27.9 33.8 40.7 47.4 33.2
– has deteriorated 61.9 67.4 64.8 57.5 35.9 29.2 55.5
Table 18
Dynamics of distribution of answers to the question: "How do you assess your mate-
rial status?", %
Variant of answer 08'01 10'01 04'02
Everything is not so bad, it is possible to live 25.3 22.7 17.2
It is hard to live, but could be endured 54.2 58.7 57.0
Impossible to endure 18.5 17.0 24.0
Table 19
Distribution of answers to the question: "How many times over the last 12
months have you faced backpays?", %
Variant of answer 04'02
Once 28.5
Several times 37.6
Face backpay monthly 17.6
Table 20
Distribution of answers to the question: "Do you think everything
is developing in the right or wrong direction in Belarus?", %
Variant of answer 10'01 04'02
In a wrong direction 38.1 55.5
In the right direction 36.7 21.4
The number of citizens living below the poverty line increased again after the elections – today eight out of ten our
nationals can hardly survive under the "socially oriented market economy" that is being built under the direction of
A. Lukashenko. Maybe that is why 55.5% of voters guess that the country is going in the wrong direction (See Table 20).
Only 38.1% of the interrogated gave this answer right after the voting. Today, however, only every fifth is of another
point of view.
More than one half (55.3%) of voters are convinced that A. Lukashenko hasn’t kept his pre-electoral promises to lib-
eralize the Belarusian economy. Only 16% of adults hold the opposite opinion. Almost two thirds (64.3%) are sure that
our people live worse than they do in the Western countries because of poor state management. According to the majority
of respondents, other reasons of bad living are insignificant.
It can be seen from Table 21 that the number of planned economy adherents is reducing, and more than 40% would
prefer the liberal alternative of market economy. This tendency is systematic and has a long history.
Table 21
Choice of economy type, %
Variant of answer 06'97 11'97 09'98 10'01 04'02
Market economy with
insignificant state control 30.4 32.8 35.2 34.5 40.5
Market economy with
significant state control 35.0 36.2 39.4 21.4 21.3
Planned economy 30.3 25.7 22.8 19.1 18.3
The comparative analysis of Belarusians’ economy preferences shows that the number of those who consider private
property to be more efficient has grown by more than 10% (today they are 54%) during A. Lukashenko’s government, and
of those who prefer to work at private enterprises – by almost 20% (they are 47.5%, while only 41.2% would like to work
at a state enterprise).
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And people wish to run their own private businesses, too. During the last three years the number of entrepreneurs or
entrepreneurs-to-be has increased in 22.2%. Almost identical (22.9%) is the decrease in the number of people who hadn’t
performed such activities and were not going to do so in the future.
Thus, the results of the opinion poll let us certify that the population’s economic views are dynamically changing for
adhering to normal market relations. Consequently, the authorities’ attempts to put obstacles before the normal develop-
ment of market economy result in directly the opposite: the harder private initiatives are suppressed and the more active
the state’s interruption is, the more people prefer normal market relations.
Recently the auctioning of state property has become a topical problem. This is caused by A. Lukashenko’s statements
and the expiring of "Imushchestvo" vouchers that give the right to buy stocks of Belarusian enterprises. As the question-
ing indicates, most voters (37.3%) would rather see the privatization with the help of the vouchers. 15.5% are convinced
that the priority should be given to enterprises’ staff. This means that more than one half of our citizens (52.8%) choose
the most inefficient way of privatization. Meanwhile every seventh of the questioned thinks that we don’t need privatiza-
tion at all. It should be mentioned that almost 45% of the respondents would like to use their share to invest in productive
enterprises, while 32.7% would use it for consuming. 22.7% more still do not know how to use their certificates and thus
they would hand them over to their children. Up to now, our society is not unanimous about foreign investments. Even if
they come from our "Slavonic brothers", from Russia, which is agreed upon by only 43.9% of the respondents. But 35%
do not want it at all. This indicates that our people do not have objective information about privatization and are guided
by ideological stamps the authorities cram them with.
A picture of Belarusian poverty
Statistics shows that the level of individual income over the country during the last three months of 2001 was about $56 a
month (in market exchange rate). As is seen from Table 22, almost 60% of population have income lower than this level.
Moreover, approximately 32% of our nationals earn less than the living wage ($38). Consequently, almost one third of
Belarusians stay below the official poverty line. Let’s study the social-demographic characteristics of this group. We will
compare it to those who have individual monthly income of more than $100, considering them "rich" according to Be-
larusian standards, though such income level is estimated as beggarly Europe.
Table 22
Distribution of the population by the level of monthly
incomes per capita, %
Interval Ministry of statistics
(4th quarter of 2001)
Below the living wage budget (~$38) 31.6
From the living wage budget to the minimum
consumer budget (~$62) 36.6
From the minimum consumer budget to $100 23.2
From $100 and up 8.6
As is seen from Table 23, the majority of the poor are women (55.6%), while almost two thirds of the "rich" are men
(65.6%). The youngest and the oldest age groups representatives prevail among the poor (18–29 years – 24.3%, 60 years
and older – 27.2%). Age distribution of the rich is distinctly skewed towards the young. However, people aged 40–49 pre-
vail in this group (42.6%). On the whole, the average age of the poor is about 45 years, of the rich – 37 years.
As one could expect, people without or with low qualifications prevail among the poor, while three fourths of the rich
(77%) are people with a University or college education. Meanwhile every eighth-ninth among the poor has a higher edu-
cation and every fourth has specialized (two-year college) education. Therefore, not everybody with a good education
managed to obtain a high-income level. One can assume that these are first of all elderly people who could not adapt to
the new life conditions. Furthermore, if we consider the fact that more than 40% of adult Belarusians would like to emi-
grate to another country, an assumption about a certain "peculiarity" of Belarus in terms of life and carrier possibilities
suggests itself.
It is useful to indicate in this connection that state sector employees (45.5%) and retired people (32.2%) prevail among
the poor, while 55% of the rich are employed in the non-state sector. On the whole more than 90% of the poor are people
whose income considerably (and sometimes fully) depends on the state. The share of the rich who rely first of all on the
state in their income does not exceed 45%. Thus, a reasonable conclusion suggests itself: the main cause of poverty in
Belarus is the Belarusian state. The more the state interferes with the economic life of the people, the more paupers the
country has!
Let us consider regional distribution of the population considering the level of per capita income (See Table 24). One
can see, the biggest number of the poor is in Minsk and Gomel regions, while more rich live in the city of Minsk and in
16
Brest region. The city of Minsk and Brest region count the smallest number of the poor, while the rich are the fewest in
Grodno (!) and Mogilev regions. In order to consider the population numbers in every region we calculated the number of
the poor and the rich per 1000 people. Now Grodno and Minsk regions "lead" in the number of the poor while most of the
rich again turn out to live and work in the city of Minsk and in Brest region, leaving other regions far behind. These ter-
ritories also boast the lowest specific poverty level.
Table 23
Social-demographic characteristics of the population depending on the level of incomes, %
Characteristics Incomes per capita The whole population
Below the living
wage budget
Above $100
Gender:
Male 44.4 65.6 48.5
Female 55.6 34.4 51.5
Age:
18-29 24.3 27.9 24.0
30-39 16.3 23.0 18.3
40-49 18.4 42.6 21.0
50-59 13.8 3.3 14.4
60 and up 27.2 3.2 22.3
Education:
Elementary and incomplete secondary 27.1 – 20.2
Secondary 36.4 23.0 35.1
Secondary vocational 24.8 32.8 26.5
Higher, (including incomplete higher) 11.7 44.2 18.2
Social status:
State enterprise employee 45.5 35.1 48.9
Private enterprise employee 3.9 48.3 9.6
Individual entrepreneur 1.4 6.7 3.2
Student 9.1 6.7 7.1
Pensioner 32.2 1.6 25.9
Housewife 2.2 1.6 1.7
Unemployed 5.7 – 3.6
Table 24
Administrative-territorial distribution of the population depending on the level of incomes per capita
Incomes per capita
Below the living wage budget above $100
Place of living
Percentage to
the country’s
population
People per 1.000
of
inhabitants
Percentage to the
country’s popula-
tion
People per 1.000 of
inhabitants
Region:
Minsk 8.3 223 45.9 104
Minsk region 19.2 632 8.2 23
Brest and region 10.4 361 19.7 58
Grodno region 16.3 682 1.6 6
Vitebsk and region 13.3 542 9.8 34
Mogilev and region 11.8 494 6.6 23
Gomel and region 20.7 612 8.2 20
Type of settlement:
Capital 8.3 223 45.9 104
Regional center 13.1 396 21.3 54
City (50,000 inhabitants and more) 10.5 404 19.7 64
Town (less than 50.000 inhabitants) 23.7 548 8.2 16
Village 44.4 705 4.9 7
The data show, poverty is spread mostly in the rural areas and in small towns – more than two thirds of the Belarusian
poor live here (68.1%). The rich, correspondingly, are abundant in the capital and in large cities – almost 87%. Specific
data do not differ greatly.
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Frankly speaking, this information only gives a quantitative proof of well-known facts. However, it lets us outline av-
erage social-demographic portraits of rich and poor Belarusians. Thus, a poor Belarusian is a retired woman or a young
woman working at a collective farm with specialized education who lives in the rural area or in a small town in Grodno or
Minsk region. A rich Belarusian is a man of 40–50 with a higher education employed at the non-state sector who lives in
Minsk or Brest.
Fear of poverty and backpays don’t force Belarusians to barricades yet
Last year’s presidential elections affected a substantial part of the society of the republic in an ill manner. There was a
long pause during which realization of the events as well as creation of a new strategy and giving new answers to old
questions were expected to take place.
However, as the latest events show, after the winter time-out the democrats started repeating what they can do and had
been doing before. We again witnessed another "hot spring" that showed us the dissociation of the opposition, forgotten
during the presidential campaign, and the society’s indifference to its activities. And this is no wonder – why should the
society react to the democratic leaders’ approaches in a different way when they do not change?
Even the authorities themselves confess that the country is experiencing a serious economic crisis that has affected
various strata of the society. Thus, the vast majority of Belarusians apprehend mostly the things that can menace their ex-
istence – social and economic troubles (inaccessibility of food and vital consumer goods, impossibility to pay for commu-
nal services) and ecological disasters (the questionnaire took place right on the eve of another Chernobyl anniversary)
(See Table 25).
Table 25
Distribution of answers to the question: "What are you afraid of in the near fu-
ture?", % (more than one answer is possible)
Variants of answer %
Rocketing prices for food products and staples 54.1
Ecological catastrophes 43.1
Impossibility to pay for communal services because of growing rates 42.4
To become a victim of growing crime 33.9
Establishment of dictatorship 30.3
Wars with other countries 29.8
Civil war 19.9
International isolation of Belarus 19.6
Loss of savings 18.8
Interethnic conflicts in Belarus 12.1
Russia would buy up all of Belarus’ property 8.9
West would buy up all of Belarus’ property 7.7
Other 3.8
Political changes are at the background. Maybe because of the fact that political needs are acute, political problems are
treated much more calmly – less than one third apprehend the foundation of a dictatorship, less than 20% are afraid of
civil war and 12.2% – of internal conflicts.
The same is true for external dangers – about 70% of voters are afraid of war with a foreign state and only 20% fear
international isolation. While the problem of "Motherland for sail", i.e. the privatization of the biggest companies, is be-
ing actively discussed in the media and among the elite common citizens treat it more indifferently – less than 10% of the
questioned apprehend that our property could be bought in bulk by Russian and Western tycoons.
Table 26
Distribution of answers to the question: "Are you personally ready to express your political views?", %
Variants of answer All
respondents
Supporters of
À. Lukashenko
Opponents of
À. Lukashenko
Vacillatory
Never afraid of openly expressing my views 32.0 40.8 29.8 32.3
Sometimes afraid of openly expressing my vies 26.1 15.1 30.3 24.2
Often afraid of openly expressing my views 14.1 4.6 17.0 13.1
Never openly express my vies 20.2 25.7 17.2 22.2
Previous polls showed that about 70% of citizens are in some way afraid to express their political opinions and that
this figure is stable. However, when the question was transformed and addressed to every concrete respondent, the result
was different. One fifth never express their political opinions openly (it is interesting that the most cautious were Luka-
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shenko’s adherents who seem not to have anything to fear), almost one third never conceal their opinions (the most brave
are president’s adherents, too) and about 40% can be characterized by a varying degree of moderation in expressing their
political views (See Table 26). In other words every individual thinks that the nation on the whole is less brave than it
actually is.
The number of those who think that it is possible to criticize authorities in public is much smaller than of their oppo-
nents. As it often happens, the response of the sides turned out to be diametrically opposite.
We have already found out that the Belarusians are most afraid of material trouble. Are these fears well grounded or
are they, so to say, in order "to be on the safe side"? It appears that there are reasons – almost 80% of the respondents
stated that they face wage and pension arrears with various regularity while more than 17% of the questioned (22.3%
among president’s adherents) face this problem almost every month. And only 6% had never seen wage or pension de-
lays!
Timely pensions and wages for budget sphere employees have for a long time been the authorities’ trump card for a
long time. They constantly pointed out that salaries and pensions were not huge but were always on time, unlike in Russia
and Ukraine. Now we have grounds to say that the authorities do not have this trump anymore. A. Lukashenko himself
mentioned in his annual appeal to the government that that the state’s fulfillment of its commitments roused censure.
Being aware of the special importance of this problem he bullied the government with all kinds of sanctions. Considering
the fact that present Russian officials did not only declare timely and full wages as their priority but are also constantly
raising salary figures, the Belarusian economic model looks less appealing. Another powerful argument for its critics on
the eve of the elections.
Table 27
Distribution of answers to the question: "Do you think it is acceptable that people who disagree with authorities’
actions publicly criticize the president and the government?", %
Variants of
answer
All
respondents
Supporters of
À. Lukashenko
Opponents of
À. Lukashenko
Vacillatory
Acceptable 62.6 25.7 78.3 54.4
Unacceptable 26.2 62.5 13.1 31.8
Table 28
Distribution of answers to the question: "What is your attitude towards mass actions of the opposition?", %
Variants of answer March of
Freedom I (11'99)
March of Freedom II
(04'00)
March of Freedom III
(11'00)
"Day of Will"
(03'01)
"Day of Will"
(04'02)
Heard nothing
about it –* 28.9** 40.6 49.6 50.8
Indifferent 24.6 19.7 23.4 20.3 21.9
Negative 56.0 31.1 21.5 17.9 12.0
Positive 16.9 18.4 13.6 12.1 14.5
*-This variant of answer was omitted in the given poll
**- in the given poll the following answer was used offered –"Find it difficult to answer"
Table 29
Distribution of answers to the question: "What is your attitude towards participating in public actions to express
one’s opinion?", %
Variants of answer Took part Ready to take part Not going to take part DA/NA
Meetings, demonstrations, pickets 8.1 16.9 68.3 6.7
Strikes 2.6 14.8 75.5 7.1
Hunger strikes 0.3 5.0 88.8 5.9
Armed struggle 0.8 5.9 86.3 7.0
Can social tension caused by wage and pension arrears make people take to the streets and join protest actions? First
we should say that the voters’ attitude to such events is still reserved (See Table 28). Despite all the efforts of Freedom
Day organizers one half of the people still know nothing of it. One fifth remained indifferent to it in spite of the rude ac-
tions of law enforcers, and the numbers of non-indifferent people (with positive or negative attitude) are small and almost
equal. Without too much sympathy for street democracy adherents, Belarusians themselves are not very eager to express
their opinions actively. Without mentioning the most extreme forms we should say that even meetings and marches would
be joined by only 17% of the respondent (See Table 29). Let us bear in mind that 17.6% do not get their salaries in time
almost every month and that readiness does not always mean participation. We can only repeat that any kind of public
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disagreement is regarded by the silent majority as radicalism and Belarusians have never been very fond of radicals.
OSCE AMG in Belarus: mission impossible?
Belarus is in the center of another international scandal: four months after the departure of first head of the OSCE Advi-
sory and Monitoring Group in Belarus, experienced German diplomat H.G. Wieck, Acting AMG Head and French dip-
lomat M. Rivollier was also forced to leave the country. It is highly possible that the remaining "officer-in-charge", Brit-
ish diplomat Andrew Carpenter will follow suffer the same fate: his visa might also not be extended. Wieck’s official suc-
cessor former German Ambassador to Ukraine E. Heyken has been trying to receive the consent of the Belarusian side for
several months already, but in vain. The country’s authorities, including Foreign Minister of Belarus Mikhail Khvostov
and the president himself openly declare: the OSCE mission as it used to be is no longer possible in Belarus. The AMG,
they claim, started interfering with interior affairs, supporting opposition, therefore, its mandate should be amended. The
OSCE management and many European leaders do not agree with this requirement and express their full support for the
AMG. The scandal is flaring up.
Table 30
Confidence in the most important state and public institutions, %
State and public institutions Trust distrust DA/NA Index of trust
Educational establishments (schools, colleges,
institutions and universities) 56.9 23.0 20.1 +0.344
Church 51.9 27.4 20.7 +0.247
Army 47.4 31.6 21.0 +0.159
Independent research centers 40.4 24.9 34.7 +0.158
State-run research centers 33.3 32.4 34.3 +0.009
OSCE AMG in Minsk 28.8 31.4 39.8 –0.027
State-run mass media 38.7 43.1 18.2 –0.044
Constitutional court 35.5 40.2 24.3 –0.048
Non-state mass media 32.2 43.9 23.9 –0.119
Unions of entrepreneurs 25.0 38.3 36.7 –0.135
Free and independent labor unions 27.6 41.0 31.4 –0.136
President 32.4 50.1 17.5 –0.179
Central Election Commission 29.6 47.7 22.7 –0.183
KGB 27.7 46.9 25.4 –0.194
Labor Unions forming the Federation of Labor Unions 23.4 42.9 33.7 –0.198
Courts 28.6 50.6 20.8 –0.222
Government 26.1 52.3 21.6 –0.266
National Assembly 19.6 52.0 28.4 –0.328
Political parties support the present authorities 19.8 52.9 27.3 –0.335
13th Supreme Council 15.7 51.0 33.3 –0.359
Opposition political parties 15.2 54.4 30.4 –0.397
Police 20.8 61.7 17.5 –0.413
Local authorities 20.4 61.3 18.3 –0.414
Since we are neither politicians nor diplomats, we will not try to estimate the developments around the OSCE AMG
from the point of view of international political and diplomatic standards. The attitude of the Belarusian society to the
events is more important for us as for professional sociological researchers. As a rule, A. Lukashenko justifies all his cru-
cial decisions by "the interests of the nation", and till recently the nation’s support was the major source of his power.
How far does the attitude of the authorities towards the OSCE AMG match that of the society?
In order to find the answer let us look at the results of the opinion poll held by the IISEPS in April. For many years we
have been asking Belarusians about the trust to the most influential state and social institutions, since trust is the basis for
stable power.
Table 30 shows, our fellow citizens trust the OSCE AMG more than they trust the majority of state and social institu-
tions, including the government, the parliament, law enforcing structures and the president himself. Over just three years
the society’s attitude towards this institution – which is in fact not even of Belarusian origin – has changed considerably
(See Table 31).
The most noticeable and important change is the fact that the number of people who do not know anything about the
activities of the OSCE AMG in Belarus and therefore cannot judge the situation has gone down 23%. Today more than
60% of the respondents express their attitude: half of them trust this organisation, the other half – do not. The reason why
the number of people who do not trust the OSCE has grown is understandable: mass aggressive anti-AMG propaganda
through state mass media and regular statements from the top-ranking officials cannot but influence mass consciousness.
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Table 31
Dynamics of public attitude towards the OSCE AMG in Belarus, %
Confidence in the OSCE AMG in Belarus 11'99 04'00 11'00 04'01 11'01 04'02
Trust 16.5 20.6 20.2 21.9 29.5 28.8
Distrust 20.7 20.5 22.4 23.4 28.8 31.4
DA/NA 62.8 58.9 57.4 54.7 41.7 39.8
Why then in spite of all this the number of people who trust the AMG has grown even more? It is important to stress
that we are not talking about those few who9 have personal experience of cooperating with the AMG (political parties
leaders, social organisations activists, relatives of political prisoners, etc). We are talking about common ("simple" as the
president likes to stress) people, who learned about the AMG’s activities from mass media, or even heard about it during
the interview for the first time. The most important thing for people is to know where the activities of the organisation are
directed and what means it uses.
One of the most famous steps of the OSCE AMG in Belarus is putting forward four requirements for the Belarusian
authorities, aimed at guaranteeing free and fair elections (parliamentary, presidential, local). These requirements were
formulated during the talks of Belarusian opposition leaders and the OSCE management in the summer of 1999 and have
since then been invariably repeated in the documents and statements of all international organizations as they fully corre-
spond to the AMG mandate. How are they perceived by the society?
First of all it is evident that the majority of our citizens support every requirement of the OSCE with no exceptions,
and they absolutely do not think that these statements reflect the interests of only a narrow group of political "block-
heads". Secondly, in three years the number of those who support these requirements has grown by 25% while the number
of people who find difficulty in evaluating them has dropped almost 2-fold (See Table 32).
Table 32
Dynamics of public support for the demands of the OSCE and other international structures to Belarus’ authori-
ties, %
OSCE demands Support Do not support DA/NA
To provide the opposition with access to state-run mass me-
dia, including television
50.7*
44.6
30.2
22.4
19.1
33.0
To change powers of the parliament so that the laws adopted
are obligatory for all authorities
71.8
55.5
9.4
8.5
18.8
36.0
To stop persecution of those who disagree with the present
political course
73.3
59.1
11.3
11.1
15.4
29.8
To introduce amendments into the Electoral Code which
would guarantee a free and fair election
77.1
62.0
7.7
9.1
15.2
28.9
Weight-average on all demands 68.2
55.3
14.5
12.8
17.3
31.9
* Numerator – results of the April 2002 survey conducted by IISEPS, denominator – the November 1999 survey.
Another important step of the OSCE AMG in Belarus was the endeavor to organize talks between the opposition and
official power representatives. As we know, these talks were started in the autumn of 1999 and turned out to be quite suc-
cessful, but were torpedoed on the initiative of the president. The achieved agreements, in particular, the protocol on the
access to state mass media were disavowed. Instead of these talks Belarusian authorities initiated "a comprehensive politi-
cal dialog without any international mediators", which ended in a complete failure in the summer of 2000, since only pro-
presidential social organizations were allowed to take part in the "dialog" and there was no need whatsoever to "negoti-
ate" with them.
Table 33
Dynamics of public attitude towards negotiations between the Belarusian authorities and the opposition, %
Attitude towards negotiations 11‘99 04‘00 04‘02
Negotiations are necessary, since only by means of negotiations it is possible to come to
common grounds and consider different interests in our society 45.3 50.8 48.2
Negotiations are not necessary, because authorities violate law and human rights, it is neces-
sary to force them observe laws, rather than maintaining a dialog 15.5 14.8 19.9
Negotiations are not necessary, because the opposition represents no one, and there is no
need for authorities to talk to it 7.9 8.2 15.0
DA/NA 31.3 26.2 16.9
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As Table 33 shows, almost half of our fellow citizens still support the AMG’s idea of holding talks between the
authorities and the opposition. in this respect the campaign on discrediting the AMG and its initiatives (accusations in
"the interference with the interior affairs", etc.) did not bring the expected effect. Moreover, the number of people without
any definite attitude towards this initiative has dropped almost 2-fold during the last three years. One cannot but point
out, however, that the number of the opponents of the talks – guided by diametrically opposite motives – has also grown
considerably: about 35% of the respondents think so today. This means that the split of the society in its attitude to the
present political line is growing. When the number of talks opponents exceeds the number of adherents, the possibility to
find agreement by calm and peaceful means might be lost forever. Will president benefit from this? More and more severe
mass sanctions will have to be used for "pacifying" those who do not agree with his line, and who knows how long these
measures will be effective?
The research results show, the more our people know about the OSCE AMG activities, the more they support the
group. It means that the mission is not only possible in Belarus, moreover, it is gravely needed for political stabilization.
It is very likely that the AMG mission is even more necessary for the ruling party, which is afraid "to lose face" if it starts
negotiations with the opposition, then for the latter itself. It will be immeasurably more difficult to "negotiate" with huge
crowds of infuriated "common folk" when they take to the streets.
Fears and sympathies of Belarusians: are the West and democracy as dreadful as they appear
The attitude of the dwellers of a country towards emigration is an important indicator of its well-being or trouble, and of
the citizens’ evaluation of their prospects in the home country. Talking about Belarus in this respect, we first of all have to
point out a high emigration potential of the country. Only half of the respondents answered that they do not want to move
anywhere, while more than 41% are ready to go to another country (See Table 34). At the same time we need to point out
that the number of such people dropped by 11% during the last 2.5 years. One can understand the mood of the voters, es-
pecially of those with democratic views in October, right after the elections, when the hope for any change was destroyed.
But half a year after, when September disappointments have already been forgotten, the ranks of those who are not going
to look for a better lot in a foreign land have grown again. This gives evidence of the fact that the post-election line of the
authorities is causing more and more disappointment to the voters.
It is curious that people manifest their readiness to leave the country which does not have any standard emigration
causing reasons, namely, ethnic and religious conflicts, military actions, etc. This fact points out the existence of hidden
social tension in the Belarusian society and clearly contradicts the authorities’ statements about harmony and stability in
the country. The stability, which is constantly named one of the most important achievements of the existing regime.
Table 34
Distribution of answers to the question: "Would you like to emigrate
to another country?", %
Variants of answer 11'99 04'00 10'01 04'02
Would not like moving anywhere 61.4 57.5 52.0 50.3
Germany 15.2 16.0 18.5 16.5
United States 11.5 10.1 6.1 9.4
Russia 1.4 2.3 3.6 4.9
Poland 3.9 3.7 5.8 4.6
Other country 3.8 6.8 6.3 4.2
Baltic States 1.8 1.5 1.8 1.8
Certain changes can be noticed in the list of countries our compatriots chose for emigration. Germany and the USA
are still in the lead leaving other countries far behind. The third place, however, is for the first time occupied by Russia,
that has taken the lead over Poland and the Baltic states. This indicator confirms the conclusion we made in our previous
issues: the number of the adherents of the integration with Russia is not only growing, but also changing in quality. There
are more "advanced" people in this group and less Lukashenko followers who logically do not need to emigrate. Earlier
we observed a curious paradox – the Belarusians wanted to integrate with Russia and to emigrate to the West. Nowadays
this contradiction is no longer so sharp.
An indirect indicator of the attitude to a country is sympathy towards its leader. Table 35 shows, in this respect the
Russian leader is beyond comparison. Furthermore, his popularity continues to grow – more than two thirds of the ques-
tioned named the Kremlin master as the most corresponding to their ideal of a politician. On the one hand president Putin
with his tough statements and decisive actions cannot but appeal to strong-arm adherents, who have always been abun-
dant in Belarus. On the other hand many respect him for his foreign policies aimed at closer cooperation with the West
and for his aspiration to liberalize the economy.
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Table 35
Distribution of answers to the question: "Whom of the modern politicians of the top rank do you like most, who
of them corresponds to your ideal of politician?", %
(more than one answer is possible)
Variants of answer 11'99 04'00 10'01 04'02
V. Putin -* 55.5 65.2 68.1
À. Lukashenko 44.9 37.0 36.8 26.0
G. Schroeder 16.0 10.2 12.6 14.3
T. Blair 6.7 5.1 8.0 10.2
J. Chirac -* 11.4 8.6 9.3
G. W. Bush Jr. -* -* 7.7 8.5
F. Castro 14.7 7.7 9.4 7.9
A. Kwasnewski 7.9 5.9 4.6 7.4
V. Havel 8.0 5.7 4.3 5.3
V. Adamkus 7.2 2.6 2.5 4.6
V. Kostunica -* -* 3.1 2.0
S. Hussein 6.0 3.4 3.2 1.5
L. Kuchma 5.6 2.5 2.4 1.3
B. Clinton 29.6 24.3 -* -*
S. Milosevic 2.8 2.0 -* -*
B. Yeltsin 2.7 -* -* -*
* The names of these politicians were omitted in the given poll
Table 36
Distribution of answers to the question: "Below is the list of possible assistance to Belarusian non-state public or-
ganizations from the side of foreign countries and world community. Which forms of it you think acceptable
from the moral, political and other points of view?", %
Variants of answer Acceptable Unacceptable DA/NA
10'00 04'02 10'00 04'02 10'00 04'02
Educational support (by means of seminars, conferences in
Belarus and abroad) 64.7 77.3 7.0 10.5 28.2 12.2
Technical support (PCs, copiers, faxes, printers and other
equipment) 62.7 76.8 10.9 11.9 26.4 11.3
Humanitarian aid (food products, medicines, clothes, etc.) 58.7 74.3 13.8 13.5 27.4 12.2
Financial support 55.1 67.3 14.9 18.6 30.0 14.1
Moral-political support (official statements,
discussions at meetings with official representatives of
Belarus, campaigns in mass media) 44.9 64.1 11.8 15.9 43.3 20.0
Informational support (providing newspapers,
journals, bulletins, etc.) 50.8 63.7 15.1 18.2 34.2 18.1
Weight-average index 56.1 70.6 12.3 14.8 31.6 14.7
Parallel to the growth of Putin’s popularity the Belarusians are more and more reserved towards their own president
who used to be an unconditional leader among all modern politicians only 2.5 years ago. The same is true for the ratings
of other authoritarian leaders (S. Hussein, F. Castro), while the popularity of Western leaders is rather high and stable as
is the case with German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder or is gradually increasing (T. Blaire, J. Chirac, A. Kwasniewski)
and returning to the level where it was before the NATO’s mission in Yugoslavia.
Earlier, before the above-mentioned mission, the NATO’s eastward expansion was negatively evaluated by almost half
of the population of the country. In autumn five more Central and Eastern Europe states are to join the NATO. Russia,
going on with its formal protests against the mechanic (using its leaders’ terms) expansion of the Alliance, is in fact es-
tablishing absolutely different, much more closer relations with this organization. It is followed by other CIS states which
have allowed the allocation of NATO forces on their territory. The standpoint of the Belarusian leader, however, remains
unchanged. At first A. Lukashenko quite harshly reacted to the behavior of his Middle Asian counterparts on the Tash-
kent Treaty. Later in Moscow after signing the documents on the creation of the Tashkent Treaty Organization he was the
only president from those who had signed the Treaty to characterize the new body as a military and strategic answer to the
NATO.
Lukashenko’s fears concerning the bases of "the aggressive monster" in Middle Asia are shared by 37% of the respon-
dents, while almost 39% are of another point of view. The explanations, to our mind, are numerous – first of all, the re-
moteness of the events has its effect. Besides, the 3 years of Polish membership in the NATO did not have any effect on
the character of the bilateral relations. Moreover, after September 11 many people were assured that there are more
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dreadful and real hazards.
The fact that the attitude of Belarusians towards the West is becoming more positive can also be proved by the data
from Table 36. We know how the official Minsk regards foreign assistance to our NGOs. The position of the government,
however, is in sharp contrast to the opinion of common citizens – the overwhelming majority of the questioned thinks
quite acceptable various kinds of help from educational and technical to moral and financial. It is especially evident if we
consider the dynamics of a the average indicator. In 1.5 years there has been a considerable (more than 2-fold) drop in the
number of those who do not have any opinion on the issue. Thus, when these people determined their standpoint, the
number of those who accept foreign assistance to NGOs increased almost 15%, while the ranks of their opponents grew
very insignificantly. It is curious that since the last opinion poll the growth is most evident among the adherents of hu-
manitarian aid. One cannot rule out that here we see the effect of the notorious president’s decree and of the experience of
socializing with the officials from the corresponding Ministry.
Sluggish integration can turn into an inconvertible process
The questionnaire indicates, public opinion about the integration of Russia and Belarus is changing. As is seen from Ta-
ble 37, today the ratio of people who stand for any kind of independence for Belarus and those who want to unite with
Russia is 1.9 to 1, while three years ago it was 3 to 1. The number of integration adherents has gone up especially during
the last year. The same tendency is shown in Table 38: today the number of people who would vote pro union with Russia
is 2.3 times bigger than the number of those who would vote contra, if they had a possibility. Three years ago these parties
were approximately equal.
Table 37
Dynamics of distribution of answers to the question: "Which variant of Rus-
sia-Belarus relations do you consider the best?", %
Variant of answer 03'99 04'00 04'01 04'02
Good neighborly relations of two
independent states 43.2 41.0 38.4 29.6
Union of independent states 30.5 31.6 33.7 32.0
Unification into one state 24.1 25.3 26.5 31.9
Table 38
Dynamics of distribution of answers to the question: "If today there were a
referendum on unification of Belarus and Russia, how would you vote?", %
Variant of answer 03'99 04'00 04'01 04'02
For unification 41.8 55.7 56.6 53.8
Against unification 40.4 27.6 28.4 23.0
Would not take part in voting 14.7 15.6 14.6 11.6
The summary of this tendency is given in Table 39. During the past three years the number of convinced adherents of
integration grew 20%, and the number of their opponents reduced 42%. Today the ratio between them is 1.7 to 1 and
three years ago it was 1 to 0.8.
Recent years have revealed a certain cooling of Belarusian authorities’ desire to integrate (Russian officials have al-
ways been somewhat condescending to the unavailing attempts of "Pan-Slavic Unitifyer", realizing that they were caused
not by the urge to unite the two nations but by a simple need to get political and material advantages to support the re-
gime). Though "historic" summits and various "union" actions still take place and the official Belarusian media praise the
integration achievements and the visibility of joint bodies’ usefulness (there is almost nothing of this kind in the Russian
media), one cannot get rid of a feeling that all performed in this field is surreal, declining and downcast.
And the population feels it too. Table 37 shows that the "union" popularity isn’t growing while the idea of one state is
attracting new followers.
You may be sure that A. Lukashenko does use the integration idea to get financial aid from our Eastern neighbor. And
he is doing this more professionally than V. Kebich, S. Shushkevich and M. Grib all together. But he is not going to leave
state independence (read: uncontrolled power in a small but separate state). It is better to be the first cowboy on a ranch
than the last millionaire in Vegas.
Any game, however, may result in a defeat. Especially when you play against professionals. And today’s Russian
management is obviously professional when the we talk about relationships with Belarus. "The Chief Integrator" is being
slowly, silently and purposefully taken the initiative from. Material aid comes alongside with strict regulations on eco-
nomic reforms. The festive visits to Russian provinces are stopped. Only close in spirit Russian governors sometimes ap-
pear at Belarusian court, but these visits take place more and more seldom, because it is understood that receiving minor
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officials is humiliating as for president and for the country, especially as these visits have very little effect.
But the main danger for independence (read: uncontrolled power…) came from an unexpected side. It was located in-
side the country! Long preparations have at last started the integration machine whose movement can break any obstacles.
One can assume that daily propaganda had the effect and the integration started. But it would be more right to say that
our nationals watching the dominant Russian TV channels are getting transparent confirmations of social and economic
progress in the neighboring state with against the stagnation of the Belarusian economy and permanently low living stan-
dards for the majority in the background. It is this but not the illusory "Slavic unity" that is, in our opinion, the engine of
today’s amplification of integration moods. It can be regarded as a desperate deed because people just do not see any other
outlet.
Table 39
Dynamics of the number of convinced supporters and opponents of unification
with Russia, %
Social types* 03'99 04'00 04'01 04'02
Convinced supporters 23.5 24.0 25.8 28.3
Convinced opponents 28.3 21.7 21.8 16.3
* Convinced supporters are those who at a referendum would vote for the unification of Belarus and Russia
and consider the unification into one state the best variant of bilateral relations. Convinced opponents are
those who at a referendum would vote against the unification and consider good neighborly relations of two
independent states the best variant of bilateral relations.
Table 40
Dynamics of distribution of answers to the question: "If the post of the president
of Belarus and Russia is introduced, for whom would you vote at a union presiden-
tial election?", %
Variant of answer 03'99 04'00 04'01 04'02
V. Putin –* 31.1 40.3 50.5
À. Lukashenko 32.8 22.3 24.4 14.0
* V. Putin’s name wasn’t mentioned
Table 41
Dynamics of distribution of answers to the question: "Whom of the modern politi-
cians do you like most of all, who corresponds to your ideal of politician?", %
Variant of answer 03'99 04'00 04'01 04'02
V. Putin –* 55.5 59.8 68.1
À. Lukashenko 45.7 37.0 34.3 26.0
* V. Putin’s name was not offered in the given poll
Table 42
Dynamics of attitude towards independence of Belarus depending on attitude towards À. Lukashenko, %*
Attitude towards independence of Belarus Attitude towards À. Lukashenko **
Convinced opponents
46.9 (28.2)
Convinced supporters
10.4 (22.3)
Convinced opponents – 28.3 (20.1)*** 32.8 (9.7) 18.6 (40.7)
Convinced supporters of – 16.4 (26.1) 73.3 (53.7) 2.9 (7.5)
* Read horizontally.
** Typology of convinced supporters and opponents of A. Lukashenko was carried out using the same method applied for supporters-opponents of in-
dependence and is based on four questions of the questionnaire.
*** In parenthesis – data for November of 1999
It is not the end yet. Many former integration opponents were antagonized by the so-called "Asian" (i.e. anti-western)
way of Russian development. But after September 11th, 2001 when our Eastern friends turned out to be allied with the
whole Western coalition, this argument was of no use anymore and the integration moods were stimulated anew. One
more reason for speeding up integration popped up at the beginning of 2000, when the "bossy" Boris Yeltsin who was
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growing lazy and decrepit was displaced by mobile and European-looking Vladimir Putin who casually left no chance for
A. Luka-shenko to occupy the Kremlin throne. Today Vladimir Putin who has shown his electorate the way to the long-
awaited progress and helped to raise the living standards for the Russians is much more appealing to Belarusians than the
gloomy A. Lukashenko who still, as five years ago promises "a shot and a steak" for his people and prison plank beds for
his own clerks (See Tables 40 and 41). As a result, the tally of integration opponents lost its members again.
Previously many researchers admitted repeatedly that integration adherents were A. Lukashenko’s adherents at the
same time. Thus, a conclusion was drawn that the independence of the country will not be endangered in the future, as
A. Lukashenko’s followers were mostly elderly and old people who would be deceased with the course of time and the
problem would be solved with no effort.
But it wasn’t! This is shown by the data in Table 42.
One can see, over the past 2.5 years the number of A. Lukashenko’s convinced opponents grew sharply – from 28.2%
to 46.9% while the number of his convinced supporters dropped from 22.3% to 10.4%. Today, however, almost one third
of his opponents (32.8%) side with the union with Russia, while in 1999 they were only 9.7%. Therefore, considerable
growth of integration intentions (3.4-fold!) among A. Lukashenko’s convinced opponents, consisting mostly of young and
educated people is evident. If the tendency is preserved and other conditions being equal, in a few years the country will
not have independence supporters whatsoever.
It is quite interesting, that the number of those siding with the unification with Russia among A. Lukashenko’s con-
vinced supporters has dropped significantly. They are only 18.6% at present while in 1999 their ranks counted 40.7%.
Now there are 73.3% ardent Lukashenko’s opponents among those who want integration against 53.7% in 1999, which
actually was to be expected.
Table 43
Dynamics of distribution of answers to the question about the Russia-Belarus Union, %
Variant of answer 04'01 04'02
Unions remains a hollow declaration of intentions, which has not affected the life of Be-
larusians and Russians 35.1 49.0
Union has improved life only of officials working in its governing bodies 27.9 30.9
Union is a really functioning structure that has improved the life of common
Belarusians and Russians 9.8 6.1
Table 44
Distribution of answers to the question: "What shall be the essence of real integration of Belarus and Russia?", %
(more than one answer is possible)
Absence of boundaries between the two countries 48.2
Single currency 44.9
Unified laws 30.6
Common border guarded jointly 23.7
Single president 20.8
Single government 11.5
Single army 10.9
Single parliament 8.1
Other 4.8
As for the union, Table 43 shows, the majority of the population regards it as a declaration of intentions that had no
effect whatsoever on the life of the two nations. In a year the number of people who share this opinion grew 1.4-fold,
while the share of those who believe in the reality of this body and in its positive effect on the life of people went down
from 9.8% to 6.1%. One can say, the present variant of the union is gradually discrediting itself in the eyes of the voters.
What should, according to the people, the real integration include? Some answers can be found in Table 44.
One can see, about half of the population want only the absence of borders between our countries and single currency
from the integration. Other issues interest only a very insignificant share of our fellow citizens. This kind of integration is
almost present. We are only to introduce single currency as in Europe.
Table 45
Dynamics of distribution of answers to the question: "What is your attitude towards restoration of the USSR?", %
Variant of answer 11'93 11'97 11'99 04'02
For 55.1 49.9 38.0 38.8
Against 22.3 25.5 30.1 42.6
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In conclusion let us consider the population’ opinion on reviving the USSR (See Table 45). Nowadays for the first
time the number of the followers of the revival dropped below the number of opponents, while 8.5 years ago the former
exceeded the latter 2.5-fold. One can expect that in a few years the majority of the population will be against the idea. We
begin to understand that the past, however we estimate it, is irreversible.
Results of the nation opinion poll, conducted by IISEPS in April of 2002, %
1. Distribution of answers to the question: "Is it acceptable or unacceptable, in your opinion, if Russia’s capital
takes part in privatization of Belarusian enterprises?"
Table 1.1. Depending on age
Variant of answer All Age, year old
respondents 18-19 20-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+up
Yes 43.9 37.1 39.6 53.3 47.4 46.9 42.9 38.0
No 35.0 44.3 41.6 29.9 34.0 35.2 37.3 31.3
DA/NA 21.1 18.6 18.8 16.8 18.6 17.9 19.8 30.7
Table 1.2. Depending on education
Education
Variant of answer Elementary Incomplete
secondary
Secondary Secondary
vocational
Higher
(incomplete higher)
Yes 27.8 38.2 41.3 46.1 54.7
No 35.4 28.6 37.8 36.9 31.8
DA/NA 36.8 33.2 20.9 17.0 13.5
Table 1.3. Depending on status
Status
Variant of answer Employees of the
private sector
Employees of the
public sector
Students Pensioners Unemployed,
housewives
Yes 49.2 45.2 42.3 37.4 53.2
No 34.8 36.2 45.2 31.8 24.7
DA/NA 16.0 18.6 12.5 30.8 22.1
Table 1.4. Depending on place of living
Area
Variant of answer Minsk Minsk
region
Brest and
region
Grodno and
region
Vitebsk and
region
Mogilev and
region
Gomel and
region
Yes 42.4 34.5 49.0 37.6 53.2 50.0 42.9
No 29.7 34.1 38.0 40.4 29.9 37.8 36.7
DA/NA 27.9 31.4 13.0 22.0 16.9 12.2 20.4
Table 1.5. Depending on type of settlement
Variant of answer Type of settlement
Capital Regional centers Cities Towns Village
Yes 42.4 55.4 37.2 42.9 42.0
No 29.7 37.1 39.4 34.9 35.2
DA/NA 27.9 7.5 23.4 22.2 22.8
2. Distribution of answers to the question: "Do you think a liberalization of the economy promised by
A. Lukashenko before the presidential election is being carried out?"
Table 2.1. Depending on age
Variant of answer All Age, years old
respondents 18-19 20-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+up
Yes 16.0 12.9 5.6 8.8 8.2 13.7 24.5 27.3
No 55.3 68.6 67.4 68.6 69.8 60.9 46.7 30.1
DA/NA 27.7 18.5 27.0 22.6 22.0 25.4 28.8 42.6
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Table 2.2. Depending on education
Education
Variant of answer Elementary Incomplete
secondary
Secondary Secondary
vocational
Higher
(incomplete higher)
Yes 30.4 23.5 13.6 13.1 14.2
No 24.1 30.4 57.5 63.9 68.2
DA/NA 45.5 46.1 28.9 23.0 17.6
Table 2.3. Depending on status
Status
Variant of answer Employees of the
private sector
Employees of the
public sector
Students Pensioners Unemployed,
housewives
Yes 6.5 14.4 11.5 26.8 6.5
No 75.9 59.0 68.3 31.6 68.8
DA/NA 17.6 26.6 20.2 41.6 24.7
Table 2.4. Depending on place of living
Area
Variant of answer Minsk Minsk re-
gion
Brest and
region
Grodno and
region
Vitebsk and
region
Mogilev and
region
Gomel and
region
Yes 17.1 10.0 17.3 8.7 11.9 29.7 17.6
No 51.7 50.5 62.5 66.5 55.9 48.3 54.3
DA/NA 31.2 39.5 20.2 24.8 32.2 22.0 28.1
Table 2.5. Depending on type of settlement
Variant of answer Type of settlement
Capital Regional centers Cities Towns Village
Yes 17.1 14.6 8.5 11.9 22.0
No 51.7 65.8 63.3 95.4 48.6
DA/NA 31.2 19.6 28.2 32.7 29.4
3. Distribution of answers to the question: "How many times over the last 12 months have you faced backpayment
of wage or pension?"
Table 3.1. Depending on age
Variant of answer All Age, years old
respondents 18-19 20-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+up
Once 28.5 15.7 29.5 24.1 22.8 24.1 29.2 41.4
Several times 37.6 42.9 35.4 39.4 39.9 38.1 37.3 34.7
Almost monthly 17.6 17.1 22.9 19.7 19.4 19.9 21.2 8.3
Never 5.9 5.7 4.2 5.1 5.2 7.5 6.6 5.8
DA/NA 10.4 18.6 9.0 11.7 12.7 10.4 5.7 9.8
Table 3.2. Depending on education
Education
Variant of answer Elementary Incomplete
secondary
Secondary Secondary
vocational
Higher
(incomplete higher)
Once 51.9 34.6 25.7 24.0 28.5
Several times 31.6 40.6 37.8 37.6 36.7
Almost monthly 7.6 9.7 20.7 20.9 16.1
Never 2.5 5.5 5.1 7.7 6.4
DA/NA 6.4 9.6 10.7 9.8 12.3
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Table 3.3. Depending on status
Status
Variant of answer Employees of the
private sector
Employees of the
public sector
Students Pensioners Unemployed,
housewives
Once 33.7 22.4 23.1 41.6 14.3
Several times 23.0 42.8 37.5 35.0 40.3
Almost monthly 13.4 23.6 19.2 8.2 13.0
Never 10.2 4.6 6.7 5.8 7.8
DA/NA 19.7 6.6 13.5 9.4 24.6
Table 3.4. Depending on place of living
Area
Variant of answer Minsk Minsk
region
Brest and
region
Grodno and
region
Vitebsk and
region
Mogilev
and region
Gomel and
region
Once 29.0 25.5 37.5 24.3 26.0 32.6 24.9
Several times 18.2 40.0 38.5 48.6 45.2 29.7 48.6
Almost monthly 6.7 15.0 13.9 19.7 23.7 26.7 22.4
Never 19.0 4.5 2.4 4.6 1.1 2.3 2.9
DA/NA 27.1 15.0 7.7 2.8 4.0 8.7 1.2
Table 3.5. Depending on type of settlement
Variant of answer Type of settlement
Capital Regional centers Cities Towns Village
Once 29.0 33.3 30.3 19.2 31.2
Several times 18.2 41.3 41.5 47.1 39.1
Almost monthly 6.7 17.5 16.0 20.2 22.9
Never 19.0 4.6 4.2 4.2 0.9
DA/NA 27.1 3.3 8.0 9.3 5.9
4.  Distribution of answers to the question: "What are you afraid of in the near future?"
(no more than 5 answers)
Table 4.1. Depending on age
Variant of answer All Age, years old
respondents 18-19 20-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+up
Rocketing prices for food products and staples 54.1 44.3 43.8 46.7 59.0 54.4 53.8 59.8
Ecological catastrophe 43.1 42.9 43.8 43.8 42.2 53.1 42.9 34.0
Impossibility to pay for communal services be-
cause of growing rates 42.4 34.3 38.9 41.6 41.4 42.7 44.8 45.1
To become a victim of growing crime 33.9 34.3 31.9 34.3 32.8 35.8 34.4 33.4
Establishment of dictatorship 30.3 35.7 38.2 41.6 38.8 35.5 73.6 88.3
Wars with other countries 29.8 34.3 36.1 21.1 23.1 26.7 26.4 40.5
Civil war 19.9 18.6 20.1 18.2 16.0 19.2 23.1 22.4
International isolation of Belarus 19.6 32.9 23.6 29.2 19.4 22.5 19.3 8.6
Loss of savings 18.8 12.9 16.7 17.5 18.3 21.2 16.5 21.2
Interethnic conflicts in Belarus 12.1 8.6 13.9 7.3 13.1 12.4 14.2 11.7
Russia would buy up all of Belarus’ property 8.9 17.1 6.3 9.5 6.7 14.0 9.0 4.9
West would buy up all of Belarus’ property 7.7 7.1 5.6 5.1 6.0 6.5 11.3 9.8
Table 4.2. Depending on education
Education
Variant of answer Elementary Incomplete
secondary
Secondary Secondary
vocational
Higher
(incompl. higher)
Rocketing prices for food products and sta-
ples 51.9 58.5 54.2 52.6 53.2
Ecological catastrophe 25.3 34.1 42.7 46.4 51.7
Impossibility to pay for communal
services because of growing rates 34.2 44.7 45.0 41.8 39.0
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To become a victim of growing crime 31.6 32.7 34.1 33.5 36.0
Establishment of dictatorship 5.1 8.8 28.1 37.4 49.4
Wars with other countries 53.2 37.3 30.6 27.3 19.1
Civil war 27.8 21.2 17.9 22.7 16.1
International isolation of Belarus 5.1 7.8 18.9 21.4 32.2
Loss of savings 24.1 18.4 17.0 19.1 20.6
Interethnic conflicts in Belarus 12.7 12.9 12.5 10.8 12.4
Russia would buy up all of Belarus’ property 5.1 3.7 10.7 8.5 11.2
West would buy up all of Belarus’ property 6.3 12.0 9.0 6.4 3.7
Table 4.3. Depending on status
Status
Variant of answer Employees of the
private sector
Employees of the
public sector
Students Pensioners Unemployed,
housewives
Rocketing prices for food prod-
ucts and staples 39.0 55.0 48.1 58.4 68.8
Ecological catastrophe 44.4 46.6 41.3 35.8 45.5
Impossibility to pay for
communal services because of
growing rates 34.8 42.5 41.3 44.6 51.9
To become a victim of growing
crime 39.0 34.1 31.7 32.6 28.6
Establishment of dictatorship 48.7 33.7 39.4 11.7 33.8
Wars with other countries 23.5 27.4 32.7 39.0 19.5
Civil war 13.4 21.5 18.3 23.3 5.2
International isolation of
Belarus 33.7 20.3 27.9 10.1 14.3
Loss of savings 29.9 16.1 17.3 19.1 15.6
Interethnic conflicts in Belarus 11.2 13.1 9.6 12.5 6.5
Russia would buy up all of Be-
larus’ property 10.7 9.1 14.4 5.8 10.4
West would buy up all of
Belarus’ property 4.3 7.4 4.8 11.1 5.2
Table 4.4. Depending on place of living
Area
Variant of answer Minsk Minsk
region
Brest and
region
Grodno and
region
Vitebsk and
region
Mogilev and
region
Gomel and
region
Rocketing prices for food prod-
ucts and staples 43.5 61.8 45.7 61.3 57.6 57.0 56.3
Ecological catastrophe 41.6 34.1 44.2 39.9 53.1 36.6 51.4
Impossibility to pay for
communal services because of
growing rates 38.3 43.6 41.3 49.0 41.2 47.1 39.6
To become a victim of growing
crime 43.1 39.1 23.1 24.3 33.3 27.3 40.4
Establishment of dictatorship 27.5 38.6 35.1 29.5 25.4 28.5 27.3
Wars with other countries 14.5 22.3 38.5 35.3 34.5 33.1 36.7
Civil war 11.5 20.0 27.4 19.1 22.6 15.7 24.1
International isolation of
Belarus 22.3 14.1 17.8 24.9 19.2 22.1 18.0
Loss of savings 17.5 20.5 13.9 8.1 23.7 22.7 24.5
Interethnic conflicts in Belarus 10.0 13.2 16.8 17.3 10.7 9.3 8.6
Russia would buy up all of Be-
larus’ property 6.7 5.0 11.1 16.8 9.6 9.9 6.1
West would buy up all of
Belarus’ property 7.1 4.1 5.3 12.1 10.7 9.9 6.5
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Table 4.5. Depending on type of settlement
Variant of answer Type of settlement
Capital Regional cen-
ters
Cities Towns Village
Rocketing prices for food products and staples 43.5 48.8 58.8 58.0 58.7
Ecological catastrophe 41.6 48.8 41.0 44.9 40.7
Impossibility to pay for communal services because of
growing rates 38.3 40.8 50.0 46.2 40.0
To become a victim of growing crime 43.1 32.1 30.3 40.1 26.8
Establishment of dictatorship 27.5 42.1 39.9 33.0 20.0
Wars with other countries 14.5 37.5 30.9 25.3 37.6
Civil war 11.5 19.2 13.3 24.7 24.6
International isolation of Belarus 22.3 27.1 27.7 14.1 14.5
Loss of savings 17.5 25.8 15.4 23.4 14.1
Interethnic conflicts in Belarus 10.0 10.4 14.9 12.5 12.7
Russia would buy up all of Belarus’ property 6.7 10.4 14.4 8.7 7.3
West would buy up all of Belarus’ property 7.1 7.1 6.4 5.8 10.1
5. Distribution of answers to the question: "Do you think young people could make a successful career in Belarus?"
Table 5.1. Depending on age
Variant of answer All Age, years old
respondents 18-19 20-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+up
Yes 43.2 41.4 34.0 34.3 35.5 40.1 51.4 55.5
No 39.4 50.0 31.4 50.4 46.6 44.6 30.7 22.1
DA/NA 17.4 8.6 14.6 15.3 17.9 15.3 17.9 22.4
Table 5.2. Depending on education
Education
Variant of answer Elementary Incomplete
secondary
Secondary Secondary
vocational
Higher
(incomplete higher)
Yes 54.4 52.1 44.6 39.7 35.2
No 24.1 24.9 37.6 46.1 49.4
DA/NA 21.5 23.0 17.8 14.2 15.4
Table 5.3. Depending on status
Status
Variant of answer Employees of the
private sector
Employees of the
public sector
Students Pensioners Unemployed,
housewives
Yes 34.2 40.7 38.5 55.7 35.0
No 54.0 41.7 51.9 23.6 45.5
DA/NA 11.8 17.6 9.6 20.7 19.5
Table 5.4. Depending on place of living
Area
Variant of answer Minsk Minsk re-
gion
Brest and
region
Grodno and
region
Vitebsk and
region
Mogilev and
region
Gomel and
region
Yes 46.1 34.1 51.4 42.2 30.5 41.3 52.7
No 34.2 38.6 40.9 46.2 44.1 46.5 31.4
DA/NA 19.7 27.3 7.7 11.6 25.4 12.2 15.9
Table 5.5. Depending on type of settlement
Variant of answer Type of settlement
Capital Regional centers Cities Towns Village
Yes 46.1 28.8 37.8 51.9 45.5
No 34.2 54.6 37.8 32.7 39.8
DA/NA 19.7 16.6 24.4 15.4 14.7
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6. Distribution of answers to the question: "Do you think the situation in Belarus is developing in the right or a
wrong direction?"
Table 6.1. Depending on age
Variant of answer All Age, years old
respondents 18-19 20-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+up
Right direction 21.4 8.6 10.4 13.9 10.1 20.2 25.5 40.2
Wrong direction 55.5 71.4 70.8 68.6 68.7 59.9 46.7 30.4
DA/NA 23.1 20.0 18.8 17.5 21.3 19.9 27.8 29.4
Table 6.2. Depending on education
Education
Variant of answer Elementary Incomplete
secondary
Secondary Secondary
vocational
Higher
(incomplete higher)
Right direction 43.0 35.0 16.2 19.8 16.5
Wrong direction 30.4 29.5 60.6 60.3 67.0
DA/NA 26.6 35.5 23.2 19.9 16.5
Table 6.3. Depending on status
Status
Variant of answer Employees of the
private sector
Employees of the
public sector
Students Pensioners Unemployed,
housewives
Right direction 11.2 18.6 9.6 37.9 7.8
Wrong direction 73.3 59.3 70.2 31.6 75.3
DA/NA 15.5 22.1 20.2 30.5 16.9
Table 6.4. Depending on place of living
Area
Variant of answer Minsk Minsk
region
Brest and
region
Grodno and
region
Vitebsk and
region
Mogilev and
region
Gomel and
region
Right direction 26.0 12.7 28.4 16.2 10.7 29.1 24.5
Wrong direction 49.8 54.1 59.1 66.5 58.8 50.6 53.1
DA/NA 24.2 33.2 12.5 17.3 30.5 20.3 22.4
Table 6.5. Depending on type of settlement
Variant of answer Type of settlement
Capital Regional centers Cities Towns Village
Right direction 26.0 20.6 10.6 14.1 28.8
Wrong direction 49.8 63.8 66.0 58.0 48.4
DA/NA 24.2 15.6 23.4 27.9 22.8
7. Distribution of answers to the question: "Some people believe that the best variant of ruling is a "strong arm,"
others prefer democracy. What do you prefer?"
Table 7.1. Depending on age
Variant of answer All Age, years old
respondents 18-19 20-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+up
"Strong arm" 30.2 21.4 14.6 21.2 24.3 29.0 33.5 46.6
Democracy 46.7 52.9 58.3 57.7 52.6 49.8 46.2 28.2
DA/NA 23.1 25.7 27.1 21.1 23.1 21.2 20.3 25.2
Table 7.2. Depending on education
Education
Variant of answer Elementary Incomplete
secondary
Secondary Secondary
vocational
Higher
(incomplete higher)
"Strong arm" 55.7 42.9 29.2 23.7 23.6
Democracy 15.2 30.4 47.2 53.1 59.7
DA/NA 29.1 26.7 22.6 23.2 16.7
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Table 7.3. Depending on status
Status
Variant of answer Employees of the
private sector
Employees of the
public sector
Students Pensioners Unemployed,
housewives
"Strong arm" 20.9 28.1 15.4 44.8 20.8
Democracy 51.5 49.1 61.5 30.0 50.6
DA/NA 17.6 22.8 23.1 24.2 28.6
Table 7.4. Depending on place of living
Area
Variant of answer Minsk Minsk re-
gion
Brest and
region
Grodno
and region
Vitebsk and
region
Mogilev and
region
Gomel and
region
"Strong arm" 29.4 34.1 25.5 34.7 29.4 33.1 26.9
Democracy 50.6 31.4 56.7 42.8 49.7 44.8 49.8
DA/NA 20.0 34.5 17.8 22.5 20.9 22.1 23.3
Table 7.5. Depending on type of settlement
Variant of answer Type of settlement
Capital Regional centers Cities Towns Village
"Strong arm" 29.4 28.8 25.0 27.9 35.2
Democracy 50.6 55.8 49.5 44.6 40.0
DA/NA 20.0 15.4 25.5 27.5 24.8
8. Distribution of answers to the question: "Are you personally ready to express your political views?"
Table 8.1. Depending on age
Variant of answer All Age, years old
respondents 18-19 20-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+up
Never afraid 32.0 24.3 36.1 32.1 25.7 29.3 34.4 38.0
Sometimes is afraid 26.1 34.3 25.0 29.9 32.8 29.0 26.4 14.7
Often is afraid 14.1 18.6 10.4 13.1 16.8 15.0 14.6 11.7
Never openly express my views 20.2 15.7 20.1 17.5 17.9 19.9 18.4 25.8
DA/NA 7.6 7.1 8.4 7.4 6.8 6.8 6.2 9.8
Table 8.2. Depending on education
Education
Variant of answer Elementary Incomplete
secondary
Secondary Secondary
vocational
Higher
(incomplete higher)
Never afraid 39.2 35.9 30.4 28.4 35.2
Sometimes is afraid 13.9 14.7 30.8 27.6 27.7
Often is afraid 12.7 9.2 12.5 16.0 18.7
Never openly express my
views 20.3 31.8 17.9 20.9 14.2
DA/NA 13.9 8.4 8.4 7.1 4.2
Table 8.3. Depending on status
Status
Variant of answer Employees of the
private sector
Employees of the
public sector
Students Pensioners Unemployed,
housewives
Never afraid 23.0 31.3 27.9 39.3 31.2
Sometimes is afraid 31.6 29.2 35.6 15.1 24.7
Often is afraid 17.6 13.7 16.3 11.4 19.5
Never openly express my
views 20.3 19.4 12.5 24.1 16.9
DA/NA 7.5 6.4 7.7 10.1 7.7
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Table 8.4. Depending on place of living
Area
Variant of answer Minsk Minsk
region
Brest and
region
Grodno
and region
Vitebsk and
region
Mogilev and
region
Gomel and
region
Never afraid 39.4 23.6 52.9 20.2 27.1 31.4 26.1
Sometimes is afraid 24.9 19.1 24.0 28.9 22.6 29.1 33.9
Often is afraid 9.7 19.5 8.7 17.9 19.2 14.5 11.8
Never openly express
my views 17.8 25.5 11.5 27.2 24.3 20.9 17.1
DA/NA 8.2 12.3 2.9 5.8 6.8 4.1 11.1
Table 8.5. Depending on type of settlement
Variant of answer Type of settlement
Capital Regional centers Cities Towns Village
Never afraid 39.4 27.5 29.8 28.5 33.4
Sometimes is afraid 24.9 27.9 24.5 34.9 20.4
Often is afraid 9.7 22.1 13.3 14.7 12.4
Never openly express my views 17.8 17.9 22.3 14.4 25.9
DA/NA 8.5 4.6 10.1 7.5 7.9
9. Distribution of answers to the question: "What is your attitude towards restoration of the USSR?"
Table 9.1. Depending on age
Variant of answer All Age, years old
respondents 18-19 20-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+up
For 38.8 22.9 24.3 18.2 32.1 36.2 43.4 62.3
Against 42.6 52.9 58.3 63.5 47.8 45.0 39.2 20.2
DA/NA 18.6 24.2 17.4 18.3 20.1 18.8 17.4 17.5
Table 9.2. Depending on education
Education
Variant of answer Elementary Incomplete
secondary
Secondary Secondary
vocational
Higher
(incomplete higher)
For 60.8 52.1 40.9 32.7 26.2
Against 22.8 23.0 43.7 46.9 55.8
DA/NA 16.4 24.9 15.4 20.4 18.0
Table 9.3. Depending on status
Status
Variant of answer Employees of the
private sector
Employees of the
public sector
Students Pensioners Unemployed,
housewives
For 22.5 35.8 17.3 61.5 22.1
Against 59.4 46.0 58.7 21.2 53.2
DA/NA 18.1 18.2 24.1 17.3 24.7
Table 9.4. Depending on place of living
Area
Variant of answer Minsk Minsk
region
Brest and re-
gion
Grodno
and region
Vitebsk and
region
Mogilev and
region
Gomel and
region
For 34.9 40.5 36.5 30.6 38.4 36.6 51.0
Against 48.0 34.1 44.7 43.4 42.9 51.2 35.5
DA/NA 17.1 25.4 18.7 26.0 18.6 12.2 13.5
Table 9.5. Depending on type of settlement
Variant of answer Type of settlement
Capital Regional centers Cities Towns Village
For 34.9 34.6 26.6 48.1 42.0
Against 48.0 52.9 48.4 32.1 38.7
DA/NA 17.1 12.5 25.0 19.8 19.3
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10.  Distribution of answers to the question: "It is known that the next election of deputies of local
Councils is to take place in spring of 2003. Are you going to take part in voting?"
Table 10.1. Depending on age
Variant of answer All Age, years old
respondents 18-19 20-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+up
Definitely would participate 32.6 34.3 21.5 27.0 28.0 29.0 42.5 40.2
Most likely would participate 35.7 32.9 29.2 35.8 34.7 41.7 33.5 35.6
Most likely would not participate 15.1 12.9 21.5 16.8 18.3 15.6 11.3 11.3
Definitely would not participate 10.9 18.6 21.5 13.1 11.6 7.2 10.4 6.7
DA/NA 5.7 1.3 6.3 7.3 7.4 15.5 2.3 6.1
Table 10.2. Depending on education
Education
Variant of answer Elementary Incomplete
secondary
Secondary Secondary
vocational
Higher
(incomplete higher)
Definitely would participate 43.0 36.9 26.9 32.0 37.8
Most likely would participate 34.2 33.2 38.2 34.8 34.5
Most likely would not participate 7.6 11.5 17.7 16.2 13.5
Definitely would not participate 11.4 10.1 10.3 11.9 10.9
DA/NA 3.8 8.3 7.9 5.1 3.3
Table 10.3. Depending on status
Status
Variant of answer Employees of the
private sector
Employees of the
public sector
Students Pensioners Unemployed,
housewives
Definitely would participate 22.5 30.9 34.6 41.9 22.1
Most likely would participate 36.9 37.2 31.7 34.5 31.2
Most likely would not partici-
pate 23.5 15.0 15.4 10.1 19.5
Definitely would not participate
10.2 10.8 16.4 8.0 20.8
DA/NA 6.9 6.1 1.9 5.5 6.4
Table 10.4. Depending on place of living
Area
Variant of answer Minsk Minsk
region
Brest and
region
Grodno
and region
Vitebsk and
region
Mogilev and
region
Gomel and
region
Definitely would
participate 29.7 27.7 35.1 37.6 24.9 32.6 40.0
Most likely would
participate 32.7 35.9 35.6 35.8 36.7 37.2 36.7
Most likely would not par-
ticipate 16.0 13.6 13.9 13.3 19.8 16.9 13.1
Definitely would not
participate 14.1 15.9 10.1 8.7 11.9 9.3 5.3
DA/NA 7.5 6.9 5.3 4.6 6.7 4.0 4.9
Table 10.5. Depending on type of settlement
Variant of answer Type of settlement
Capital Regional centers Cities Towns Village
Definitely would participate 29.7 36.7 28.7 28.8 36.3
Most likely would participate 32.7 38.3 37.2 37.8 33.8
Most likely would not participate 16.0 14.2 18.1 16.0 13.2
Definitely would not participate 14.1 7.5 7.4 12.2 11.2
DA/NA 7.5 3.3 8.6 5.2 5.5
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11. Distribution of answers to the question: "What candidate would you prefer to vote for?"
Table 11.1. Depending on age
Variant of answer All Age, years old
respondents 18-19 20-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+up
For A. Lukashenko’s supporter 29.2 15.7 15.3 13.9 14.2 21.5 34.9 60.4
For A. Lukashenko’s opponent 28.3 45.7 34.0 36.5 31.7 33.9 26.9 11.7
For another candidate 15.2 15.7 18.7 16.1 19.8 18.6 11.8 8.6
DA/NA 27.3 22.9 32.0 33.5 34.3 26.0 26.4 19.3
Table 11.2. Depending on education
Education
Variant of answer Elementary Incomplete
secondary
Secondary Secondary
vocational
Higher
(incomplete higher)
For A. Lukashenko’s supporter 65.8 51.6 26.1 21.6 16.9
For A. Lukashenko’s opponent 15.2 16.1 29.2 32.0 35.0
For another candidate 3.8 7.8 14.6 17.8 22.3
DA/NA 15.2 24.5 30.1 28.6 25.8
Table 11.3. Depending on status
Status
Variant of answer Employees of the
private sector
Employees of the
public sector
Students Pensioners Unemployed
housewives
For A. Lukashenko’s supporter 8.0 23.8 12.5 57.3 15.6
For A. Lukashenko’s opponent 42.2 29.2 44.2 14.1 35.1
For another candidate 19.3 16.9 23.1 7.4 16.9
DA/NA 30.5 30.1 20.2 21.2 32.4
Table 11.4. Depending on place of living
Area
Variant of answer Minsk Minsk
region
Brest and
region
Grodno and
region
Vitebsk and
region
Mogilev
and region
Gomel and
region
For A. Lukashenko’s
supporter 26.8 33.2 30.3 22.0 21.5 38.4 31.4
For A. Lukashenko’s
opponent 26.4 21.8 35.1 37.6 35.6 23.3 22.4
For another candidate 16.4 9.5 14.9 15.0 13.0 14.5 21.8
DA/NA 30.4 35.5 19.7 25.4 29.9 23.8 24.4
Table 11.5. Depending on type of settlement
Variant of answer Type of settlement
Capital Regional centers Cities Towns Village
For A. Lukashenko’s supporter 26.8 22.9 20.7 26.9 38.9
For A. Lukashenko’s opponent 26.4 35.8 27.1 25.6 27.9
For another candidate 16.4 23.3 22.9 8.3 11.9
DA/NA 30.4 18.0 29.3 39.2 21.3
12. Distribution of answers to the question: "How many times over the last 12 months have you visited foreign coun-
tries?"
Table 12.1. Depending on age
Variant of answer All Age, years old
respondents 18-19 20-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+up
Never 65.6 55.7 57.6 58.4 53.4 58.6 68.9 88.7
Once 17.3 25.7 23.6 16.1 21.3 21.5 14.7 7.7
Several times 12.0 14.3 14.6 20.4 19.0 11.4 10.8 2.5
More than 10 times 3.9 1.4 2.8 5.1 4.9 7.8 3.3 0.3
NA 1.2 2.9 1.4 0 1.4 0.7 2.3 0.8
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Table 12.2. Depending on education
Education
Variant of answer Elementary Incomplete
secondary
Secondary Secondary
vocational
Higher
(incomplete higher)
Never 96.2 84.3 69.6 56.7 46.4
Once 1.3 9.7 17.7 19.8 23.6
Several times 2.5 4.6 9.0 14.4 23.2
More than 10 times 0 0.9 2.7 7.5 4.5
NA 0 0.5 0.3 1.6 2.3
Table 12.3. Depending on status
Status
Variant of answer Employees of the
private sector
Employees of the
public sector
Students Pensioners Unemployed,
housewives
Never 33.2 64.3 59.6 87.0 57.1
Once 23.0 19.2 25.0 8.2 20.8
Several times 28.3 12.9 11.6 3.4 7.8
More than 10 times 15.0 2.4 1.9 0.1 13.0
NA 0.5 1.2 1.9 1.3 1.3
Table 12.4. Depending on place of living
Area
Variant of answer Minsk Minsk
region
Brest and
region
Grodno and
region
Vitebsk
and region
Mogilev and
region
Gomel and
region
Never 56.9 65.0 57.2 67.6 70.6 66.9 76.7
Once 23.4 18.2 16.3 11.6 14.1 20.9 14.3
Several times 14.9 10.9 15.9 13.9 13.0 9.9 6.1
More than 10 times 4.1 3.2 9.6 5.8 1.7 1.7 1.2
NA 0.7 2.7 1.0 1.1 0.6 0.6 1.5
Table 12.5. Depending on type of settlement
Variant of answer Type of settlement
Capital Regional centers Cities Towns Village
Never 56.9 57.1 67.6 65.4 74.5
Once 23.4 21.3 17.0 18.6 10.8
Several times 14.9 14.2 13.8 11.5 8.8
More than 10 times 4.1 4.6 1.6 3.5 4.6
DA/NA 0.7 2.8 0 1.0 1.3
Trends of change in Belarusian public opinion about some socio-economic
and political problems
(based on results of IISEPS’s national opinion polls, %)
Table 1. Confidence in mass media
Variant of answer 11'97 09'98 06'99 08'00 08'01 04'02
State-run mass media
– trust
– distrust
43.7
21.0
41.8
26.0
39.8
31.0
34.4
34.7
40.9
40.1
38.7
43.1
Non-state mass media
– trust
– distrust
25.4
24.1
19.6
32.6
19.5
34.9
28.0
34.1
29.0
44.7
32.2
43.9
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Table 2. The most attractive, corresponding to an ideal politicians
Politician1 11'97 09'98 06'99 08'00 08'01 04'02
V. Putin –2 –2 –2 56.9 60.9 68.1
. Lukashenko 50.4 51.5 47.2 31.3 39.4 26.0
G. Schroeder –2 –2 10.8 10.9 9.1 14.3
T. Blair –2 2.3 4.1 7.9 6.2 10.2
J. Chirac 9.5 9.9 15.7 9.4 10.7 9.3
G. W. Bush Jr. –2 –2 –2 –2 8.9 8.5
F. Castro 8.3 10.8 11.3 9.5 12.2 7.9
. Kwasneiwski 2.9 5.3 6.1 4.7 3.8 7.4
V. Havel 3.6 4.7 7.3 4.2 3.4 5.3
V. Adamkus –2 1.2 6.0 3.5 2.7 4.6
1
 Other politicians received less than 3% of votes
2
 Names of the given politicians were not offered in the polls indicated
Table 3. The best variant of Russia-Belarus relations
Variant of answer 06'97 11'97 09'98 11'99 08'00 08'01 04'02
Union of independent states 24.5 26.2 28.1 33.4 37.2 41.2 32.0
Good neighborly relations of
independent states 41.4 34.5 50.8 42.4 37.7 35.9 29.6
Unification into one state 16.3 27.5 20.1 21.8 22.5 21.2 31.9
Table 4. Voting at a hypothetical referendum on unification of Belarus and Russia
Variant of answer 03'99 11'99 08'00 02'01* 08'01 04'02
For unification 41.8 47.0 52.9 58.8 57.3 53.8
Against unification 40.4 34.1 29.4 26.0 20.9 23.0
Would not take part in voting 14.7 15.6 16.4 12.5 12.5 11.6
Table 5. Readiness to take part in public actions
Actions 03'99 11'99 04'00 11'00 08'01 10'01 04'02
Meetings, demonstrations, pickets:
– ready to take part
– not going to take part
18.7
54.7
11.4
53.6
19.8
57.4
17.9
60.2
16.7
71.4
15.5
74.4
16.9
68.3
Strikes:
– ready to take part
– not going to take part
12.9
61.1
14.5
61.4
13.4
64.0
13.5
67.1
12.9
78.0
14.5
78.8
14.8
75.5
Armed struggle:
– ready to take part
– not going to take part
7.7
69.2
7.0
70.4
6.4
73.0
5.6
77.6
4.0
86.1
4.8
86.2
5.9
86.3
* The given option was not offered
Table 6. Attitude towards negotiations of Belarus’ authorities and the opposition
Variant of answer 06'99 11'99 04'00 04'02
Negotiations are necessary, since only by means of negotiations it is possible to come to
common grounds and consider different interests in our society 38.3 45.3 50.8 48.2
Negotiations are not necessary, because authorities violate law and human rights, it is
necessary to force them observe laws, rather than maintaining a dialog 13.8 7.9 8.2 15.0
Negotiations are not necessary, because the opposition represents no one, and there is no
need for authorities to talk to it 16.9 15.5 14.8 19.9
Table 7. Attitude towards restoration of the USSR
Variant of answer 11'93 11'97 11'99 04'02
Positive 55.1 49.9 38.0 38.8
Negative 22.3 25.5 30.1 42.6
Table 8. Please, state average income (including wages, pensions and other incomes) for one family member last
month
Variant of answer 04'00 06'00* 07'00* 08'00 10'00 11'00 02'01* 04'01 06'01* 08'01 10'01 04'02
Below living wage
budget 68.2 64.1 58.3 50.4 69.0 65.8 57.9 54.2 52.0 50.5 44.9 49.9
From living wage
budget to
minimum living 20.6 23.7 28.9 30.5 19.6 22.1 25.7 32.3 33.0 32.4 34.7 31.1
From living wage
budget to $100 7.4 8.1 9.7 15.9 8.3 9.3 10.8 10.8 11.2 11.9 14.0 14.8
More than $100 1.8 1.7 1.2 2.2 2.2 1.6 2.5 1.8 2.0 4.6 5.8 4.2
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Table 9. Choice of economy time
Chose the following type
of economy
11'94 06'95 06'96 06'97 11'97 09'98 06'99 04'00 11'00 08'01 04'02
Market economy 51.0 52.1 53.8 65.4 69.0 74.6 72.1 74.1 73.5 56.6 61.8
Including:
With insignificant state con-
trol –1 –1 –1 30.4 32.8 35.2 36.8 41.7 41.4 33.3 40.5
With significant state con-
trol –1 –1 –1 35.0 36.2 39.4 35.3 32.4 32.1 24.3 21.3
Planned economy 46.2 45.1 44.2 30.3 25.7 22.8 24.7 22.7 21.5 18.2 18.3
1 Types of market economy were not offered in the given opinion polls.
Table 10. Choice of type of ownership
Consider the most efficient type of
ownership:
12'93 11'94 06'95 06'96 06'97 11'97 06'99 04'00 11'00 08'01 04'02
– private 52.8 45.9 41.8 42.5 48.3 41.4 50.7 53.1 53.1 44.7 54.1
– state 29.0 39.7 47.1 44.8 44.0 45.5 40.5 39.6 39.7 40.8 33.4
– other 13.6 12.0 9.3 11.2 5.7 11.3 7.5 5.7 5.0 2.2 3.7
Table 11. Change of economic situation over the last year
Consider that over the last year the
situation1:
06'96 06'97 11'97 09'98 11'99 04'00 11'00 08'01 04'02
– has improved 8.3 18.7 32.7 22.9 8.5 7.0 9.7 16.9 7.7
– has not changed 28.8 30.2 25.6 30.5 23.9 27.9 38.9 40.7 33.2
– has deteriorated 61.9 51.0 38.1 46.0 67.4 64.8 50.9 35.9 55.5
1 In questionnaires of November of 1997, September of 1997, and September of 1998 lines "has improved" and "has deteriorated" also include answers
"has rather improved" and "has rather deteriorated" respectively.
Table 12. What company would you prefer to work for?
Variant of answer 06'97 11'97 03'99 11'99 08'00 11'00 04'01 10'01 04'02
For a state-run company 62.9 53.5 58.7 49.1 48.9 47.1 46.3 42.3 41.2
For a private company 28.1 35.7 30.0 43.9 44.0 46.0 41.5 42.6 47.5
Table 13. Participation in private enterprise
Variant of answer 11'97 03'99 06'99 08'00 08'01 04'02
Has taken part and is going to proceed 29.2 12.9 11.6 14.8 14.0 17.8
Has taken part, but not going to proceed –1 7.5 9.4 10.0 10.6 8.9
Hasn’t taken part, but would like to try –1 30.7 27.6 30.2 33.0 35.5
Has never taken part and no going to 69.7 48.9 50.5 43.5 42.3 37.7
1 In the questionnaire of 1997 the respondents were offered variant "Yes" and "No".
Table 14. What language do you mostly speak in everyday communication?
Variant of answer 06'95 11'97 09'98 06'99 08'00 02'01* 10'01 04'02
Belarusian 4.5 5.7 2.9 2.5 4.0 4.0 1.7 2.6
Russian 37.3 40.6 39.2 39.8 40.9 42.4 46.3 46.3
Both Russian and Be-
larusian 7.8 20.3 22.7 29.0 21.8 18.7 20.9 19.9
Mixed 50.0 32.5 33.6 27.8 33.1 34.7 30.0 31.1
Other 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1
Table 15. Would you like to emigrate to a different country?
Variant of answer 11'99 04'00 08'00 11'00 10'01 04'02
Would not like moving
anywhere 61.2 57.4 58.1 60.1 52.0 50.3
Germany 15.2 16.0 15.9 14.1 18.5 16.5
United States 11.5 10.1 9.5 11.1 6.1 9.4
Poland 3.9 3.7 3.7 3.1 5.8 4.6
Russia 1.3 2.3 2.4 3.2 3.6 4.9
Baltic States 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.8 1.8
Other country 4.7 5.9 3.3 7.1 6.3 4.2
* The survey was conducted jointly with the Center for Social and Ecological Studies
The section was prepared by Prof. Manaev, A. Sasnow, V. Dorokhov, I. Burina
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Within the framework of the project "Strengthening role of independent social research and experts' net-
works in Belarus" a practical research seminar on the subject of "Social Research and Social Development in
Belarus" organized by IISEPS took place on June 7–8 in Gomel.
Reports were given by Prof. Oleg Manaev, IISEPS Director, Prof. Dr. Stanislav Bogdankevich, honorary
chairman of the United Civic Party, Dr. Peter Kozarzhewski of the Center of Social-Economic Studies (CASE,
Warsaw), Dr. Alyaksandr Sasnow, employee of IISEPS, Anatoly Kasyanenko, president of the Gomel-based
Center for Social Resources Development "Oracle", and others.
Representatives of different public organizations, political parties, labor unions, foreign representations,
international organizations, mass media and business-associations took part in the seminar.
We offer to your attention fragments of the most interesting reports given at the seminar.
INDEPENDENT RESEARCH AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
IN BELARUS: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
Prof. O. Manaev, IISEPS director
Independent research and analytical centers – think tanks – have become one of the modern social institutes that ap-
peared in Belarus after 1991. The key difference of these organizations from traditional scientific centers of university,
academic or departmental profile is that their activities are aimed not only at studying different problems of social devel-
opment, but also at solving them by means of working out well-founded prognoses, scenarios and recommendations.
Therefore many employees of think tanks find an application for their knowledge in power structures, whereas represen-
tatives of power structures – for their experience in these centers. The most prominent examples: K. Rice, advisor on na-
tional security for President George W. Bush, who used to be the vice-president at Stanford University, and G. Pavlovsky,
aide to President V. Putin on political issues, who founded and heads the Russian Foundation of Efficient Politics. Both of
them are commonly known to have a considerable influence over their bosses. Such a "circulation of knowledge and in-
fluence" resulted in an increased role of such centers in formation of public opinion and public policy in the West, and
they are even called the fifth power, after the press which is known as the fourth power.
The first think tanks appeared in Belarus in 1992, and in 1997 the most prominent of them joined into the Belarusian
Think Tanks uniting 18 organizations from Minsk and most of the country’s regions. The major motive for the creation of
such centers was the aspiration of scientists-sociologists, economists, politologists, lawyers, psychologists, representatives
of other social sciences – to promote the progress of social development of the country and its regions, because a gap be-
tween social science and practice characteristic of the Soviet times has not narrowed during the years of independence,
but, on the contrary, widened.
IISEPS has repeatedly published data of numerous national opinion polls, which proves that the rating of public trust
to think tanks surpasses the rating of trust to many other state and public institutions (including government, parliament,
local authorities, political parties, labor unions, etc.). A direct question on this topic clearly reveals people’s attitude to-
wards their activity (See Table 1).
As one could see, within four years Belarusians’ attitude towards the new social institutions has changed considerably:
in 1998 almost 60% knew nothing about them, today almost two thirds of the respondents know about them, and the
overwhelming majority thinks positive of them. The number of those who find it difficult to answer this question dropped
more than twofold!
The main reason for such an unusual respect of think tanks with the Belarusian public is the quality of information
and analyses they offer on the most important problems of social development, which is considered insufficient regardless
of the huge information-propagandistic apparatus of the state. So, according to the latest opinion poll conducted by
IISEPS, only 11.5% of the respondents said information received from official sources "fully corresponds to their real
life", two thirds said – "partially corresponds", and more than 16% – "does not correspond at all".
Another reasons, which is also of certain importance, is availability of information and analysis offered by think tanks.
Unlike traditional structures of social sciences (what does a wide public know about results of researches by academic in-
stitutions and universities?), independent centers offer to public most of their results, estimations and recommendations
on a regular basis via publication in press (during 10 years of its existence IISEPS has published about 1.900 materials in
Belarusian and foreign press, i.e. about two publications per week), different bulletins and books, conferences and semi-
nars, direct mailing of analytical materials (IISEPS’s mailing list includes about 200 leading public and private structures,
as well as all libraries of higher education establishments), thereby promoting the formation of an objective public opin-
ion, its influence upon public policy.
Unlike their colleagues in other countries, however, independent researchers and analysts of Belarus have faced seri-
ous and unexpected problems. At the first stage of development (before 1997) Belarus’ authorities cooperated – although
not so actively and openly as in neighboring countries – with think tanks: took part in their conferences and seminars,
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published materials in their periodicals, referred to their results while substantiating importance managerial decisions, in-
dependent analysts worked in various expert groups and councils at legislative, executive and judicial bodies, whereas
representatives of authorities often made part of constituent or advisory boards of many independent centers.
Table 1
Dynamics of the population’s confidence in the most important state and public institutions of Belarus, %*
State and public institutions 04‘02 10'98
Trust Distrust DA/NA Index of
trust**
Trust Distrust DA/
NA
Index of
trust
Church 51.9 27.4 20.7 +0.247 48.6 15.6 35.8 +0.329
Army 47.4 31.6 21.0 +0.159 36.8 23.2 40.0 +0.135
Independent research centers 40.4 24.9 34.7 +0.158 25.7 15.9 58.4 +0.098
State-run research centers 33.3 32.4 34.3 +0.009 -**** - - -
OSCE AMG in Belarus 28.8 31.4 39.8 -0.027 - - - -
State-run mass media 38.7 43.1 18.2 -0.044 41.8 26.0 32.2 +0.159
Constitutional court 35.5 40.2 24.3 -0.048 - - - -
Non-state mass media 32.2 43.9 23.9 -0.119 19.6 32.6 47.8 -0.130
Associations of entrepreneurs 25.0 38.3 36.7 -0.135 10.8 40.0 49.2 -0.292
Free and independent labor unions 27.6 41.0 31.4 -0.136 14.5 27.1 58.4 -0.126
President 32.4 50.1 17.5 -0.179 48.0 22.1 29.9 +0.258
Central Election Commission 29.6 47.7 22.7 -0.183 - - - -
KGB 27.7 46.9 25.4 -0.194 - - - -
Labor Unions forming the
Federation of Labor Unions 23.4 42.9 33.7 -0.198 14.9 29.2 55.9 -0.143
Courts 28.6 50.6 21.6 -.0266 22.4 38.8 38.8 -0.164
Governments 26.1 52.3 21.6 -0.266 29.9 26.1 44.0 +0.038
National Assembly 19.6 52.0 28.4 -0.328 18.9 26.6 54.5 -0.007
Political parties supporting
authorities 19.8 52.9 27.3 -0.335 5.4**
*
37.4 57.2 -0.320
Opposition political parties 15.2 54.4 30.4 -0.397
13th Supreme Soviet 15.7 51.0 33.3 -0.359 10.8 27.3 61.9 -0.165
Police 20.8 61.7 17.5 -0.413 20.9 43.8 35.3 -0.229
Local authorities 20.4 61.3 18.3 -0.414 24.3 37.4 39.3 -0.131
* Here and below results of national public opinion polls conducted by IISEPS are given (in all cases about 1.500 respondents were questioned using
the face-to-face method, margin of error did not exceed 0.03).
** Index of trust could vary from +1 to –1 and is calculated as a quotient of the sum of positive ("trust") and negative ("distrust") answers to the num-
ber of all the respondents who answered the question.
*** Parties were not divided in the given poll.
**** The questionnaire did not included the given institution.
Over the last five years the situation has changed dramatically: from a cautious cooperation with think tanks the
authorities have turned to an open confrontation with them. I would remind only of the most known examples, which
caused an international resonance: from the "claims" to the Belarusian Soros Foundation, the Independent Sociological
Institute "Vostok-Zapad" ("East-West") and the Charitable Foundation "Children of Chernobyl" in 1997 (as a result of
which some of these structures ceased their activities) to a new initiative by the Belarusian authorities (the resolution of
the Cabinet of Ministers # 707, dated May 31, 2002) to put under a strict control activities of independent research cen-
ters, not to publicize data of sociological surveys, since they allegedly "fulfil the order by those who sponsor them" (the
list varies from the "crafty West" to "shadow capital"). Accusations of bias, commercial dependence, political engage-
ment, and even espionage – have become a permanent refrain in speeches of many representatives of Belarus’ authorities
related to activities of Belarusian think tanks. Today, however, the public demonstrates support not in favor of authorities,
but independent research centers: according to the same survey by IISEPS, almost 63% of the respondents believe that
"sociological researches shall be conducted and their results shall be published without any permissions", only 14.8%
agree that "a permission by authorities is necessary to conduct sociological surveys and to publish their data".
The reason for such an aggressive attitude of authorities towards think tanks is, probably, explained by their striving to
be independent and to exert influence upon the process of social development, and not using a habitual "corridor" method
(by means of writing analytical notes and reports mostly for the "top"), but instead appealing directly to society.
The more independent research centers become, the higher their authority with society, the heavier pressure authori-
ties exert on them. And this is not just a matter of ideological-political views (quite different, in fact) of independent ana-
lysts. The striving for an independent position and influence on the process of social development, as we have already
mentioned, is the mission of think tanks – that is what they were created for (most of their employees used to work for
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state-run research institutes and universities).
Speaking objectively, the striving for independence and influence does not run counter to state interests. Thanks to
their unique character, think tanks act on principle of complementarity, rather than confrontation with the state. Even in
the present complex circumstances there are examples of an efficient cooperation. In early 1999 the leadership of the Be-
larusian Think Tanks offered the Belarusian Foreign Ministry their assistance in defrosting of TACIS programs (in the
fall of 1996 the European Union alloted about $6m for the projects of civic society development, but Belarus’ authorities
did not accept the chosen projects and offered their own variants, which Brussels did not like)/ as a result of joint efforts
the program was defrozen, and the projects are being carried out.
Another, and the most recent example – the publication of the results of IISEPS’s April national opinion poll (See the
article entitled "Collapse" in Narodnaya Volya of May 4, 2002), according to which A. Lukashenko’s rating dropped to
record low of 30.9%. A rough reaction by the president at the April 29 session of the Cabinet of Ministers is an evidence
of the fact that the disturbing [for authorities] tendencies of social development, revealed by independent centers, are, in
fact, being taken into account. During the ten years of its existence Belarusian think tanks have created a unique "early
social warning system", which allows authorities, civic society structures and wide public to recognize (or even take re-
spective measures) problems, tensions and conflicts that are becoming mature in the Belarusian socium. The principle of
complementarity is also displayed in the following: activities of independent Belarusian research centers (as well as their
colleagues in Central and Eastern Europe), as a rule, are supported – in terms of financial, technical and informational as-
sistance – by different international and foreign structures or private business, i.e. penniless for the state. Thus, the ag-
gressive reaction of Belarus’ authorities at their activity (including the notorious presidential decree #8, which put up se-
rious obstacles for the whole third sector in receiving assistance from abroad) seems absolutely inadequate. Unlike the
authorities, "which are afraid of their own shadow", Belarusians are quite loyal to such assistance (See Table 2).
Table 2
Distribution of answers to the question: "Below is the list of possible assistance to Belarusian non-state public or-
ganizations from the side of foreign countries and world community. Which forms of it you think acceptable from
the moral, political and other points of view?", %
Variants of answer Acceptable Unacceptable DA/NA
10'98 04'02 10'98 04'02 10'98 04'02
Educational support (by means of seminars, conferences in
Belarus and abroad) 61.2 77.3 7.9 10.5 31.0 12.2
Technical support (PCs, copiers, faxes, printers and other
equipment) 65.6 76.8 8.3 11.9 26.1 11.3
Humanitarian aid (food products, medicines, clothes, etc.) 54.1 74.3 16.6 13.5 29.4 12.2
Financial support 60.9 67.3 12.6 18.6 26.5 14.1
Moral-political support (official statements, discussions at
meetings with official representatives of Belarus,
campaigns in mass media) 46.9 63.7 14.1 18.2 39.0 18.1
Informational support (providing newspapers, journals, bul-
letins, etc.) 43.3 64.1 15.1 15.9 41.6 20.0
Weight-average index 55.3 70.6 10.0 14.8 32.3 14.7
As we see, the majority of the respondents consider various assistance from international organizations to the Belaru-
sian third sector quite acceptable, and during the last four years the number of those who are in favor of such assistance
has increased by 25%, while the number of those who find it difficult to give an answer – has fallen twofold!
Due to a cautious or hostile attitude of the authorities towards activities of independent research centers, their influ-
ence upon social development has taken rather specific shapes, distinguishing Belarus from other countries: civic society
structures rather than the state have become their major partner, and wide public – their major consumer. According to
the data of a special survey in the third sector, recently conducted by the Gomel Center for Development of Social Re-
sources "Oracle", Belarus’ think tanks together with related NGO’s and mass media have become the most efficient part-
ners of Belarusian non-governmental organizations.
Interest in data of independent researchers and trust to them form the side of the society are turning into a powerful
factor of their influence upon public opinion and through it on different processes of social development. The results of
such influence are seen from Table 3.
As we see, the audience of think tanks – are people sharing democratic and market values, supporters of Belarus’ inde-
pendence, respecting international structures and standards. Those who know nothing about activities of such centers are
of different, sometimes diametrically opposite, opinions.
Independent press has become the most important and efficient – we could say strategic – partner of Belarusian think
tanks. According to the results of IISEPS’s latest national opinion poll (conducted in April of 2002), about 73% of those
who trust independent mass media, simultaneously trust think tanks (compare: opposition political parties – only 21.2%,
labor unions – 17.1%, government – 17.0%, Supreme Council – 19.3%, National Assembly – 11.3%). Within the last four
years the crossing of audiences of independent mass media and think tanks has jumped by almost 30% (See Table 4).
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Table 3
A comparative social-political portrait of those who trust figures and analysis by independent
research centers and those who know nothing about them, %*
Social-political features Attitude towards figures and analysis by
independent research centers
Trust
(37.5)
Know nothing about such centers
(16.9)
Satisfied with A. Lukashenko’s seven-year rule:
• Rather yes
• Partially yes, partially no
• Rather no
23.7
40.4
34.9
35.7
43.1
20.4
Want A. Lukashenko to be the president of Belarus for another term:
• Yes
• No 35.5
44.1
53.5
16.6
Believe that if A. Lukashenko is elected for a new term,
his policy:
• Might become more progressive
• Might become more reactionary
• Would remain unchanged
24.1
20.9
46.8
25.4
7.5
39.6
The most important aspects of candidates for presidency while voting:
• Continuation of A. Lukashenko’s present policy
• Changing A. Lukashenko’s policy cardinally 30.6
66.7
52.6
39.9
• Strengthening of Belarus’ independence
• Further integration of Belarus and Russia
48.0
51.5
31.5
65.2
• Carrying out market reforms
• Continuation of the present economic course
74.8
23.0
48.0
42.0
• Strengthening law and order by means of perfecting legislation,
 society’s control over power structures
• Strengthening law and order by means of widening power
structures and their functions
85.3
14.0
68.2
26.0
• Increasing role of state in politics and economy
• Increasing role of citizens in politics and economy
29.2
68.4
43.7
46.8
If tomorrow a new presidential election takes place, would you vote
for (open question):
• . Lukashenko
• An alternative candidate
37.3
15.7
57.4
2.4
The 2001 presidential election in Belarus was free and fair:
• Yes
• No
• D/A
35.4
36.1
28.4
49.3
13.0
37.7
Belarusians’ readiness to express their political views:
• No one is afraid
• Some people are afraid
• Many people are afraid
• All are afraid
• D/A
22.2
33.9
34.1
7.9
2.0
17.1
34.3
17.4
3.3
28.0
Attitude towards the meeting of labor union on February 14, 2001:
• Positive
• Indifferent
• Negative
• Heard nothing about it
62.4
9.4
7.9
15.0
40.6
6.7
5.5
40.0
Consider the best variant of relations between Russia and
Belarus:
• Good neighborly relations of two independent states
• Union of independent states
• Unification into one state
35.9
33.4
29.0
17.4
26.5
53.8
43
Attitude towards OCSE AMG’s training of 14.000 observers to
monitor the presidential election:
• Positive
• Negative
• Heard nothing about it
65.4
13.5
12.0
19.9
8.5
47.4
Believe that OSCE AMG violates Belarusian laws:
• Yes, violates
• No, does not violate
• Heard nothing about the AMG
14.9
47.1
10.8
7.0
11.5
45.7
Believe that:
• It is necessary to get a permission from authorities to publish
 data of sociological surveys
• Data of such surveys shall be publicized to the maximum without
 any permissions
• D/A
8.8
83.6
7.6
5.2
25.7
69.2
* Based on IISEPS’s poll conducted in February of 2001.
Table 4
Dynamics of audience of non-state mass media,
simultaneously trusting independent research centers, %
Time of opinion
poll
Those who trust non-state mass media and
simultaneously trust independent research centers
09'98 44.4
11'99 51.4
11'00 56.9
10'01 65.2
04'02 72.7
Table 5
Distribution of answers to the question: "Recently mass media have frequently published materials of independ-
ent research centers. Publications of which centers are you familiar with?", %
National public
opinion poll
Elite survey*Independent research center
All
respondents
Employees of the
private
sector
Employees of
the public sec-
tor
IISEPS 20.2 96.2 100.0 90.9
Novak Laboratory 5.0 84.9 83.9 86.4
Center of Social and Ecological Studies 5.0 3.8 6.5 -
International Institute of Political Studies 3.1 13.2 9.7 18.2
Lev Sapega Foundation 2.6 26.4 22.6 31.8
Strategia (Strategy) Analytical Center 1.7 64.2 61.3 68.2
Belorusskaya Perspektiva (Belarusian Prospect) scien-
tific-analytical center 1.4 22.6 25.8 18.2
Center for Support of Associations and Foundations
SCAF 0.8 9.4 12.9 4.5
Belarusian Center of Constitutionalism and Comparative and
Legal Studies 0.5 18.9 25.8 9.1
Other 3.3 - - -
DA/NA 66.3 1.9 - 4.5
* IISEPS’s national public opinion poll was conducted in April of 2002, the elite survey (60 policymaker, businessmen, scientists and journalists al-
most equally representing the private and public sectors were interviewed, interviewees could give several answers) was conducted in November of
2000.
Today, almost three fourths of those who trust independent mass media and
think tanks – are basically the same people! The reasons for such a close correlation of their audiences are evident:
both institutions combine (of course, in different proportion) two major types of activities – perception of society and in-
fluence upon it. Inner mechanisms of their activities differ considerably, but the outcomes look alike – information and
analysis addressed to the society. Moreover, the alliance of the two civic society institutions is mutually beneficial: infor-
44
mation and analysis offered by non-state mass media on the basis of materials provided by think tanks become more rea-
soned and persuasive, obtaining, in turn, a direct access to society, think tanks become more prominent and respected.
Since the scope of activity and influence of independent mass media (the permanent audience of which is fourfold smaller
than that of the Belarusian television) and think tanks (which employ less people than a single state-run academic institu-
tion) cannot be compared with the state, their alliance strengthens the positions of both sides and their influence upon the
society also increases. Aside form that, today there is a number of such centers functioning in Belarus and well-known to
Belarus’ elite and wide public (See Table 5).
While the opposition circles are debating to what extent mass media and research centers should be supported (though
they constantly oppose the attempts of these circles to control them), the Belarusian authorities, understanding well the
potential role of the alliance of independent mass media think tanks, are creating new limits for their activity. Undoubt-
edly, a growing role of this unique alliance in the public-political process objectively increases the role of other society
forces interested in changes, reveals new prospects for democratic development of Belarus, strengthening of its independ-
ence and returning to the European community. Just in the alliance with independent press, civic society and wide public,
in my opinion, are the prospects for a further development of independent social research in Belarus and their influence
upon the country’s social development.
ROLE OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES IN SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF
BELARUS: PROBLES AND PROSPECTS
Prof. S. Bogdankevich, IISEPS Advisory Board Chairman
By the moment when Belarus obtained political independence there was neither mature democratic society in the
country nor structured democratic forces. The most important feature of the post-Soviet society was its primary adherence
to social fairness values as interpreted by Bolsheviks’ ideology. Most Belarusians put these values above political and eco-
nomic freedoms and civil rights, which resulted in a long-time conservation of traditional communist myths and stereo-
types in public consciousness, coming to power of populist neo-Soviet political forces that correspond to such public
moods and, in fact, public support of the authoritarian regime.
During the past years of independent development some changes have taken place in public consciousness in terms of
value perception with respect of understanding importance of civil rights and freedoms, ideological, political and eco-
nomic pluralism, structuring society by ideological, political and economic opinions and preferences. Mostly it affected
the most educated part of the society and relates to the formation of different non-governmental organizations as well as
independent mass media. First of all, under their influence public consciousness changes towards democracy and plural-
ism, civic society is being formed and it declares to the state its claims, exerts certain influence on the country’s social-
political and economic course, respect of civil rights and freedoms. As a result, according to the survey of Belarusian soci-
ety development index conducted by the international organization CIVICUS with the assistance of UN, our civic society,
regardless of a complex political environment, is relatively "healthy" and promotes progressive values, is enough struc-
tured and influential. Among the mishaps pinpointed in the survey are: the problem of irregular distribution of public or-
ganizations in the regions, limited resources and their complete dependence on international donors, underdeveloped spe-
cialized resource centers. There are no alternative channels for support of non-governmental organizations from the side
of the state and business in the country.
Unlike other European countries, including Russia, the state does not stimulate the development of civic society, does
not use the system of state orders or sponsorship to realize the programs aimed at satisfying social requirements of the
population which would have been carries out by non-governmental organizations. Both central and local state bodies in-
sufficiently use research and other data offered by public organizations. Moreover, the state limits the activity of civic so-
ciety, puts forward a complex procedure for registration of its organizations, an unfavorable tax legislation, a bureaucratic
system of control over donor assistance and charity.
The influence of civic society upon public consciousness in the sphere of culture, business, ecology, education, social
security, protection of citizens’ rights, international politics, etc., seems rather strong. The dynamics of public opinion
polls conducted by IISEPS proves it. However, the influence on real politics of the state is minimal. The activity of civic
society, as a rule, is covered by state-run mass media rather negatively. The state basically ignores organizations of civic
society and they play no significant role in the process of elaboration and realization of state policy.
For example, for years unions of entrepreneurs, research centers, sociological laboratories, political parties put a well-
reasoned question before the authorities about a considerable decrease in licensed activities, inadmissibility of extortions
from entrepreneurs, including "voluntarily" upon decisions of local authorities. In his election campaign statements
A. Lukashenko took obligation to solve the problem of conditions for small and medium business, including the issue of
licensing. But the things are tight were they started. On the contrary, if A. Lukashenko promised to limit the list of li-
censed activities to 13, in fact, diametrically opposite decisions are being taken. In April of 2002 the government adopted
the resolution "About measure to perfect the regulation of exports and imports" in line with which the list of goods, ex-
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ports and imports of which should be approved by the Ministry of Agriculture and licensed by the Ministry of Trade (a li-
cense and a registration certificate cost 430.000 rubles), was widened.
Not only independent mass media, but even the pro-presidential Sovetskaya Belorussia, are abundant in information
about arbitrariness of local authorities towards entrepreneurs, their public insults when applying for registration and li-
censing, about examples when license to private trucking was denied and which might have stimulated competition and
brought prices down, about using financial check-ups to extort bribes, etc. According to the estimates of the union of en-
trepreneurs, last year such a forced "charity" cost Belarusian entrepreneurs about $5.5m.
Non-governmental organizations are created by the society and are working for its benefit. It would have been in the
national interests, in the interests of the state to form legal and political conditions for an efficient functioning of civic so-
ciety organizations, for a wide usage of results of their activity.
Along with the activity of non-governmental organizations, the development of civic society resulted in the appearance
of political parties and ideologically related public associations, free labor unions and an increasing independence of tra-
ditional ones, revival of traditional churches and development of new churches, first of all protestant denominations. Un-
doubtedly, even in the present difficult political and economic conditions, their activity for democracy development,
spiritual revival of society, protection of rights and freedoms of citizens, for perfection of legislation and economic rela-
tions is extremely useful.
A multipolar political community is gradually being formed in the political sphere. Political institutions, based on
different ideologies and opinions, have been created in the country to assist in revealing and expressing political will of
citizens.
Political parties are still not numerous and do not enjoy the necessary support with the society. But one shall not be
disappointed, because everything could change. The experience of post-Soviet states, first of all Russia, shows that only
after a transition to formation of representative authorities on majority-proportional principle a real political structuring of
the society takes place, which reveals electorate’s attitude towards one or another ideology, political program and their
carriers. In the conditions of the totalitarian regime it would be better to speak about two existing parties: the "party of
power" and the "party of opposition", because until the country returns to democracy a real structuring of the society is
almost impossible.
The creation of the civic coalition before the election was based on the above understanding of the problem. After the
presidential election opinion polls demonstrate that the "party of power" loses public support, and the electorate of the
"opposition party" grows in number. At the same time, as the April 2002 survey showed, 54% of the respondents believe
that opposition politicians known to the society enjoy certain respect and they influence people’s life.
After the defeat of democratic forces at the parliamentary and presidential elections, some prominent public figures of
the country claim there is a public necessity in appearance on the political arena of moderate, centrist forces, about ex-
tremism of existing political parties and exhausted "political pensioners". In their opinion, the whole opposition move-
ment in Belarus is in a deep crisis and only a third political force, which would be based on widely accepted liberal-
democratic values, might be able to solve the problem of gaining public support and to ensure the country is retaking the
path of democracy and prosperity. Such estimation has been recently voiced, in particular, by L. Zaiko, the president of
Strategia (Strategy) Analytical Center, L. Zlotnikov, a prominent propagandist of liberal values, S. Dubovets, a figure of
Belarusian culture, A. Arkush, the editor-in-chief of Kalosye journal, and other people.
Such and similar statements ignore the real environment in which the existing political parties and public organiza-
tions are functioning. Under the rule of authoritarian regime, legal arbitrariness, absence of independent parliament, in-
dependent judicial system, monopoly on electronic mass media at any moment the head of state could announce and the
state propaganda widely publicize that economist L. Zaiko, liberal L. Zlotnikov and the structures they head are extrem-
ists or anti-national formations. And the electorate would consider them that way.
But that does not mean that white has in reality become black. Realistically, A. Lukashenko is the true extremist, pub-
licly insulting and labeling democratic politicians, prominent figures of Belarusian culture and other opposition and not
only public figures, publicly alleging that decent citizens of our country are sinful unless they take a lackey position to-
wards his regime and policy, constantly violating any rules and laws.
It would have been naive at least to follow A. Lukashenko’s example and to consider Belarusian public figures, who
have a rich experience of state activities for the benefit of the country and who used to cooperate with A. Lukashenko until
he turned into the sole dictator causing damage to the country, the extremist irreconcilable opposition, accepting no com-
promises, having no desire to talk and cooperate with the real authorities. None of the prominent ex-statesmen, who form
or used to form the core of democratic opposition – including G. Karpenko, M. Chigir, M. Grib, M. Marinich,
A. Lebedko, V. Leonov, A. Dobrovolsky. P. Kozlovsky, V. Shlyndikov, V. Goncharik, Y. Khodyko, S. Domash,
S. Kalyakin, A. Bukhvostov and many others – has ever been nationalist, anti-Russian or pro-NATO figures, or extrem-
ists. As well as the well-known cultural figures – V. Bykov, N. Gilevich, G. Buravkin. The list of prominent Belarusians
staying in the opposition and alleged to be traitors, nationalists, swindlers, extremists, is rather long.
Of course, there are extremist exceptions in democratic opposition. At a stretch, only Z. Poznyak’s party of the Belaru-
sian Popular Front, which he head from abroad, could be considered such an exception. At dawn of Belarus’ independ-
ence the BPF headed by Z. Poznyak was the widely recognized leader of democratic forces based on the idea of Belarusian
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statehood and total sovereignty.
Today programs of the major opposition parties include protection of Belarusian statehood and sovereignty as one of
their priorities and is no longer the prerogative of the BPF. At the same time Z. Poznyak’s party expresses views and in-
terests of the most nationalist-minded strata of our society. It advocates the idea of maximalism, formation of Belarusian
liberation movement. Contrary to moods of the majority, the party rejects the idea of a close cooperation with Russia, de-
mand an immediate and complete de-russification, is against talks between the opposition and the ruling regime, against
cooperation with the OSCE AMG.
As for the "Adradzhenne" (Revival) Party of the BPF, its program is not of an extremist nature and corresponds to
European standards. To a great extent its activity is of a cultural-enlightenment character aimed at revival of the national
culture and the Belarusian language, protection of Belarusian statehood and total sovereignty. However, in the eyes of
wide public this party is seen archinationalistic and extremist.
Appeals by S. Dubovets and A. Arkush to the political opposition to change its course, to get over to one field with the
authorities and play according to one and the same rules and offer A. Lukashenko and his regime "the pipe of peace",
stepping over even moral aspects related to the disappearance of the opposition politicians, to support A. Lukashenko in
his secret opposition to democratic Russia are based on a wrong assessment of successes of totalitarian regime and democ-
racy’s defeats. From the one hand it is known that the political opposition has for a long time been open for talks, com-
promises and has always claimed about it. The opposition has never spoken against Russia’s capital inflow on a competi-
tive basis or privatization with participation of foreign capital. The opposition is struggling not against A. Lukashenko,
but for elimination of the authoritarian regime, separation of power, rule of law, independence of judicial power and free-
dom of mass media, freedom of voters’ will at elections without falsifications. What of this could be considered as ex-
tremist demands? It is not true that the present opposition is putting spokes in the country’s wheels. It struggles against
dictatorship for a prospering Belarus. It tries to help Belarus’ authorities not to allow an economic collapse, offering its
own concepts, programs and projects, dialog and cooperation. The opposition sees the real weakness of the regime, its
"Pyrrhic" victories. This is not the opposition, but the regime is in political and economic doldrums. Its forces are dying
away. A. Lukashenko’s positions are not unshakable, there are enough people able to replace him. Separate defeat moods
are unlikely to force, as the regime hopes, the opposition to give up the struggle for democracy and reforming the country.
Undoubtedly, political parties have to get rid of the past mistakes and mishaps as soon as possible, mistakes such as
the election boycott and dissemination of illusions about the possibility to remove the regime with the help of street [ac-
tions]. They have to stay united to solve common democratic and economic tasks, to be the leader of the wide civic coali-
tion (the "opposition party"), consisting of all the major structures of civic society, to nominate new leaders from demo-
cratic ranks. At the same time, there is no need for new parties to appear – guided by an incorrect assessment of political
situation or for the sake of some individual ambitions. Moderate centrists forces are widely represented in the functioning
liberal, social-democratic and other parties labeled by official propaganda as extremist and nationalist. However,
L. Zlotnikov, for example, claims that a new liberal party might change the country’s development vector, since this
ideological niche in Belarus’ political space is vacant.
In fact, the niche is not vacant. There is a moderate centrist party keeping to a liberal-democratic ideology – the
United Civic Party. The UCP is the most elite party in terms of its staff. As we know, this p[arty was claimed for by
democratic public – in the 13th Supreme Council it had a faction of 18–22 deputies. The party was headed by widely
known statesmen and public figures – G. Karpenko, deputy of the 12th and 13th Supreme Council, Deputy Chairman of the
Supreme Council (died under unknown circumstances), V. Gonchar – vice premier of A. Lukashenko’s government, the
Central Election Commission Chairman, later – Deputy Chairman of the 13th Supreme Council (disappeared in 1999),
Y. Zakharenko – minister of interior of A. Lukashenko’s government (disappeared in 1999).
Over the last several years the party has made a number of tactical mistakes what weakened its influence in the soci-
ety. However, after the April 2002 4th Congress it actively restores its image of a moderate centrist party, its influence
widens. The party has unambiguously claimed it is going to take part in all subsequent election campaigns, worked out a
new Program, a new Strategy and tactics of its activity, set the course at maintaining dialog and cooperation with demo-
cratic forces in authorities, including the House of Representatives. It responded at a declarative appeal of authorities to
cooperate for the benefit of the country, sending to the government a Program of social-democratic reforms for Belarus
elaborated by prominent economists, Programs of budget and tax reforms, a Concept of pension reform as well as more
than 20 law drafts. Unfortunately, regardless of its own appeal to cooperate, the government declines to discuss the proj-
ects submitted by the party. Facing a factual collapse of the current economic policy, Belarus’ authorities turned out not
ready for a sweep change of its doomed economic course and even to discuss the submitted economic proposals. At the
same time, a dialog between the authorities and the opposition seems inevitable.
In order to strengthen its centrist image, the UCP widened its ranks with prominent public figures and statesmen.
Among its new members are: M. Chigir – the first premier of A. Lukashenko’s government, A. Pavlov – the former rector
of the Belarusian State University, the leader of the Minsk education and science labor union, A. Petrovsky – the former
deputy education minister, V. Starovoitov – a hero of Socialist labor, and a number of other Belarusians known for their
liberal-democratic views.
L. Zlotnikov’s statements that the party allegedly simplifies the reasons for the opposition’s defeat, boils them down to
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the lack of proper conditions for a free will and falsifications, that the party denies the ruling regime has a social base are
absolutely groundless and run counter to an official estimation of the reasons for the defeat. Also he groundlessly alleges
that the party is solidary with the BPF’s position regarding the issues of integration with Russia, usage of the Russian lan-
guage, that the UCP rejected a fundamental principle of liberalism – priority of human rights over the interests of nation
and state. In reality, it is quite the contrary. The UCP unconditionally speaks in favor of Belarus remaining a sovereign
state, it is for a close integration with Russia, welcomes an inflow of Russia’s capital in the process of privatization and
selling stocks – on a competitive basis, for a free usage of Belarusian and Russian, against jointing NATO, etc.
In its political activity the opposition must consider negative tendencies that appear in the economy. The ruling
authoritarian regime remains in captivity of its own myths and illusions. A. Lukashenko’s annual address to the parlia-
mentarians reads: "The country’s economy is steadily developing. Belarus is on the rise". It has been repeatedly stated, in-
cluding in Russia, that thanks to a special development model, contrary to recommendations of doctors-professors, Be-
larus is the only post-Soviet state which has managed to exceed the 1990 level of production.
This is mere bluffing. In terms of production of the most important types of industrial goods as compared to 1990 –
the figures are between 23% (tractors) to 49% (chemical fiber). There is only a 14% rise in the production of refrigerators.
The cattle is only 53% of the 1990 level, cows – 70%, pigs – 57%; the grain production – 73%, milk – 52%, cattle and
poultry – 44%.
Constant delays in solving the ripe problems, rejection of reforms, misuse of administrative levers, self-isolation of
foreign investments resulted in a complete exhaustion of reserves to support the current production and people’s incomes.
As of early 2002, on average basic assets are 80% worn-out, the level of wear annually goes up by 3% because of the lack
of investments, half of Belarus’ enterprises has totally "ate through" their working capital, another third has only 15–20%
of the minimum need, 4.002 enterprises registered as loss-making, or 34% of their total number (against 22.3% on Janu-
ary 1, 2001), and after the first quarter of 2002 – half of all functioning Belarusian enterprises; the level of profitability of
the leading sector dropped more than twofold within the second half of 2001 and the first quarter of 2002 and on average
is less than 6% (against 13.1% of 2000).
From the second half of 2001 the foreign trade balance became negative, and the deficit of payment balance reached
10% of the GDP. Within the first quarter of 2002 the volume of exports decreased by 10% as compared to the planned
figures. There is a foreign trade deficit of $120m. And considering inflation in 16% of such enterprises – more than 75%.
With the 2001 GDP of 14.9 trillion rubles, accounts payable equaled 8.8 trillion rubles, of which half are officially over-
due. The total amount of debts to the budget exceeded 208 billion rubles. In April Belarus’ debt for natural gas increased
by $22m, and the total debt amounts to $292m, including $260m – to Gazprom. As of May 13, regardless of loans given
by commercial banks to pay out wages, the total amount of backpay totaled 29 billion rubles. Pensions are paid in time
only in every tenth district. Real incomes of the population dropped in the first quarter of 2002 almost by 25% as com-
pared to the fourth quarter of 2001.
The following data is an evident of the situation at A. Lukashenko’s motherland. During the first four months Mo-
guilev region’s industrial enterprises reduced production by 5%, in April the production volume amounted to 88% of
April last year. Foreign trade shrunk by 6.2% as compared to 2001. The budget arrears exceeded 26 billion rubles.
On May 28 the Belarusian government summed up the economy’s development in the current year. Formally, during
the four months of 2002 only 7 out of 16 social-economic prognosis parameters were met. Including a 4.1% growth of the
GDP, in reality this growth replenished stocks of unsold goods, which reached 73.8% of monthly production.
Regardless of the above data, Belarus’ authorities still speak about correctness and invariability of the Belarusian de-
velopment model and the current economic course. Setting all authorities’ hopes upon the administrative resource, re-
jecting long ripening reforms, inability to recognize that the current policy is wrong, political and investment self-
isolation cost the Belarusian people dear. Still there is no middle class in Belarus, the state has not ensured accumulation
of national capital even for small business.
Today, having led the economy into a deadlock, the authorities are ready to sell out the country’s property to foreign-
ers, Russian oligarchs, first of all, the leading Belarusian petrochemical enterprises. Privatization of industrial enterprises,
worn-out and almost unprofitable, would be carried under conditions while over the last several years the strategic branch
western capital, which would have secured new technologies and new markets, settled in other countries with economy in
transition, which created favorable conditions for outside investments in good time.
Many Belarusian enterprises turned into junk, lost their value and are unattractive for a civilized branch investor. In
such conditions Russian oligarchs, Russian capital, very often of a questionable nature, become the only alternative for
Belarus’ industry.
In industrialized Europe small and medium business amounts to 60% of the GDP, in Belarus – less than 10%. Only by
means of developing small and medium business it is possible to avert rocketing unemployment caused by the necessity to
liquidate loss-making jobs, to increase people’s incomes.
In estimation of independent Belarusian experts, this year Belarus’ economy is doomed to stagnation. The lack of
working capital, price and other non-competitiveness of goods, loss-making or low profitability, a deepening tax and
budget crisis and crisis of non-payment, would force to increase the ruble’s monetary expansion. Unless the country re-
ceives some $300-500m in outside investments (through privatization, etc.), directive parameters envisioned by the Pro-
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gram of Social-Economic Development of Belarus most likely would fail. Instead of 20–27%, the year’s inflation would
amount to 70-100%, the dollar exchange rate might fall to 2.700–3.000 rubles for $1. The population’s real incomes
would drop by 3–5%, instead of a 8% rise. Unfortunately, this is only the beginning of the requital for the current igno-
rant policy
INFLUENCE OF THINK TANKS ON POLICY OF REFORMS: CASE
EXPERIENCE
P. Kozarzhewski, Ph.D., Center of Social-Economic Studies (Warsaw)
1. Necessity of establishing think tanks in the process of postsocialist transformations
Postsocialist transformation is a complex process demanding an efficient intellectual support. One of its specific features
is a certain constructivism, i.e. the necessity of a purposeful establishing of institutions and public relations, which
couldn’t ripen in the conditions of socialist order. That is the major difference of our countries from countries with devel-
oped market economy and democratic political order (the so-called countries of developed capitalism), where the devel-
opment, as a rule, was of a organic, evolutionary character, and major state institutions were established and improved
when socially required. This difference predetermines a significant role, which researchers and experts should assume in
the process of postsocialist transformations, since novelty and complexity of the processes do not allow copying prepared
decisions from the countries where capitalism was under creation several centuries ago, and mistakes while modeling a
new reality might be too costly.
However, the problem was that the potential of institutions of socialist times, which are engaged in research and ex-
pert activities, did not meet the requirements of postsocialist transformations. For example, in the late 80’s and early 90’s
leading specialists and directors of respective institutions of the USSR Academy of Sciences, as a rule, still thought in the
categories of socialist economic and political relations, their mentality and skills did not allow to efficiently support mar-
ket reforms. Unfortunately, that relates even to those institutions which in Soviet times were considered as oases of free-
thinking – for example the Institute of World Social System Economy, where studies devoted to socialism’s crisis first ap-
peared in early 80’s. The same scientists, who were able to take part in elaboration and support of reforms, could not do it
in ossified institutional frameworks of (post) Soviet science.
The situation in other countries of the "socialist camp" was different, even where there was no restrictions on freedom
of scientific studies, contacts with western scientists and possibilities to publish, as in the USSR. In Poland, for example,
although the concept of reforms was worked out by Polish economists who processed the experience of western economic
thought and struggle against economic crisis, it soon turned out that existing by that time state scientific-research centers
(academic institutions and higher education establishments) were not able to ensure an intellectual support to reforms.
Reforms were supported only by some scientists who entered the government and governmental advisory bodies, but not
organizations as such. An illustration of such paradox is the 1989 inflow of most employees of the Economy Functioning
Sector of the Institute of Economic Studies at the Polish Academy of Sciences into governmental and related structures.
Its employees, in particular, took the positions of the National Bank Chairman and Deputy Finance Minister. The role of
the institute is still very modest.
In such situation there was an objective necessity to establish independent private institutions which would study the
field of reforms and be able to efficiently support transformations. In Poland several such organizations were created, the
largest of which are the Institute of Market Economy Studies in Gdansk and the Center of Social-Economic Studies
(CASE) in Warsaw.
2. CASE: goals, activity, problems, prospects
CASE is an independent and fully private organization having a legal status of foundation. It was established in Septem-
ber of 1991 y a group of Polish economists who in 1989–1991 actively participated in preparation and fulfillment of re-
forms. In particular, B. Blaszczyk, who contributed to the privatization policy elaboration, became the Center Board
Chairperson, L. Balczerovich became the Council Chairman, and its members, in particular, M. Dombrovski (former fi-
nance vice-minister and chairman of the Privatization Council of the Prime Minister), A. Fornalczik (former Antimonop-
oly Committee Chairman) and other people.
The CASE mission is to support economic, social and political reforms in Poland, other countries of Central and East-
ern Europe, as well former Soviet republics.
The major directions of CASE’s activity are as follows:
- conducting economic research jointly with scientists and organizations from Poland and other countries;
- distribution of research results and popularization of the most important discoveries in economy theory;
- education activity – organizing seminars, course, conferences, etc.;
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- expert services to governmental and non-governmental organizations in Poland and abroad;
- cooperation with Polish and foreign research centers;
- support of the NGO sector development in the former USSR states, in particular, be means of establishing branch
institutions.
The major themes of research and expert activity are:
- macroeconomic policy;
- social policy;
- privatization and restructuring;
- corporate management.
The major consumers of our research and services are:
- governments of Poland and other postsocialist countries (in particular, CASE is carrying out or carried out such
projects in Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan, Mongolia, Romania and Bulgaria);
- scientific circles and public of Poland and other postsocialist countries, including Belarus;
- Poland’s private sector.
Most of CASE’s activities are financed from outside sources: as a rule, grants for concrete projects, to a smaller de-
gree, institutional grants. The major outside financial sources in 2000 were:
- foreign private organizations (G. Soros Open Society Institute, Ford Foundation, etc.) – 44.2%;
- foreign governmental organizations (for example, USAID) – 32.2%;
- international organizations and programs (World Bank, UNDP, EU programs) – 12.1%;
- private domestic organizations (first of all banks) – 12.1%;
- domestic sources of public means – 2.8%.
In 2001 the amount of outside financial assistance totaled about 2 million euro.
As we see, the Center’s sponsor structure is typical for think tanks in postsocialist countries: the lion’s share goes from
abroad. The situation has its advantages and shortages.
One of the shortages is that foreign financial sources are gradually running short because of the total diminution of
transformation programs financing by foreign private, governmental and international donors, as well as the transfer of
financing from Poland (and the central European region) to other regions (for example, the USAID ceased its activities in
Poland). Certain hopes on a rise in outside financing could be set upon the EU programs.
On the other hand, the advantage of foreign financing is that it, as a rule, gives researchers more freedom and is aimed
at rendering efficient assistance to postsocialist countries, and consequently the Center experiences no political or ideo-
logical pressure. In other words, in practice outside financing gives the Center a real independence.
Financing from domestic private sources could not be so simple and clear. However, the reality of Polish political cul-
ture, where the lobby’s struggle of a more moderate and civilized character, than, for example, in Russia or Ukraine, as
well as the character of CASE activities create prerequisites for a high demand for independent estimations by the Center,
rather than assistance in lobbying particular interests. Our major partners from the private sector are banks, which value
high our macroeconomic analysis and prognosis, and its independent character. We hope to expand private sector serv-
ices.
Aside from that, Poland’s specific feature is that there is a weak cooperation between independent think tanks with
governmental and parliamentary structures, especially at the central level. Of course, part of the blame is on NGO’s,
which has not managed to establish a long-term cooperation with authorities. On the other side, the Polish legislation
does not promote budget financing of projects carried out by independent organizations, since it could easily be used
against officials taking decisions on distribution of resources. The procedure of distribution (only tenders) does not facili-
tate establishing a long-term cooperation.
Moreover, governmental structures acquired their own research institutions and expert groups, and authorities prefer
"pulling out" specialists from NGO’s to ordering a survey. Also the Polish government even established a special research
fund the tasks of which overlap CASE’s activity in the field of distributing reform experience in other postsocialist coun-
tries. The activity of the fund seems inefficient. The major reason, in my mind, is the budget financing, because the issue
of spending taxpayers’ money – an instrument of political struggle – is an object of rapt attention of politicians.
That creates nervous conditions, when the Fund is more concerned over possible embezzlement charges, rather than
efficient activities.
Another reason for such a weak cooperation between think tanks and authorities is "politicizing" of taking decisions
by the government (in the interests of the ruling coalition), as a result of which experts divide into more or less politically
"friendly". In such conditions closer contacts with the government might result in politicizing of NGO’s activity, its
turning from an independent research center into an organization protecting group interests.
That would lead not only to a loss of the organization’s independence, but would also undermine confidence of other
customers, since governmental coalitions of Poland change once in several years, and benefits form such cooperation
could be short-term, and consequent losses – long-term.
Thus, Polish think tanks, including CASE, have almost no direct influence on policy carried out by Polish authorities.
As a result, our expert activity for governments is much more developed in other postsocialist countries than Poland.
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But that does not mean that in Poland CASE has absolutely no influence on politics. Mostly this is an indirect influ-
ence. Firstly, some experts linked to CASE work as advisors in governmental structures (sometimes they even became
members of the government). Secondly, governmental structures consider results of our expertise, experts’ estimations.
Governmental officials and experts receive our materials; they frequently participate in seminars and conferences that we
organize. Thirdly, our independent research create an "atmosphere of reforms", since they contain an estimation of gov-
ernmental activities, an analysis and economic prognoses. That enables interested companies and social strata to better
understand and take optimal decisions. Aside from that, such our activity performs the role of a reform "watchdog", helps
struggling against with their distortions for the same of particular political interests.
Probably, the future of CASE would be related, first of all, to research studies for "wide popular strata" and experts for
the private business, rather than direct assistance to authorities not only in Poland, but also abroad where such activity of
the center is widely spread. The matter is that the direct assistance to governments of postsocialist countries in the institu-
tional-legal sphere, as a rule, is of little efficiency. Ten years of transformations showed that reforms cannot be limited to
this sphere, because for these institutions and law to work it is necessary to involve most of t he society and political cir-
cles into transformations, and such involvement should contribute to establishing market relations and civic society. The
process is hampered by cultural factors (national traditions and habits developed under socialism), and often an oppor-
tunist position of local elites, for which announcing a course of reforms means, first of all, receiving foreign aid. Unfortu-
nately, these factors can neither be overcome quickly, nor automatically. A painstaking work of developing market and
democratic mentality and behavior is necessary for that. It is necessary to support the development of local reform-minded
political elites and strengthen local research and expert potential. It is necessary to support the development of private
sector and private initiative in general, teach people to understand the situation correctly and ability to make the right
choice. Only then reforms could be based on domestic resources. As J. Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize’s winner, wrote, reforms
should be introduced not from outside, but by means of a creative learning by local "carriers of reforms". According to
him, "the country should be at the helm itself".2
In my opinion, such a widely understood educational activity – is one of the most important tasks of think tanks of our
kind for the coming years, if not decades. We should mention that from the very beginning CASE attached a great im-
portance to distribution of the results of its activity among the widest possible circle of individuals and organizations.
That is what the Center’s publishing activity serves to. From the moment of its establishing, the Center has published
(independently and jointly with other organizations) more than 400 publications, including 24 books. The Center issues 6
series of publications, including the series working papers – "Research and Analysis", 250 issues of which has come out.
In order to make our works available to a wide international audience, many publications come out in English and in Rus-
sian.
In turn, the establishment in three former Soviet republics – Kyrgyzstan, Georgia and Ukraine – of CASE branch
centers, which are successfully functioning and prepare, above everything, a periodic analysis of economic situation in the
their countries, should contribute to strengthening of local research and expert potential.
Quarterly information-analytical publications devoted to the economy of Kyrgyzstan, Georgia and Ukraine serve to in-
crease the quality of information about economic conditions of the former Soviet republics and its dissemination among
scientists and representatives of authorities. They are prepared in CASE branch centers with the participation of local
specialists. From 2002 such bulletin comes out in Belarus as a result of CASE’s cooperation with the Institute of Privati-
zation and Management ("Economy of Belarus: Tendencies, Estimations, Prognoses").
The cooperation between CASE and Belarusian scientists and independent research institutions, such as the Independ-
ent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies, the National Center of Strategic Initiatives, the Institute of Privati-
zation and Management, started in the early 90’s. By the way, B. Blaszczyk, CASE’s Board Chairperson, is also a mem-
ber of the Advisory Board of IISEPS.
For understandable reasons, cooperation with Belarus’ authorities was not possible, and the Center’s experts focused
on the projects to study the social-economic and political situation in Belarus and organizing assistance to Belarusian re-
searchers in the form of seminars, acquaintance trips, etc. CASE’s employees often visit Belarus to take part in confer-
ences, seminars and other meetings with their Belarusian colleagues.
Last year a large research project fulfilled jointly with the Institute of Privatization and Management and devoted to a
complex analysis of the Belarusian economy was completed. It encompassed the problems of macroeconomics (monetary
policy, money demand, the problem of inflation, money flows, payment balance, foreign trade, etc.), development of small
and medium business, privatization, corporate management and social policy. Certain attention was paid to economic
consequences of a possible integration with Russia and the system of power in Belarus.3 Recently two projects aimed at
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 J. Stiglitz, Scan Globally, Reinvent Locally: Knowledge Infrastructure and the Localization of Knowledge, First Global De-
velopment Network Conference, Bonn, December 1999.
3
 The results of the projects are published in the two-volume edition Belarusian Economy: from market to plan 1995-2002
by R. Antchak, M. Guzhinski and P. Kozarzhewski, Warsaw: CASE, 2001-2002. At present the second volume has come
out. It is devoted to small and medium business, privatization, industry restructuring and corporate management. So far the
first volume is available only on www.case.com.pl.. The English edition is being prepared.
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raising the level of qualification of Belarusian researchers and spreading Poland’s reform experience have been carried
out.
Privatization is one of the directions of CASE research and expert work.
The CASE Center carried out a whole series of research projects devoted to estimation of the privatization process and
its results in Poland and a number of other postsocialist countries, in particular, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, Mongolia, Bulgaria, Romania. Also the center took part in international comparative studies on pri-
vatization in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and the former German Democratic Republic. In the middle 90’s by
the order of the Polish Ministry of Privatization the Center created a database on privatization legislation of former so-
cialist countries and literature on privatization. Many CASE’s publications devoted to privatization, including the two-
volume edition "Privatization in Postsocialist Countries" (In English).4 As for recent projects, we should mention the re-
search on privatization of monopoly branches of the national economy, as well as the so-called sensitive branches, privati-
zation of which is difficult, first of all, for political and social reasons. CASE’s experts also focused on the processes that
are underway at the enterprises after their privatization: further redistribution of property, corporate management system
formation, economic consequences of privatization. A number of emperic studies were conducted on the enterprises of
Poland, Belarus, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan.
Besides, CASE’s experts actively participated in the programs of rendering technical assistance to the governments of
a number of postsocialist countries in the field of economy privatization (in Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia,
Mongolia, Bulgaria and Romania). Among the most significant achievements of CASE in this sphere we should mention
the elaboration of the privatization legislation and privatization procedures in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
3. Chances and dangers of privatization in Belarus
The topic of privatization is still actual even in those postsocialist countries where the process has already taken place. In
fact, postprivatization processes need some improvement, especially in the field of restructuring and corporate manage-
ment. The issue even more actual for the countries where the progress in the field of reforms considered modest.
In this respect, the situation in Belarus is special. On the one hand, there is still a large sector of state-owned enter-
prises, and the property of these enterprises, unlike in many other former republics of the USSR, in most cases was not
plundered (in the course of the so-called spontaneous privatization). On the other hand, Belarus’ state property might be
in great demand among Russian buyers in the near future. In order to correctly assess chances and dangers facing the Be-
larusian state enterprises (and the country’s economy as a whole), it is necessary to have a clear idea of privatization, what
could be expected from it and what not, and under what circumstances. Shortly, the following should be mentioned.
First, privatization does not exist on its own, but an essential part of market reforms. Even a wisely projected privati-
zation is likely to fail, resulting neither in an improvement of functioning of certain enterprises, nor in a general eco-
nomic rise, unless its is accompanies by an economy stabilization and liberalization, formation of market infrastructure in
the form of a proper legislation and institutions. Therefore, unless there is no radical change of the whole economic policy
in Belarus, we could hardly expect any tangible privatization results.
Second, it is necessary to clearly understand what could be achieved by means of privatization, and what not. Fre-
quently, objects set on privatization are unreal and even dangerous, able to cause harm both to enterprises and the whole
economy. It is necessary to be cautious about maximizing revenues from privatization into state budget, since a too high
price reduces future investments into enterprises: an owner possesses a certain amount, and the more he gives to the state,
the less would be invested into the enterprise itself. Aside from that, privatization is a strategic instrument and none of
tactical tasks should be accomplished with its help, for example, patching up holes in budget. That might result in a
dominance of momentary privatization tasks over long-term ones and would weaken its positive results.
Even more caution should be taken regarding attempts to solve some social problems by means of privatization.
Achieving social justice with the help of privatization on the level of the whole society is impossible, especially if justice
is understood in a simplified-equalizing manner. Similar attempts are most likely to cause a rise of discontent of the
whole population and its separate groups felt deceived, "abandoned". At the level of enterprises it is necessary to take
caution while considering the possibility of imposing social responsibilities on customers of state-owned enterprises (on
the level of employment, wages, supporting social sphere, etc.), because they could radically decrease attractiveness of
privatized entities and reduce investments into development of the enterprise. What may turn disastrous to the enterprise,
and as a result, employees’ social status would deteriorate, but not improve (right to the enterprise closure.)
Real objectives that should be set for privatization in Belarus – are as follows: passing enterprises to real, efficient
owners which consider its owning for a long-term period, are able to manage it and invest into its further development.
Only in this case functioning of the enterprises would be well based and contribute to the development of the whole na-
tional economy.
That means that, third, it is very important to ensure high quality of the privatization process, where selecting inves-
tors for the largest and the most significant enterprises for the economy is one of its components.
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An optimal owner of the enterprise is a strategic investor holding the bulk of its shares, and not any investor, but the
one with long-term interests regarding the enterprise. There are few such potential buyers in Belarus which, aside from
the desire to buy property, have enough sources to purchase it and make further investments, and also have modern
knowledge in the field of management, production organizing, marketing, etc. Potential investors from abroad – first of
all from developed industrialized countries – meet such requirements. By the way, studies of privatization aftermath in
many countries show that the most favorable and acceptable variant is to sell the enterprise to a foreign investor, bringing
investments and also a new culture of production and management, "know-how", new markets and distribution networks,
etc.
The problem is that in the near future investors from Russia rather than from western countries could be such potential
buyers. Unfortunately, Russia’s privatization proved that private domestic owners showed themselves not from the best
side. Property is constantly divided and redistributed between oligarchic groups applying any legal and illegal means for
that.
Mostly they consider property as a short-term source of revenues, and instead of investing and multiplying it, private
owners, especially of the most significant and profitable entities, in fact plunder it and move capital abroad. There are no
reasons to assume that Russian oligarchs, acting this way in their country, would act differently in Belarus, observe law
and ethic norms of private enterprise, and what is the most important thing – to care about long-term development of en-
terprises. Most of Belarus’ enterprises might soon be bought up (including those owned by Belarusian private owners),
after that their drainage would be carried out. Only a few number of enterprises, in particular, those dealing with transit of
energy resources, would be able to survive in such conditions. Aside form that, a mass inflow of Russian investors is un-
likely to contribute to the formation of normal market relations in Belarus’ economy, when there are no semimafioso oli-
garchic groups dividing spheres of their influence with a total absence of ethic business norms. It is worth reminding, that
Russia’s economic order seems more progressive (i.e. market) only if compared with the economy of Belarus and does not
stand up to comparison with economies of the most reformed former socialist countries, not to speak about developed
western countries.
Thus, it is necessary to take a great caution with regard to the prospect of selling out Belarusian enterprises to Russian
investors, instead it would be better to attract investors from other countries. An unequal access to privatized property is
not a violation of principles of economic reforms, especially when it comes to large enterprises which are of significant
importance for the economy. Moreover, the state ought to take care about selling the property to "a good owner". From
the technical point of view, the task seems achievable, since privatization of such enterprises is carried out not by means
of open auctions, but tenders and talks with potential customers.
INDEPENDENT RESEARCH AND SOCIAL-LABOR RELATIONS
A. Sasnow, Ph.D., IISEPS Deputy Director
1. Independent research and public
Recently we could have noticed a growing public interest in publicized results of activities of different non-state scientific
research organizations. So, in November of 2000 only 30.2% of the respondents were familiar with publications of inde-
pendent research centers, but in April of 2002 33.7% of the respondents answered in the affirmative.5 A growing interest
is also seen from the dynamics of the respondents’ trust to research centers (See Table 1). Today, in terms of confidence
they surpass mass media, the president, government, parliament, labor unions, law enforcement agencies and political
parties, going after educational establishments, church and army.
Table 1
Dynamics of the population’s confidence in research centers, %
Research centers 09'98 03'99 04'00 04'01 04'02
Independent:
– trust
– distrust
25.7
15.9
28.6
12.9
31.6
13.4
31.4
16.2
40.4
24.9
State-run:
– trust
– distrust
–*
–*
25.2
18.4
22.4
22.1
25.4
24.0
33.3
32.4
* no data
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 Here and below data of IISEPS’s national public opinion polls is used (about 1.500 respondents, margin of error does not
exceed 0.03)
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What caused such a growth? In our opinion, there are enough reasons for that. First, speeding up of the natural historic
development of socium resulted in a deficit of time while reacting to life challenges. In order to understand what is going
on and make the right choice, an analysis of different points of view is necessary. Today, unfortunately, Belarus’ mass and
available sources of information, first of all electronic, tend to cover a single, official point of view. Thus a thinking part of
the population has reasonably paid attention to alternative positions and opinions covered by independent mass media on
the basis of independent research materials.
Second, Russian TV channels enjoying the largest audience in Belarus regularly invite representatives of different re-
search centers to take part in popular programs as experts. Today many of them are well known to the Belarusian TV
audience and the interest in them is projected on research centers in general and their Belarusian colleagues in particular.
Third, an average citizen is unlikely and is unable to collect and process a considerable amount of primary information.
Only skilled specialists are able to do that, what causes an interest in materials offered by analytical centers.
And finally, we could assert that the interest in independent, as well as state-run research centers is stirred up by offi-
cial mass media which sometimes try to denounce unfavorable for authorities results of independent research, thereby once
again reminding of their existence.
What is independent research and how Belarus’ socium perceives it? Let’s consider it on the example of payment of la-
bor, the sphere close to the author.
2. Legislation in the sphere of payment of labor
Payment of labor is regulated by Article 42 of the Constitution, which is the corner stone of labor legislation. It stipulated
the responsibilities of the state in this sphere and also legal framework for regulation of payment of labor. The current
version of the Article envisions that "employees are guaranteed a fair share of remuneration in economic results of labor
according to its quantity, quality and social significance, but not below the level ensuring them and their family members
with a free and decent life".6
As one might notice, from the economic point of view the given version is obviously unsound, since it contains vague
nations distorting the essence of wage and using characteristics having no quantitative forms. So the word "remuneration"
has no sense in the phrase "a fair share of remuneration in economic results of labor". It is unclear what is meant: whether
labor results shall necessarily contain a remuneration, or the remuneration is a share in economic results of labor, or the
worker is guaranteed a share of this remuneration, or the share should be fair.
It is unclear from the Article how the state is going to guarantee the share of compensation, what is considered a fair
remuneration, what methods would be used to compare the fairness of the remuneration share with quantity, quality and
social significance of labor. It is also unclear how to compare the share of results with the wage, since the latter is an ele-
ment of costs and regardless of the fact whether the employer "has economic results of labor" or has no such results, it has
to be paid out to the hired worker. According to the same version, if there are no economic results, the wage could not be
paid at all. In other words, any arbitrary action from the side of the state regarding the wage is possible.
It is noteworthy that the phrase "not below the level ensuring them and their family members with a free and decent
life" lacks clear creteria because of what the level of compensation could be the subject of court suits. It seems at least that
in line with such statement the worker has the right to demand a compensation not below the living wage budget for each
family member.
If we compare the current text of the Article 42 with the 1994 version, it is clear that the-then variant was more pro-
fessional, clear and understandable. It read: "Employees shall have the right to remuneration for fulfilled work in accor-
dance with its quantity, quality and social significance, but the pay shall not be below the government-indicated mini-
mum".7 Thus, the Article did not set unclear and impracticable state guarantees regarding the wage, no source for remu-
neration was indicated – that is the employer’s business, who was obliged to compensate any fulfilled work not be below
the government-indicated minimum regardless of the fact whether there are certain results or not.
The new variant of the norm was introduced (almost unchanged) to Clause 5 of Article 11 of the Belarusian Labor
Code adopted in 2000. However, the authors of the Code realized the nonsense of the Constitutional wording and cor-
rected it, introducing the following phrase "…a fair share of remuneration for work…"8 Now the law runs counter to the
Constitution, but meets real economic relations.
In general, there are a lot of claims to the Labor Code. In fact, it excludes the possibility of setting a higher level of
wage in the collective agreement for budget workers (Article 59), thereby decreasing the authority of local laws. All em-
ployers are obliged to use the state tariff grid as a minimal guarantee of payment for work (Article 60). All economic en-
tities were forced to tariff works and employees in accordance with the state tariff-qualification norms and the possibility
to apply non-tariff systems of payment was excluded (Article 61). The latter resulted in appearance of a great number of
forced violators, since it is almost impossible to exclude non-tariff payment systems. That is just an example of the failed
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 The Constitution of the Republic of Belarus, Minsk, 1994, p. 28.
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 The Labor Code of the Republic of Belarus, Minsk, 1999, p. 11.
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regulation of labor relations of the new Code. In general, its adoption severely deteriorated legal regulation in the sphere
of labor relations as compared with the previous edition of the Labor Code.
The above and other notes by independent experts regarding the introduced labor law have repeatedly been published
in 1998–2000 in open press. Unfortunately, neither the Belarusian legislators, nor the proper bodies having the right to
legislation initiative, did not bother to consider the given problem.
3. Social-labor norms
The minimum wage and payment tariffs are the most important social-labor norms. Today they are set by the government
and are obligatory for all employers, regardless of forms of ownership, what could hardly be considered well grounded in
market relations.
In line with the legislation, the minimum wage shall be defined on the basis of the minimum living budget. Since the
law gives no correlation, in practice the government tries to set the minimum age at the lowest possible level. In particu-
lar, today it is equal to only 17.000 rubles (less than $10).9 The reasons for the given level of the minimum wage have not
been explained for public.
It is worth mentioning that in February of 2002 the minimum wage was even lower – 10.000 rubles, i.e. less than 9%
of the living wage budget. At the period the minimum wage was used as a financial norm, to which all tariffs of taxation,
fines, different payments were tied. Such load almost exhausted the essence of the minimum wage as a norm of payment
for work and hampered its growth. Independent experts have repeatedly written about it, urging authorities to improve the
situation. In particular, in the middle of 1998 the author published a series of articles in which, aside form everything, the
necessity to relieve the minimum wage of the functions of a financial norm.10 It took about four years for Belarus’
authorities to realize how harmful the existing practice is and take a halved decision. The minimum wage was relieved of
non-characteristic functions, but its amount was raised only by 70%, what is not enough.
The formal logic says that the minimum wage cannot be below the living wage budget, i.e. the level of income that en-
sures physical survival with the existing prices. As of April of 2002, the living wage budget equaled 76.603 rubles ($44).
Taking into account the wage reproductive function the minimum wage shall correspond at least to the minimum living
wage, what should be a priority objective of the state policy.
In practice, however, today the minimum wage amounts only to 22.2% of the living wage budget and 13.8% of the
minimum living wage. Such correlation the authorities explain by the financially weak budget. In turn, the budget directly
depends on the level of the country’s economy development. Clearly, in many respects this level is determined by sub-
stance, directions and pace of the current economic reforms. The leadership’s intention to curb "unreasonable" stratifica-
tion of the population by the level of incomes also plays here certain role. In neighboring countries the situation is quite
different. For example, in Estonia back in 1997 the minimum wage was 1.8fold higher than the living wage budget.
As for payment tariffs, the legislation envisions no criteria to set them. It is said that they are "determined in accor-
dance with coefficients of the Single Tariff Grid for employees of the Republic of Belarus and the government-determined
first grade tariff rate jointly with labor unions" (Article 60 of the Labor Code). What is "jointly with labor unions" – is on
the conscience of the legislator. Beginning December 1, 2001, the first grade tariff rate is equal to 19.500 rubles (about
$11), i.e. less than 16% of the minimum living wage. This is how unskilled labor (janitor, cloakroom attendant, etc.) is
tariffed.
Table 2
The living wage budget (LWB), the minimum living wage (MLW), the minimum wage (MW) and the first grade
tariff rate (FGTR) in 1999-2002.
Date of in-
troduction
LWB,
rubles
MW,
rubles
MW to living
wage %
MLW,
rubles
FGTR,
rubles
FGTR to MLW, %
Without extra
payments
With extra pay-
ments
01'99 4874192 500000 10.3 8123653 1200000 14.8 28.3
05'99 9128046 1000000 11.0 13306919 2150000 16.2 30.5
10'99 14717382 1450000 9.9 22828854 3000000 13.1 23.2
01'00 20642 2200 10.7 31724 4500 14.2 25.1
05'00 26020 2600 10.0 39876 5200 13.0 25.6
10'00 37325 3600 9.6 57470 7200 12.5 25.1
12'00 37996 3600 9.5 63933 7200 11.3 33.0
03'01 43636 5700 13.1 72857 11500 15.8 32.5
07'01 52777 7500 14.2 85466 14500 17.0 32.7
12'01 62568 10000 16.0 103464 19500 18.8 36.2
03'02 119354 17000 14.2 119354 19500 16.3 31.4
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No doubt, it is not enough. That is why there are additional payments to the first 11 grades of the Single Tariff Grid
which also are determined by the government or on its behalf. So, the extra pay for a first grade worker is 18.000 rubles,
and thus the tariff part of the wage is 37.500 rubles. As of today, it is about $21.4 or 30.5% of the minimum living wage,
i.e. the level of simple reproduction. And less than half of the living wage budget – the level of physiological survival or
poverty line. It should be noticed that the given amount is also taxed.
The same formal logic proves that the first grade tariff rate cannot be below the minimum living wage in order to se-
cure employee’s simple reproduction. And considering family burden the first grade tariff rate could not be less than 1.5–
2.0fold of the minimum living wage or 200.000–250.000 rubles (as of April of 2002).
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Picture 1. Dynamics norms of remuneration of labor (in US dollars)
Clearly, no one receives a "bare" tariff, as a rule. There are different bonuses, extra payments and benefits, which sig-
nificantly increase the wage even in the budget sphere. Since different extra payments amount to 70–75% of tariff, con-
sidering the current level of economic development, we could agree that the minimum wage shall be set on the level of the
living wage budget, and the first grade tariff rate – on the level of the minimum living wage. In fact, it is necessary to
equalize the minimum wage and the first grade tariff rate so that they would reach the level of the minimum wage budget.
If the production efficiency increases, the minimum wage and the first grade tariff rate might exceed the minimum living
wage.
Independent experts have repeatedly written about it, but things are right where they were. The current level of the
minimum wage and the first grade tariff rate does not correspond to the above theoretic discussion (See Table 2). So,
during the given period the minimum wage with respect to the living wage budget varied from 9.5% to 16.0%, and first
grade tariff rate with respect to the minimum wage budget – from 11.3% to 18.8% (considering extra payments – from
23.1% to 36.2%). In other words, the minimum wage and the first grade tariff rate do not provide for an elementary
physical survival and their level cannot be accepted as reasonable.
Although they have been repeatedly raised, it only has partially compensated inflation losses and has not changed the
whole system.
Thus, today the major social norms are set by the government ad arbitrium, without taking into account public opinion
though civic society structures. They do not meet social requirements, and the setting procedure is not democratic. We as-
sume that budget limits is the only determinative factor for setting the minimum wage and the first grade tariff rate. Pic-
ture 1 displays the dynamics of payment norms starting 1999 (introduction of new norms are highlighted). One might see
that by the present time the situation with the norms has improved, though their absolute rates are insufficient.
It is also noteworthy that in most developed countries the minimum wage and tariff rates are set by means of negotia-
tions between labor unions and entrepreneurs, interests of which respective national associations express. The role of state
is boiled down to settling disputes between the side and validating adopted decisions.
4. Tariff system
The Single Tariff Grid is used to tariff work of all employees, and employers of all forms of ownership are obliged today
to use it. At the same time non-state economic entities have the right to set higher tariff rates.
At present the 27 grade Single Tariff Grid with a nominal rate is used – correlation of extreme grades is 7.84:1 (See
Table 3).
Having so many grades, an average difference between them is less than 8%. It is known that the level of "sensitive-
ness" stimulating additional labor efforts is the inter-grade difference of 10–15%, which is observed only for the first six
grades. Then the difference is fading, depriving labor activity of impetuses. In other words, to make a department deputy
chief agree to become chief of department other impetuses are necessary than those provided by the tariff grid. The differ-
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ence for other grades does not exceed 7%, but there is a certain progress, because previously the difference was even
smaller. For example, the tariff grid which existed from January through May of 1999 the inter-grade difference from 18
to 23 grades was a mere 5%, from 24 to 28 – 4%.
Table 3
The Single Tariff Grid and tariff rates, introduced on December 1, 2001.
Grade Nominal tariff
coefficient
Nominal
intergrade ratio
Tariff,
rubles
Extra,
rubles
Tariff + extra,
rubles
Factual tariff co-
efficient
Factual
intergrade ratio
1 1.00 – 19500 18000 37500 1.00 –
2 1.16 1.16 22620 18000 40620 1.08 1.08
3 1.35 1.16 26325 16500 42825 1.14 1.05
4 1.57 1.16 30615 13500 44115 1.18 1.03
5 1.73 1.10 33735 12000 45735 1.22 1.04
6 1.90 1.10 37050 9000 46050 1.23 1.01
7 2.03 1.07 39585 8000 47585 1.27 1.03
8 2.17 1.07 42315 7000 49315 1.32 1.04
9 2.32 1.07 45240 5000 50240 1.34 1.02
10 2.48 1.07 48360 4000 52360 1.40 1.04
11 2.65 1.07 51675 2000 53675 1.43 1.03
12 2.84 1.07 55380 – 55380 1.48 1.03
13 3.04 1.07 59280 – 59280 1.58 1.07
14 3.25 1.07 63375 – 63375 1.69 1.07
15 3.48 1.07 67860 – 67860 1.81 1.07
16 3.72 1.07 72540 – 72540 1.93 1.07
17 3.98 1.07 77610 – 77610 2.07 1.07
18 4.26 1.07 83070 – 83070 2.22 1.07
19 4.56 1.07 88920 – 88920 2.37 1.07
20 4.88 1.07 95160 – 95160 2.54 1.07
21 5.22 1.07 101790 – 101790 2.71 1.07
22 5.59 1.07 109005 – 109005 2.91 1.07
23 5.98 1.07 116610 – 116610 3.11 1.07
24 6.40 1.07 124800 – 124800 3.33 1.07
25 6.85 1.07 133575 – 133575 3.56 1.07
26 7.33 1.07 142935 – 142935 3.81 1.07
27 7.84 1.07 152880 – 152880 4.08 1.07
However, as we have already mentioned, there are extra payments of 18.000 – 20.000 rubles for the first 11 grades,
which "tighten" the Single Tariff Grid and, therefore, the correlation is only 4.08: 1. As a result, an average inter-grade
difference is 5.3% what diminishes the stimulating function of the tariff system. The most insignificant difference is set
for workers of 1–8 grades and mass professions of the budget sphere (9–12 grades). There are no explanations for this
phenomenon as well as for the senseless differentiation of the inter-grade difference from 1% to 8%.
Table 4
Range of the Single Tariff Grid
Full grid range Workers grid rangeData of introduc-
tion nominal factual Nominal Factual
01'99 6.48 3.38 2.17 1.35
05'99 6.48 3.43 2.17 1.27
10'99 6.48 3.67 2.17 1.32
01'00 8.39 4.75 2.17 1.30
05'00 7.63 4.27 1.97 1.21
10'00 7.63 4.19 1.97 1.22
12'00 7.63 2.86 1.97 1.15
03'01 7.13 3.81 1.97 1.22
07'01 7.13 4.07 1.97 1.28
12'01 7.84 4.08 2.17 1.32
The more the grid is tightened, the stronger payment equalizing. Table 4 shows that over the last three years the larg-
est nominal and factual range of the Single Tariff Grid. The lowest factual range (2.86:1) – January and May of 2000.
Fortunately, it was used only for three months.
As for tariffs for workers, over the last several years the grid range has always been narrow for them. The worst grid
was that of December of 2000. As we see from Table 4, its range for workers equaled to 1.15: 1. It is worth reminding that
in Soviet times the range of the 6 grade grid for engineering workers, for example, was 1.43: 1. Thus, the present 32% of
difference between the first eight grades could hardly be considered optimal.
Russia’s tariff grid introduced in December of 2001 seems more favorable than the Belarusian Single Tariff Grid. Al-
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though Russia’s grid also is not perfect, its range of 18 grades is 4.5: 1, with the inter-grade difference for the first 11
grades of 10–11%, for the rest – 7–8%. And naturally, there are no extra payments.
If the government sets the first grade tariff rate at 37.500 rubles, without extra payments of course, the tariff for the
27th grade would have been 294.000 rubles, which is two times higher than the present one (152880 rubles). Probably, it
seemed unacceptable for political reasons, since it runs counter to equalizing moods of Belarus’ authorities.
Looking at Table 4, a reasonable question arises: why does the Single Tariff Grade change so often? Why couldn’t it
be adopted once and applied for several years? The reason for frequent revisions of the Single Tariff Grid is the indexing
of incomes, in accordance with which compensation of inflation losses is applied only to part of wage (no more than 60%
of the living wage budget, 44.666 rubles as of March of 2002). Today only wages for the 1-4th grades are indexed com-
pletely. Higher wages are indexed partially, as a result of which indexing tightens the grid thereby weakening its invalid
stimulating function. To avoid it, it is necessary to partially index the whole wage instead of completely indexing part of
wage. Back in 1996 the author managed to submit the proposal to the parliament, however the deputies refused to con-
sider it because of vague prospects of the upcoming referendum.
It is noteworthy that a regular introduction of new variants of the Single Tariff Grid changes little in real tariffs, but
each time forces economic entities to do useful job of tariffing their employees.
In our opinion, a Single Tariff Grid with the inter-grade difference of not less than 10% would have been optimal and
progressive. Such a grid shall not have more than 18–19 grades. The number seems sufficient if management of economic
entities is given more rights to set wages for concrete employees.
As for the grid range, exceeding the limits of 6–7: 1 seems undesirable, because a payment gap becomes excessive
since workers of higher tariffs, as a rule, receive higher extra payments.
The above considerations have repeatedly been published, including by the author, in press11 and reported at different
conferences and meetings. We could state that at a certain moment Belarus’ authorities heed to the public voice and the
Single Tariff Grade changes for the better. However, it is usually done too slowly, by means of tests and mistakes, inviting
no public and independent expertise.
The associations of entrepreneurs and labor union pay little attention to the given problem. Although their national as-
sociations take part in the work of the National Council on Labor and Social Problems of the government, the council
takes all decisions regarding the Single tariff Grid on its own, ignoring opinion of its social partners. But there is no spe-
cial reaction by them – not in mass media, or among employees. As for political parties, only recently some of them (the
UCP, the SDPB, the Labor Party, the Women’s Party "Nadzeya", etc.) have started actively include in their rhetoric the
problems of economic conditions of the population, also regarding payment for fulfilled work.
5. Payment rates
For a clearer picture of the current wages in the country and its recent dynamics let’s consider some statistical character-
istics. Table 5 presents data about average monthly nominal wage over the last 11 years. Inflation makes figures in rubles
almost useless for any comparison. To avoid influence of inflation, as a deflator we would use the index of consumer
prices, the minimum living wage and the dollar rate.
Table 5
Nominal average monthly wage in the economy in general
$Year In fact, rubles** With regard for consumer
prices index, rubles **
To
MLW At official rate At market rate
1991 541 541 –* 310.9 –*
1992 5072 306 2.50 49.9 –*
1993 61208 176 1.91 22.4 8.0
1994 98203 137 1.11 24.4 18.8
1995 755129 306 1.07 65.5 65.5
1996 1212157 354 1.10 90.3 82.5
1997 2262351 405 1.23 84.6 70.4
1998 4618877 293 1.28 99.4 49.8
1999 19677300 355 1.17 78.1 42.2
2000 59406000 516 1.27 83.3 60.2
2001 124944000 742 1.50 89.5 88.8
2002*** 167482000 857 1.44 100.3 99.1
* No data
** In rubles, 1991.
*** For four months
                                               
11
 See, for example, A. Sasnow, Legal and organizational aspects of work payment. – Belorusskaya Gazeta, 1998, issues
27, 29, 31, 33.
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Picture 2. Average monthly wage with regard for consumer prices index, rubles
Avoiding influence of inflation with the help of the index of consumer prices allows to compare wages of different
years with respect to the index of consumer prices that is considered as 1. In our case we apply the year of 1999. The dy-
namics received is pictured in the form of a histogram. See Picture 2. As we could see, a slump in average wage between
1991 and 1994 (it dropped almost 4fold) turned into its growth. Then in 1998 it fell again down to the level of 1992,
cause by the financial collapse in Russia, since due to constant efforts of Belarusian authorities the country is closely tied
to Russia’s economy. Then figures began to grow again, thereby encouraging official propaganda and reanimated rosy
hopes in the ruling circles. Meanwhile, we shall remind that the figures began "improving" only after the authorities de-
cided to reconsider methods of calculating the index of consumer prices.
Today the official index of consumer prices adopted by the Ministry of Statistics and Analysis is calculated for the
whole range of consumer goods purchased by the population within a month. The volumes of consumption and average
prices for goods used in calculations are not for public discussions. However, using other deflators cast doubts on reliabil-
ity of the official index of consumer prices. So, for example, according to official data, within the first four months of
2002 the average monthly wage, taking into account the index of consumer prices, increased by 15.5%, but in terms of the
minimum living wage it dropped by 6 points.
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Picture 3. Average monthly wage to the minimum living wage
In this respect using other deflators for assessments seems necessary. Especially regarding the minimum living wage as a
norm determining the level of simple reproduction. This index takes into account the ruble purchasing power, and that is why it
has to more adequately reflect factual changes of the real level of wages. The histogram (See Picture 3) clearly shows that falling
down to the level of 1.07–1.11 of the minimum living wage in 1994–1996, only in 2001 the average monthly wage reached the
level when two working parents are able to provide for a child. In 2002 even this insufficient level turned out a too heavy burden
for our economy. It is also necessary to keep in mind that in early 1999 Belarus’ authorities decided to reduce the consumer bas-
ket.
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Almost the same tendencies are demonstrated by the dynamics of the level of wage12 in dollars at the official exchange
rate. The histogram of Picture 4 reveals that regardless of repeated official statements the average monthly wage has so far not
reached the level of 1991. Today it is less than one third of the pre-reform wage. Although growth tendencies cause no doubt, the
pace of such growth is insignificant and in the year to come it could hardly achieve the pre-reform level.
Calculations of the dollar equivalent of the wage at market exchange rate reflect the level of the average monthly wage
more correctly, since the official course was repeatedly artificially changed and very often did not reflect a real correlation
of currencies, especially between 1996 and 2000.
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Picture 4. Average monthly wage in US dollars
The given data shows that at present the nominal wage increased as compared to its minimum rate, and if calculated
with respect to the index of consumer prices it exceed the 1991 level. However, reliability of state statistics figures is
doubtful. First of all because from 1996 the official dollar exchange rate was set administratively and did not reflect real
economic relations.
The same problems are characteristic while using the index of consumer prices and the minimum living wage: over
the recent years the methods for their calculation have repeatedly changed and figures were underestimated. At the same
time, using all the indexes together allows to correctly define tendencies and their possible development in the near future.
In general, the authorities’ policy regarding the organization and level of payment received by employees cannot be
considered efficient. Instead of supporting people’s desire to earn more, Belarus’ authorities, on the contrary, try to curb a
rise in incomes regardless of labor efficiency, to promote the principle of equalizing. Systematically widening state regu-
lation in this sphere, depriving economic entities, first of all non-state ones, of right to settle issues of payment on their
own, the authorities suppress initiative and enterprise, weaken impetuses for the economy development and restrain eco-
nomic progress.
For a real rise in payment for fulfilled work, increase of its stimulating role and reproduction function it is necessary to
significantly change the state policy in this sphere. First of all, it is necessary to relieve economic entities of excessive ad-
ministrative control and give them previous (before 1995) powers in the sphere of payment. It is expedient to regulate the
upper level of wage using fiscal methods, increasing the role (but not rates!) of the tax on incomes though the mechanism
of declaring incomes and at the same time decreasing tax burdens for economic entities. It is necessary to exempt the
minimum living wage for each family member from taxation, and the tax free minimum shall be raised to the minimum
living wage. In order to guarantee the reproduction function and to play the role of the minimum pay for unskilled work,
the first grade tariff rate shall be raised to the level of the minimum living wage, and the minimum wage – to the level of
the living wage budget. It is necessary to modernize the Single Tariff Grid by reducing the number of grades to 18-20 and
introduce an inter-grade difference of at least 10-15%, and oblige only budget organizations to use it.
The above proposals have long been publicly debated, but only when objective circumstances leave no chance to keep
the status quo proper state bodies heed to them.
At the same time it is noteworthy that problems of social-labor relations do not fall out from attention of public opin-
ion. Many of the issues considered above, by-passing power and management bodies, have been directly submitted to the
socium via independent mass media, different seminars, conferences, party and public events. Consequently, there is a
growing interest of a wide public in the results of activity of independent experts and independent research as a whole.
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60
O P E N  F O R U M
VALERY FROLOV: "POLITICAL EXTREME HAS NEVER LEAD TO
POSITIVE RESULTS"
Vladimir Dorokhov, Head of Center for Documentation of IISEPS, interviews Valery Frolov, Chairman of the deputy
group "Republic" of the Chamber of Representatives of the National Assembly.
You had already reached certain heights before you took up politics. What made you start your political career?
Well, eight months before my military career was over, I realized that I couldn’t solve all the problems I faced as a mili-
tary man. And I thought – I have ideas how to change it all if work in the Parliament. Besides, I was proposed for the post
of Deputy Defense Minister. Instead, I went to hospital after cardiac infarction and lost the post. So, that was God’s will, I
said.
What is your political stand? Are you an oppositionist, a constructive oppositionist or, let’s say, a politician not opposing
the authorities formally but introducing reforms from the inside?
I’m more a constructive oppositionist led by common sense, law and the experience of the other world countries.
Regarding your political views, are you a conservative, a liberal or a centrist?
When I went to the Joint Staff Academy (the years 1998—1991) – it was time of the USSR further development being ac-
tively discussed – I used to be an ardent democrat. People suggested lots of ways on what to do and where to go. We even
fell to loggerheads at times. Later on, when I was appointed divisional commander to Vilnius I used to talk to some offi-
cers that were even more fervent. This very communication experience and also raging democracy flattened my political
views at that time. Imagine, I bore responsibility for particular people – for about 7 000 – and for particular actions. Be-
sides, I was mightily influenced by V. Lansbergis and A. Paulaskas, current of Chairman the Lithuanian Seym. Now, I
cannot place myself among either the Right or the Left. I’m more a centrist for political extreme has never given positive
results.
Have your political views changed since your working in the Parliament?
I wouldn’t say so. I consider myself a democrat. I say, there’s nothing better than democracy. Despite all its drawbacks.
You know, while in the Parliament, I had my views flattened. Not that radically as, let say, being Bolshevik turned to so-
cialist-revolutionary. Just the environment I’ve being working in put certain restrictions on me preventing my playing
radical democrat. Consider my suggestions on the army reforms to V. Sheiman, then State Security Council Secretary,
that I prepared before going to hospital.
Would you, please, tell more about this?
In its style, it was similar to A. Solzhenitsyn’s article "How we can build the army". Thirty-five years of the army, three
higher military educations and the high positions I’ve being taking were the necessary foundation to correctly evaluate
situation and choose a direction for the armed forces to follow. And I should say many of the directions I mentioned in my
article were followed during the army reforms carried by Defense Minister L. Maltsev.
But the reaction then was quite negative, wasn’t it?
That might have been wrong time for this kind of suggestions or, may be, they came from a wrong man. I wrote not only
to V. Sheiman but also to the Prime Minister. And when the president or someone else in the Government heard about all
that they said something like: "Look at this know-all! We better kick him out". So they kicked, thank God.
How does your high-rank-military-man experience influences your political career?
Indirectly. Dealing with politicians I, first of all, look for the personal traits I always appreciated in officers – ambition,
decency, self-discipline and boldness.
I believe these very qualities made you the head of the deputy group "Republic". What are the initial aims of the group
and how did government and then the opposition reacted to your entering the political arena?
There hasn’t been any pressure on the part of the government so far – we are a recent organization. Neither opposition
shows any interest in our group. Although, there might be inside jealousy or suspicion towards the group. What I want to
stress is that the group is formed by, first of all, human factors.
And not by ideological, political or professional?
Any human relations reveal political views. And I believe, in the course of our discussions and joint situation analysis
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we’ll take a certain ideological and political stand.
Now, about what we’ve already done. Our group’s activity prevented the amendments to the law on mass actions and
to the odious law on information safety to pass. We’re not boasting for this is not a positive outcome. But I think we’ll
have about 6—8 draft bills by the fall. They will probably be approved at the adoption stage but there might arise real dif-
ficulties when they are given to the president for confirmation.
I sympathize with many people in the parliament. There are quite many professionals among them. But in view of
certain circumstances they haven’t yet sized up their roles as the parliamentarians – that they not just can but should in-
fluence the situations. Many of the deputies are only grasping the idea.
The Chamber of Representatives is known not to be acknowledged by international organizations. This seems to be an
obstacle for the deputies. Do you plan some steps in this direction, I mean international acknowledgement of the Parlia-
ment?
Frankly speaking, I don’t see any problem here. Many of those building great future for Belarus are too much concerned
about what Russia or the West could think. I believe, the mostly important thing is to work inside the country. And if we
are successful, this will be appreciated outside our borders.
I would still like to talk about the international acknowledgement of the Parliament. There are certain OSCE demands to
the Government, and especially to the Parliament, to be satisfied if the country claims to be introduced to the OSCE
Parliamentary Assembly and to PACE.
The Parliament alone cannot satisfy these demands right now. But the very process of the changes will demonstrate that
there are people in the Parliament to cooperate. The recent hearings with EC participation were very demonstrative in this
respect. I can’t say how far sincere were the comments of its members but I believe they understood that the Belarusian
Parliament is not a puppet. Our deputies time and again expressed the opinions opposing the president’s stand.
Many of the oppositionists have admitted that the parliamentary elections boycott was a pure mistake. But they hardly
change their attitude to the Chamber of Representatives. Doesn’t this hinder your contacts with the democrats? Have you
faced a kind of prejudices during such contacts?
I’ve never had problems while dealing with this kind of people. The Parliament is truly restricted in its powers. But it is
possible to reach a lot even within these frameworks.
On the other hand, if the opposition doesn’t consider the Parliament legitimate, neither I consider its activity effective.
They sometimes engage in the activity not at all respected by the common people. V. Lenin said that an idea is to be in-
troduced so as to seize on the masses. They seem not to understand this.
Then, what do you think are the ideas that could if not seize then win people over to your side?
These should be not just abstract slogans but more down-to-earth and pragmatic ideas. Some like, for example
N. Statkevich, start seeing the necessity of helping people solve their social problems. Most of the oppositionists, however,
just make statements for the press. We, the deputies, have all the resources to solve actual problems.
Despite your critics of the opposition, are you looking for any cooperation with the opposition?
Sure. I believe that the best thing for us, parliamentarians looking for the situation improvement in the country, and for
the opposition is not to tear each other to pieces but to join our efforts. And we are doing steps in this direction. I think
there are many clever and sound professionals among the oppositionists. There is cooperation. They see ways to imple-
ment their views through our activity. And we are looking forward to consulting and mutual discussions of the very dif-
ferent issues.
How would you comment on the social economic situation in Belarus?
I wouldn’t like to repeat myself. Only the lazy keep silent of the backpay, low production efficiency and overstocking.
There are plenty of examples that the situation is not very safe. Minsk directors can at least for some time forget about
their problems when at home but it’s different with the provinces. I use to know many directors, of the small or big enter-
prises. Not long ago I met one of them. He showed me his check-pass and said he just couldn’t work like that. The reports
of the Belarusian economic model are not very favorable.
You say that nomenclature in the regions is quite pessimistic. Do you judge by the Grodno region or you have informa-
tion on the other regions as well? And how is the "Republic" group represented at the regional level?
All members of our group have close contacts in the regions. And they all receive signals making clear that our country is
going into nowhere.
Besides local factors, Belarus is much influenced by the external factors, especially by Russia. That’s all clear. Belaru-
sian political parties look forward to getting into contacts with the similar organizations in Russia. What about the "Re-
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public"?
We are planning this kind of contacts. Many of the people I’ve been studying with at the USSR Joint Staff Academy are
taking high positions in the Russian government. And officers’ unity is a serious thing. We marked our 10 years after
graduating the Academy recently. And I should say we keep the relationships ideal. I haven’t yet met civil politicians. But
we do have plans to establish contacts and with whom to establish.
Who are your potential partners in Russia?
"Edinaya Rossiya" (United Russia), more likely. Of all the political leaders I like their leader the best and then D. Rogosin,
Chairman of the Duma foreign affairs committee. There are also serious people in the Union of the Right.
Let’s get back to your work in the Parliament. Does the Parliament perform its duties?
Very poorly. Some in the Parliament have connections (in the power structures), some are occupied with personal per-
spectives, some – with their future after the second presidential term expires. Then, suspicion prevents the Parliament of
performing its functions. During the years of Alexander Lukashenko the president, all got used to the pressing of the ex-
ecutive power – decrees on mass actions, on political parties, a new regulation of the Council of Ministers on making
opinion polls, draft law on the religion freedoms. All these acts are aimed to line up. That’s why people are just fright-
ened.
What was the reaction to forming of your group within the Parliament?
Regular. They didn’t make an event out of this. There are four fractions in the Parliament already. We submitted applica-
tion for group formation before the president delivered his annual State of the Union address but he somehow didn’t no-
tice it. And when the statement was over he read out our application.
You said the deputies were cautious and even frightened. Would the deputy corps change its attitude?
We’re moving in this direction. And I think when we take a victory of some sort many will spread their wings. The current
circumstances make some of the parliamentarians act against their conscience so far.
OK. Now, I would like to talk about your group’s program. There’s a clause in it on the extension of Parliament authori-
ties. Which authorities does the Parliament need?
First, monitoring function. For instance, when the Government comes to us and we ask them questions. Second, the right
of the interpellation for each deputy. Right now we don’t participate in the forming of the government. We just vote for it,
thus, pretending that this is well-thought and many times discussed process. The very Constitution says: "The Parliament
considers". So this might be not the deficiency of the Parliament authorities but the excess of the presidential authorities.
In other words, we don’t need to extend Parliament powers but need to cut down President’s powers?
This would make sense. The powers we have would be sufficient enough. The law field would be wide enough while now
it is narrowed by presidential decrees. The law field is so narrow now, and he still interferes with his decrees. It’s not that
simple to reject a decree. Deputies haven’t yet matured for this.
Another clause of your program is to ensure your candidates being slated at the local board elections. How are you go-
ing to achieve this – just you alone or privately united with someone else, without making a coalition or preparing an
electoral platform?
The priority task nowadays is to unite all democratic forces. It is important for political forces to understand that this is
our fist stage and we all should be united. Later on, democrats could probably permit such luxury as fighting with each
other.
Still, the political field of Belarus is quite well structured. And there are two democratic blocs supposedly to participate
in the elections to the local board. One will unite organizations of the Coordination Council of Democratic Forces, the
other – members of the Confederation "Za Sotsialnye Peremeny" (For Social Changes). Which of them is your possible
partner?
I think it will be easier to reach understanding with the Confederation members. But again, the two blocs are better to
unite. This is difficult but it’s the best variant.
Does the Republic group have longer-term plans than just local board elections? Let’s say, to create a movement or a
new political party or, may be, to become a member of a party…
We’ll come to one of these of vital necessity. We won’t be able to work without analytical structures and specialists that
work within these parties and movements. We won’t function without them as well as they without us. And if going in
one direction we’ll finally merge and unite. There will be many obstacles on the part of the government on this way. The
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problem will be to not to lose our ground, to stand all this.
As an opposition politician, are you ready to face not very parliamentarian methods of resistance on the part of Govern-
ment if your group will, for example, take part in the local board elections?
Yes, I am ready. I will probably have to be more careful in my everyday life. But with the aim I’ll be able to solve these is-
sues as well. During the Soviet times I did whatever considered right. All the more now, I do everything in good con-
science. And I am proud of this.
Has the attitude towards you changed since you were introduced opposition politician?
Sure. Those who claim to be government faithful became distinctly separated. Some of my friends I consider smart, re-
sponsible, honest and conscientious people became cautious. On the other hand, I made friends with a lot of new people.
Not long ago the Chamber of Representatives has voted to send your deputy interpellation concerning the government
statement on forming a commission that would monitor the order of the opinion polls to the Council of Ministers. Is it
your first interpellation?
Unfortunately, the first. I’m very sorry I haven’t send an interpellation concerning the regulation on the new order of
trade-union dues. From now on the practice of deputy interpellation will be more often applied and more skillfully.
Why the instrument of deputy interpellation is used so poorly? Does the deputies lack resources or desire?
The desire. You know, just an address is not necessarily answered. As for the deputy interpellation, it is an official docu-
ment to be necessarily answered within 20 days. And according to the law, it can be published in the media.
What was the first reaction to your deputy interpellation and why have you chosen this very field to appeal?
My Chamber of Representatives colleagues were quite reserved – they do understand everything. I am strongly convinced
that, as far as this government regulation is concerned, it is a typical constitutional tort.
Appendixes
Regulation
of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus
 707 of May 31, 2002
n the Opinion Poll Commission
at the National Academy of Sciences
In order to regulate sociological polling on a republic referendum, presidential election of the Republic of Be-
larus, election of the deputies to the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus, polling on social and political
situation in the country and in order to increase scientific reliability and objective appraisal of the polling results
as well as ensure their publishing, Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus DECREES:
1. to form Opinion Poll Commission at the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Belarus.
2. to confirm the enclosed Regulation on the Opinion Poll Commission at the National Academy of Sciences of
the Republic of Belarus.
3. to establish that:
Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus upon presentation of the presidium of the National Academy
of Sciences of the Republic of Belarus designates and dismisses chairman of the Opinion Poll Commission at the
National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Belarus;
financing of the activity of the Commission is carried out of the country exchequer.
4. to the Ministry of Finance:
in the year 2002 to assign to the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Belarus a sum of
39.654.000 rubles out of the assets for other costs of the country exchequer to finance the costs for the formation
and activity of the Opinion Poll Commission at the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Belarus;
since the year 2003 ensure annual financing of the Commission activity.
Prime Minister
of the Republic of Belarus
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CONFIRMED
Regulation of the
Council of Ministers of the
Republic of Belarus
707 of May 31, 2002
REGULATION
n the Opinion Poll Commission
at the National Academy of Sciences
1. Opinion Poll Commission at the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Belarus (hereafter –
Commission) is formed to improve carrying out and publishing procedure of the opinion polls on social and po-
litical situation in the country, on country referenda and election.
2. In order to ensure quality of sociological studies, objective data analysis and validity of the published pre-
dictions, the Commission keeps records of the polling specified in art.1 of the current Statement on polling and, if
there is a necessity, gives evaluation of the scientific reliability of the results.
3. The Commission is formed of 15 leading specialists in the sphere of sociology and of the representatives
from Central Election Committee of the Republic of Belarus, Ministry of Information, Ministry of Justice, and
Belarusian Society of Sociologists. Constitution of the Commission is affirmed by the presidium of the National
Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Belarus upon presentation of the chairman of the Commission according
to recommendations of sociological associations and the governmental bodies listed.
Activity of the Commission is carried out according to the legislation and international agreements of the Re-
public of Belarus.
4. An association carrying public opinion poll on social and political situation in the country, on referenda or
election in the country is to send to the Commission a written notice and commitment to observe during polling the
legislation and the procedure of sociological studies, of processing and analysis of the sociological information.
The commitment should also contain information about the association carrying the opinion poll and its client,
sources of financing the opinion poll, time and conditions of its carrying out. Information requirements are deter-
mined by the Commission.
5. If the opinion poll data is published, the association that carried the opinion poll is to present additional in-
formation into the Commission on the polling subject, methods of information gathering, criteria of respondents
selection, full list of the posed questions with the number of the respondents on each not answered question, cop-
ies of the information quality assurance protocols if quality assurance was carried and also published poll based
material.
6. The Commission has the right to carry comparative analysis of the published opinion poll results and the re-
sults received from the association that carried the opinion poll to check their correspondence as well as legisla-
tion compliance during polling and at publishing its results.
To perform the activity mentioned above, the Commission may on a contractual basis enlist the services of the
corresponding specialists. Both the Commission members and the specialists recruited are to observe statutory
confidentiality of data.
7. If any infringements of the law or data falsification are revealed the Commission has the right to demand the
association that published the opinion poll results to publish more accurate information within two weeks term. In
case of non-compliance with the regulations the Commission publishes the more accurate information in the re-
publican press sui juris.
The persons guilty of violation of law and order while carrying out an opinion poll or publishing polling re-
sults on social and political situation in the country, country referenda or election are liable according to the leg-
islation of the Republic of Belarus.
8. The Commission takes decisions by a simple majority vote. The decisions are registered in the Journals.
Sitting of the Commission is considered legal if not less than two thirds of its members are involved.
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9. Organization expenses and material security of Commission’s activity are effected by the National Acad-
emy of Sciences of the Republic of Belarus on a special expense item out of the republican exchequer assets.
STATEMENT
of the Coordination Council of the Republican Public Association
"Belarusian Think Tanks"
On May 31, 2002 the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus adopted regulation N 707 "n the
Opinion Poll Commission at the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Belarus" that has marked the
end of the last year government initiative to take independent sociological studies under their control. On February
1, 2002 the Coordination Council of the Republican Public Association "Belarusian Think Tanks" delivered a
statement stressing that "the regulation will prejudice not only the scientific association but millions of the Be-
larusians that will deny their right on reliable and timely information". Representatives of the international or-
ganizations showed their concern by stating that "each attempt of the government to take control over independ-
ent public opinion in Belarus will be a significant step backward on the way of creating conditions for efficient
work of the independent media and for transparency of the mechanism of political discussions in this country".
This April the board of the Belarusian public association Sociological Society uniting sociologists of the leading
state institutions sent a letter to the National center of bill activity under the President of the Republic of Belarus
that regarded the bill of the Republic of Belarus "On changes and amendments into the Electoral Code of the Re-
public of Belarus of the order of opinion poll studies and publishing procedure of opinion poll results" as "absurd
attempts to take control over sociological studies and over public opinion polls in particular".
The Belarusian authorities, however, gave "a decent answer to the challenge of the time": not to pass the deci-
sion through the Parliament – for many of the deputies using information of the independent analytical centers
would most likely reject the bill – but in the favorite manner of the government, i.e. as the executive power regu-
lation. The attempt to introduce the decision as " the will of the scientific community " failed and the authorities
had to operate out in the open.
Three provisions of the regulation are to be given special attention. First, higher demands to the requirements.
Concerning not just opinion polls on a referendum or an election (as it was in the bill) but "social and political
situation in the country". In other words, from now on all questions on public attitude to politics – President,
backpays, EU expansion, opposition statements, integration with Russia, etc. – are to be first confirmed by a spe-
cial commission approved by the Council of Ministers. Second, 40 m rubles will be annually provided from the
state budget for the activity of this Commission. And third, "the persons guilty of violation of law and order while
carrying out an opinion poll or publishing polling results … are liable according to the legislation of the Republic
of Belarus". Motives of the government are quite evident – while the institution of the government is losing public
confidence, independent research centers are gaining (according to the last opinion poll, more than 40 percent of
population give them their confidence, less than 25 percent distrust the research centers, almost two thirds says
that "it is necessary to carry out opinion polls and publish their results without any permissions" and only 14.8
percent have an opposite opinion.
Thus, authorities are eager to take total control (at the expense of the very nationals!) over an independent
source of information and analysis that provides the Belarusians as well as the international community with in-
formation on the actual state of affairs in the country.
Authorities seem to treat public opinion based on objective information and professional analysis not as a sup-
port but as a threat to their course.
The Community of independent researchers and analysts enters its protest against the actions of the Belarusian
authorities and claims to continue its mission, i.e. carry professional surveys of the Belarusian society and deliver
survey results to the very society.
Minsk, June 5, 2002
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O U R  A U T H O R S
• Dr. Oleg Manaev – Director of IISEPS, Professor of the Department of Social Communication at
the Belarusian State University. Chairman of Coordinating Board of the Belarusian Association of
Think Tanks. He was one of founders of United Democratic Party of Belarus and Chairman of
Board of Belarusian Soros Foundation
 
• Dr. Alexander Sasnow – Deputy Director of IISEPS, member of the Political Council of the United
Civil Party and President of the "Open Society" Foundation. He was a member of Presidium of the
XII Supreme Soviet and Minister of Labor of the Republic of Belarus.
 
• Vladimir Dorokhov – Head of Center for Documentation of IISEPS and reporter for "Deutche
Welle"
 
• Prof. Stanislav Bogdankevich – IISEPS Advisory Board Chairman, Honorable Chairman of the
United Civic Party
 
• Peter Kozarshewski – Doctor of Political Science, Senior expert and member of Council of the
Center for Social and Economic Research Foundation (CASE, Warsaw)
 
• Valery Frolov – retired Major-General, leader of faction "Republic" of Belarusian Parlament.
